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ABSTRACT
This thesis is about measuring and interpreting banking efficiency in China. It consists 
of three empirical essays that use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) in three novel 
ways to measure inefficiency. The first essay measures cost inefficiency of the 14 
nationwide banks over the period 1997-2006. A rational model of rent-seeking 
behaviour is used to explain part of the cost inefficiency. Cost inefficiency is 
decomposed into X-inefficiency and Rent-seeking inefficiency and the latter is 
interpreted as symptomatic of rational decision making by the Chinese bank manager. 
The efficiency estimates are obtained from a Simar and Wilson (2000a) proposed 
bootstrap method. A second stage regression model explains that the rate of decline of 
the inefficiencies is faster for the joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) than for the 
state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). The second essay, estimates total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth for SOCBs, JSCBs and city commercial banks (CCBs) for 
the period 1997-2007. The method of estimation is the Malmquist bootstrap method. 
This study finds that TFP growth did not improve significantly in the run up to WTO. 
Technical innovation was dominated by the big banks and efficiency gains were 
dominated by the CCBs. The third essay uses a network DEA (NDEA) framework to 
analyse profit efficiency between three profit centres within the bank, namely 
consumer, corporate and Treasury banking. The internal efficiencies of the state wide 
banks are analysed for the period 2007-2009. The study demonstrates the value of the 
NDEA method in aiding the manager to identify areas of inefficiency within the 
internal flow of funds of the bank. The results show Treasury operations have the 
lowest efficiency. This is partly caused by restrictions on the loan-deposit ratio that 
forces the banks to hold lower yielding other earning assets through their Treasury 
operations.
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Motivation 1
Chapter 1 
Introduction and Motivation
“Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must first be overcome.” 
Samuel Johnson
1.1 Introduction
Napoleon Bonaparte (1761-1821) once said ‘Let China sleep. For when she awakes, 
she will shake the world’. The awakening of the Chinese dragon can be traced to the 
reform process initiated by Deng Xiao Ping in 1978. Yet while industrial China 
moved ahead in great leaps and bounds, for long its banking sector lagged behind in 
the reform process. Handicapped by bureaucratic management style and a large 
non-performing loan structure, the approach to banking reform has been cautious and 
piecemeal. In 2010 Chinese banking resembles a modem banking system with a 
harmonised regulatory framework that matches international standards in capital 
adequacy and risk management. The last of the big state-owned commercial banks 
(Agricultural Bank of China) was listed on the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock 
exchanges in July 2010. Whereas profit was a by-product of banking activity in the 
past, particularly for the state-owned banks (SOCBs) which had social and political 
objectives, in current times profit is the central objective of the banking unit.
This thesis examines some aspects of Chinese banking that sheds light on the process 
of evolution from the 1990s to the present. The central theme of this thesis is 
efficiency in Chinese banking. The technology used to measure efficiency is the Data
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Envelopment Analysis familiarly known as DEA. The DEA is a linear programming 
method that maximises*the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs (or the dual 
minimises the ratio of weighted inputs to outputs). While the topic of bank efficiency 
has been well trodden both in China and in overseas research, this thesis develops and 
presents an innovative approach that has hitherto not been applied extensively to 
Chinese banking. This thesis consists of three empirical chapters. The following 
sections outline the main theme of each empirical chapter.
1.2 Cost Efficiency in Chinese Banks
The first chapter uses non-parametric methods to examine cost efficiency in Chinese 
banks. Its contribution is twofold. First the method of estimation uses a bootstrapping 
technology provided by the seminal work of Simar and Wilson (1998) (2000a) 
(2000b) to produce measures of efficiency (or inefficiency) that allows for statistical 
inference1. Second it decomposes cost inefficiency into technical inefficiency and 
allocative inefficiency. Briefly technical inefficiency measures the excess use of 
inputs in producing a vector of outputs relative to the benchmark or alternative the 
under-production of the vector of outputs given a vector of inputs, relative to the 
benchmark. In much of the literature, technical efficiency (or inefficiency = 1 -  
efficiency) has been viewed as X-efficiency (or its inverse, X-inefficiency). This 
empirical chapter follows in this tradition and also interprets allocative inefficiency as 
indicative of rent-seeking. Bureaucratic rent-seeking behaviour is used to explain 
over-staffing in Chinese banks. Overstaffing has declined considerably since 1997 
and is less of a problem in 2007-8. Crude measures of over-staffing can be obtained
1 MATLAB and R codes of the algorithms are available on the respective websites of Simar and 
Wilson.
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by comparing the deposits per employee of the Chinese banks with a sample of banks 
from other countries that can act as a benchmark.
Figure 1.1 below shows the common currency deposits per employee for China’s big 
four banks and the rest (excluding city commercial banks) compared with a sample of 
banks from Hong Kong, Taiwan, UK and Singapore. By 2007 the $ equivalent of 
deposits in other Chinese commercial banks (joint-stock commercial banks plus Bank 
of Communications), matches Hong Kong and is in striking distance of levels 
associated with international benchmarks. However, the big-4 banks of China (Bank 
of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank and 
Agricultural Bank of China) have deposits per employee that is less than half of the 
levels of the other commercial banks in China.
Figure 1.1 Dollar deposits per employee - China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and 
UK
$ D eposits  p e r Em ployee 2007-08
C hina big- C hina Hong Taiwan UK S in g ap o re
4 O th er Kong
S a m p le  o f la rg e  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s
Source: Fitch-Thompson Bankscope
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A model of bureaucratic rent seeking would supplement the conventional utility 
function of the manager consistent with the shareholder from just profits to include 
staffing as an additional argument Let n be profits, w be the given wage rate, p be 
the product price, and L represent staffing levels. The conventional optimisation for 
the firm is described by maximising the manager’s utility function given by the 
implicit function;
Max U = U (x) (1.1)
it =  py-w L  
Subject to y  = /( £ )  (1.2)
/ ' > 0 ; / ' < 0
f^ . = p / '- w = 0  
dL
L' = L(w ,p;y) (1.3)
^ -  = p f’ < 0 dL2
Equation (1.3) describes the profit-labour input function which shows that there is a 
single maximum. The optimising conditions reveal the profit maximising input of 
staffing for a given level of output as described in figure 1.2. However, the 
bureaucratic manager may also have the objective of building up his managerial 
empire or be following political strictures to employ more staff. The utility function of 
the bureaucratic rent-seeking manager is given by;
U = U(it,L) (1.4)
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Optimising 1.4 with respect to the constraints leads to excess staffing as shown by the 
tangency of the bureaucratic rent-seeking manager’s utility function to the locus of 
profit and labour input in figure 1.2. The profit function describes the relationship 
between profit and the factor input. The maximum profit for a given level of output is 
shown at n  and following Williamson (1963) the rent-seeking equilibrium is 
described by LR. The excess staffing is given by LR -  L*.
Figure 1.2 Excess staffing as a rational outcome
I(n, L)
Excess staffing
Profit
maximising rate
L* L*
While it can be argued that bureaucratic rent-seeking behaviour and political 
imperatives led to excess staffing in the past, the dominance of the profit maximising 
framework in Chinese hanks in recent years has led to the decline of rent-seeking 
inefficiency. The chapter on bank efficiency not only attempts to evaluate the relative 
differences between X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency between the SOCBs 
and the JSCBs, it also attempts to model the speed of decline of each over time.
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While rent-seeking on the part of corrupt party officials and financing of publicly 
traded companies has been examined by Fan, Rui and Zhao (2006) and rent-seeking 
gains to individual membership of the Communist Party by Bishop and Liu (2006), to 
my knowledge the concept of rent-seeking as applied to over-staffing in regulated 
industries has not hitherto been examined previously.
13 Bank Productivity
The next piece of empirical work relates to the measurement and determination of 
productivity in Chinese banks. In this chapter (Chapter 6) I borrow concepts from the 
growth accounting literature in the form of total factor productivity (TFP) and growth 
convergence literature (beta-convergence). The contribution of this chapter is 
threefold. First it measures TFP of the Chinese banks for the SOCBs, the joint stock 
commercial banks (JSCBs) and the city commercial banks (CCBs) over the period 
1998-2007 with a view to examining which of the types of banks have grown the 
fastest Second, it uses the concept of conditional p-convergence to evaluate the 
dynamics of TFP controlling for bank specific factors. Third, it uses the Simar and 
Wilson bootstrapping technology to estimate TFP using a non-parametric framework 
and thereby providing the point estimates with a statistical inferential capability. The 
non-parametric method is an extension of the DEA approach to accommodate the 
change in efficiency between two periods which produces an index of growth for 
multiple outputs and inputs known as the Malmquist index2.
2 After the work of Malmquist (1953) and Caves, et al (1982).
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The concept of total factor productivity growth and growth accounting developed 
from the work of Solow (1957). Solow discovered the one-third rule which states that 
a 1 per cent increase in capital per hour of labour brings a one-third increase in real 
GDP per hour of labour. This one-third I used to decompose the growth of real GDP 
per hour of labour into the increase in the capital per hour of labour and technological 
change to the growth of real GDP3. If the production function is of the form;
Y = AF(K ,L)
Fk>Fl > 0  (1.5)
Fkk^Fu  <0
Where Y is real GDP, K is capital and L is labour time in hours and Fl, Fk and Fll, 
Fkk define the conditions for marginal product of labour and capital respectively and 
diminishing marginal productivity of labour and capital. Defining, output per hour of
Y x
labour time is v = — and capital per hour of labour is k = — , then;
L L
y  = af(k) (1.6)
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology;
y  = a + ak (1.7)
The dots over the variables indicates proportional rate of growth. Alternatively, 
growth in GDP is given by;
3 For a textbook exposition see Parkin et al (2005) p.686
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y = i + a £  + ( l-a )Z  (1.8)
Equation 1.8 is the fundamental growth accounting statement which decomposes 
GDP growth into the growth in capital and the growth in labour and the residual A 
is the growth in total factor productivity.
In the context of multiple outputs and inputs the Malmquist index decomposes the 
growth in a firm or micro unit between two periods into the technological change and 
efficiency gain. Technological change represents growth in technical progress 
illustrated by a shift in the frontier of the production function and efficiency gain 
represents a movement towards the frontier on the part of an inefficient firm or micro 
unit Figure 1.3 illustrates in the case of a one output and one input, where y  is the 
output and x is the input; y  -  f { x ) .
Figure 1.3 Technical progress and efficiency gain
y
f(x)
x
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The growth of an inefficient firm represented by the coordinates at A towards any 
point in the space defined by the arrows represents an increase in output growth that 
can be decomposed into technical progress given by a shift in the production function 
and a movement towards the frontier.
The research o f Chapter 6 is to identify those banks that define the frontier in terms of 
being the benchmark and those banks that emulate best practice and make efficiency 
gains by shifting closer to the frontier. The findings of this chapter suggest that the 
SOCBs and some JSCBs have defined the frontier but it is the CCBs that have made 
the greatest strides in efficiency gains.
1.4 Bank Intermediate Outputs and Intermediate Inputs
The DEA technology relates to a single level situation where the efficiency of a unit is 
evaluated against comparable units at a given point in time. In their review of thirty 
years of DEA, Cook and Seiford (2009) describe a multistage model in which 
production passes through different levels. These can be thought of as one of three 
general models.
(1) A static framework where a finite set of sub technologies is connected to form 
a network which enables the analysis of the allocation of intermediate products.
(2) A dynamic network, where there is a sequence of production technologies 
separated in time. In this framework the outputs of one stage become the inputs of 
another stage.
(3) A technological adoption framework which allows for the production on 
different processors (machines). In this case inputs are allocated among the processors 
to allow for the adoption of a specific technology.
Chapter 1 Introduction and Motivation 10
Chapter 7 examines a static parallel network that separates the bank into three profit 
centres, namely Consumer banking, Corporate banking and Treasury operations. 
Overall efficiency is given by the ratio of outputs to inputs (or the dual) but the 
network framework provides insight to the manager as to the internal efficiency of the 
profit centres relative to benchmark banks internal processes. The application of 
network DEA to banking is rare and application of this study is the first in applying 
the parallel network to Chinese banks4.
IS  Structure of the Thesis
The remaining chapters o f the thesis outline the context, methodology and data used 
in the study. Chapter 2 details the development of the modem Chinese banking 
system concentrating on the reform period of the 1990s. Chapter 3 outlines the 
principle methodology used in each of the empirical chapters. This chapter sets out 
the technology of the DEA, Malmquist and Network frameworks and also reviews the 
literature and its application to Chinese banks. While this chapter outlines the 
methodology and the literature, there is some repetition in each of the empirical 
chapters as these were written with the principal aim of publication as scholarly 
papas. Chapter 4 describes the data and the assumptions used in deriving particular 
data used in the analysis. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 are three empirical studies. Chapter 5 
decomposed cost inefficiency into technical and allocative inefficiency. Chapter 6 
used the bootstrap technology to measure TFP growth of the banks and its 
components, technical innovation and efficiency catch-up. Chapter 7 applied a novel
4 Matthews (2010) applies a serial network DEA to one year of Chinese banks data to evaluate the 
relative efficiency of risk management procedures as an intermediate process.
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technology of network DEA to open up the “black box” from the conventional DEA 
estimates. Chapter 8 summarises and concludes.
1.6 Epilogue
After 10 years of experience in the Chinese banking industry, I felt I had a good 
worms-eye view of the workings of the system. My interest in developing a birds-eye 
view was stimulated by my study of the efficiency of Chinese banks as part of my 
dissertation when taking the MSc in International Economics, Banking and Finance at 
Cardiff University. At that time I was aware that there were many studies of Chinese 
banking that showed similar results. Measuring Chinese bank inefficiency had 
become a growth industry among Chinese Masters students and Chinese scholars. 
Over 180 papers have been published in China relating to bank efficiency. However, 
the measurement of bank inefficiency while being an important contribution does not 
explain the conception and evolution of this inefficiency. The existence of large scale 
inefficiency could only be explained by a political economy process. While the 
empirical chapters may not be the only explanation, they represent a beginning.
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Chapter 2
The State of Chinese Banking
“Get the facts first, and then you can distort them as much as you want.” Mark Twain
2.1 Introduction
The ancient Chinese sage Lao Tzu is supposed to have said, 'the journey of a thousand 
leagues begins with the first step'. A well-known Irish saying is 'If you want to get to 
Tipperary, I wouldn't start from here'. Both statements are appropriate to 
understanding the state of Chinese banking. Chinese banks have come a long way 
since the reforms of the last two decades of the 20th century, but it is also clear that in 
terms of global performance that they have much further to go. Similarly, the 
evolutionary journey of Chinese banks is made much more difficult because of the 
legacy of its history. Western banks have typically evolved from a 'free banking' 
tradition to a regulated one. In contrast, Chinese banks have come from the opposite 
direction, from a state-planned system to a regulated market-based system.
This chapter describes the state of the Chinese banking system. It traces its evolution 
from ancient tradition, through the socialist planning stage on to the current stage that 
resembles a modem banking system. The route taken will concentrate on the 
development of the modem Chinese banking system from the beginning of the reform 
period in 1979. The first part describes the evolution of the Chinese banks from 
ancient times to the revolutionary period. The next section describes the development 
of the banking system from the mono-banking system of the central planned economy 
to the current banking system. The third part outlines the main indicators of the
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Chinese economy and the role of the banking system in its development. The fourth 
part examines the structure and performance of Chinese banks. The final part looks at 
very recent developments and the prognosis for the future of Chinese banks.
2.2 Chinese Banking from Ancient Times
Banking in China has an ancient and venerable tradition dating two thousand years. 
The use of paper money was pioneered in China and the earliest known credit 
institution appeared in the 5th century of the Tang dynasty (618-907) (Yang, 1952). 
The equivalent of promissory notes issued by the government, feiqian (flying money) 
redeemable at provincial treasuries existed and paper money, jiaozi (exchange 
medium), was in use in Sichuan province in the early part of the 11th century. A 
sophisticated system of banking that took in deposits, made loans, issued notes, and 
made long distance remittances of money developed during the Song dynasty 
(960-1279) (Tamagna, 1942). However, it was in the period of the Qing dynasty 
(1644-1911), with increased commercialisation of the economy did three distinct 
types of banks develop namely piaohao, qianzhuang and foreign banks (Cheng, 
2003).
The piaohao (ticket store) was a cash remittance system that grew out internal 
transfers of credits by companies that had branches separated by geographical 
location. The difficulty in the secure transference of cash across geographical areas 
led to the development of an internal transfer of credit, which amounted to a cashable 
draft issued by one branch of a company on another branch. According to Cheng 
(2003), the Xiyuecheng Dye Company located in the Pingyao district of Shanxi 
province was the first to develop such a system. The large number of internal
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transactions led to a balancing netting system. The efficiency of the system led to 
many other merchants and traders either developing their own systems or began to use 
the piaohao as a means of remitting funds across the country. Eventually the piaohao 
began to remit government tax revenues, advanced payments to local authorities and 
raise foreign loans for provincial governments. By the late 19th century the piaohao 
had become a government financial agency in everything but name. By the end of the 
19th century there were 32 piaohaos in business with 475 branches spanning all of 
China's eighteen provinces plus Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang and frontier areas.
Independently of the piaohao system a large number of small domestic banks, 
qianzhung, developed during the 18th century. These were highly localised banks that 
conducted money exchange, issuance of cash notes, discounting and trading bills of 
exchange. These domestic banks were strongly suited to the small scale business of 
the local enterprises. Typically the loans were small scale and required no collateral 
and business hours were flexible providing what was often a *24 hour service’.
The two types of banking were specially separated and did not directly face a 
geographical competition. The two institutions frequently cooperated with piaohao 
depositing idle cash in qianzhung. In the early 1890s there were around 10 thousand 
qianzhung in China.
The third type of banking institution was the foreign merchant banks that followed 
their customers to the international trading areas of China. The first of these was an 
Indo-British bank called Oriental Bank, which set up a branch in Hong Kong in 1842 
and an agency branch in Canton in 1854. A number of other Indo-British banks
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followed in rapid succession and in 1865 the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation was established in Hong Kong. The late 19th century saw banks from 
Germany, France, Japan and Russia establish in China. Because of the extra territorial 
rights granted to the foreign concessions, these banks were free of Chinese 
government regulations, which meant that not only had the banks as a group able to 
secure international currency business but they could also operate in China with no 
regulatory incumbency. The international borrowing of the Chinese government to 
meet reparations following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 further enhanced the 
position of the foreign banks.
The division of the banking market between the three types of institution followed a 
keen segmentation. The foreign banks dominated international trade financing; the 
piaohao dominated the domestic remittance business and the qianzhung controlled 
domestic credit. The relative shares capital of the three banking types for 1894 is 
shown in Figure 2.1 below.
Out of a total capital of 220 million yuan, the piaohao had 19%, the qianzhung had 
65% and the foreign banks had 16%. However, the share of deposit liabilities, which 
represented a total of 863 million yuan, was 32%, 35% and 32% respectively (Figure 
2.2). The ratio of capital liabilities to deposit liabilities is an indicator of the 
constraints the qianzhung were working under. The ratio of capital to deposits for the 
qianzhung was 89% reflecting both high cost and high risk associated with 
small-scale banking. Whereas the piaohao, which had a nationwide network could 
exploit economies of scale and given the large amount of government business, a
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relatively lower risk profile, had a ratio of 18%. However, the relatively unregulated 
foreign banks had a ratio of 14%.
Figure 2.1
Capitalisation share
Piaohao 
■  Qianzhung 
□  Foreign
Source Peng (2003)
Figure 2.2
Deposit Funds Share
Source Peng (2003)
□  Piaohao
■  Qianzhung
□  Foreign
One of the reasons for the relative dominance of foreign banks in China was the 
regulation that covered domestic banks. The piaohao and qianzhung were organised a 
single proprietorships or partnerships with unlimited liability. Therefore business
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expansion was constrained by capital availability, whereas foreign banks did not face 
this regulation (typically joint-stock) but were able to compete nationwide on 
international trade business5.
The first modem Chinese bank, the Imperial Bank of China (IBC) was set up in 1897, 
organised on a joint-stock basis. The IBC followed the customs and organising 
principles of the HSBC and hired foreign professionals into senior management. Its 
business was the financing of domestic industry and international trade. An additional 
privilege was the right to print its own currency bank notes in competition with the 
foreign banks. Ironically this turned out to be one of the reasons for its relative decline 
in reputation following the looting of its branches in Beijing and Tianjin during the 
Boxer rebellion and massive counterfeiting that led to a run on the bank in 1903. The 
loss of reputation of the IBC highlighted its relative financial weakness. Recognising 
the value of a stable domestic banking system, the Qing government set in motion a 
series of reforms to encourage the development of domestic banking. In 1903 the 
Daqing Bank was set up as a limited liability company with many of the functions of 
a central bank. It governed the financial business of the state treasury and unified the 
currency circulation with the monopoly issue of Qing currency banknotes.
The establishment of the Daqing Bank was a green light for the creation of a number 
of other banks both from government and private backing. In 1906 the Xincheng 
Bank was established in Shanghai; in 1907 the National Commercial Bank (Zhejiang 
Xingye Yinhang) was established in Hangzhou by the Zhejiang Railroad Company
5 The financing of domestic industry by the foreign banks was limited due to unfamiliarity with 
Chinese business customs, accounting procedures and laws relating to loan security. See Peng (2003)
p.22.
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and in 1908 the Ningbo Commercial and Savings Bank (Siming Yinhang) was set up. 
In 1908 the Bank of Communications was set up by the Ministry of Posts and 
Communications. By 1911 a total of seventeen domestic banks had been set up in 
China. Even during the turbulent years of the interwar period, Chinese banking 
business grew with a total of 266 new banks setting up in the years from 1912 to 
1927.
23  From Socialist Planning to Market Based Banking
The mono-banking system of China began with the creation of the Peoples Republic 
of China in 19496. All banks were nationalized culminating in the creation of the 
Peoples Bank of China (PBOC). Between 1949 and 1978 the PBOC operated as a 
commercial bank and as a central bank. The PBOC behaved less as a financial 
intermediary and more as an instrument of the centrally planned system. Some 
specialist banks existed but these were either agents for budgetary grants from the 
government or business branches of the PBOC. For example the Peoples Construction 
Bank of China, established in 1954, was the cashier of the capital construction finance 
department of the government ministry of finance and the Bank of China (BOC) was 
the international business arm of the PBOC.
Bank lending was administered according to a strict quota system. No adjustment or 
exchange between the various quotas was allowed. Lending was channeled to the 
state owned enterprises (SOE). The purpose of the mono banking system was to 
implement the financial targets of the central economic plan. Bank credits were
6 An extensive review of the Chinese banking system can be found in Shirai (2002), and Allen, Qian 
and Qian (2005a) (2005b)
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created as accounting units independently of deposits or other sources of funds, purely 
to fund net public spending. The fiscal-credit funds planning framework7 is set out in 
equations (2.1) -  (2.3) below.
R + AL = G (2.1)
AL = AD + AC + AB (2.2)
A C = I - W  (2.3)
Equation (2.1) says that planned state expenditure (G) is equal to state budgetary 
revenues (R) and the increase in bank credit (AL). Equation (2.2) sates that the 
increase in bank credit is financed from the increase deposits (AD), the increase 
currency in circulation (AC) and the increase in bank's own capital and other liabilities 
to domestic and international financial institutions (AB). Equation (2.3) states that the 
increase in currency is given by the difference between planned currency injections (7) 
and planned currency withdrawals (W). Nowhere in this system was bank credit 
constrained by reserve requirements or deposit financing. In reality bank credit played 
a junior role in financing state expenditures and it was only since the start of the 
reform period that it began to take on sizeable proportions. Between 1953 and 1978 
the average annual contribution to state funding from bank credit was only 5.6%. In 
1979 this jumped to 15.8%, in 1980 it was 22.4% and in 1991 it was 36%. Even after 
the start of the reform of the banking system in aggregate the state expenditure plans 
were increasingly supported by bank credit.
1 Referred to as the Zhonghe Caizheng Xindai Zijin Pingheng. See Tam (1995)
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In 1979 the monopolistic position of the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) was removed 
with the establishment of three specialized banks in the early 1980s that took over its 
banking business. The Agricultural Bank of China (ABOC) took over the business of 
providing credits to the rural sector, The Bank of China (BOC) took over foreign 
currency transactions, and the China Construction Bank (CCB) took over financing 
the construction sector. The fourth specialized bank, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC) was set up in 1984 that eventually took over the commercial 
business of the PBOC in 1994.
The 1980s saw the setting up of other commercial banks, joint-stock banks, and 
state-owned investment banks. The Commercial Bank Law of 1995 ushered in a 
two-tier banking system. At the apex sits the PBOC and below it the commercial 
banks that are subject to prudential regulations and supervision by the PBOC. Policy 
banks were officially separated from commercial banks, although in reality because of 
a lack of a branch network, the commercial banks continued with policy lending 
(Chen et. al 2005). In reality commercial banks followed the direction of the PBOC in 
its quota lending (Perkins, 1994) and lending rates were kept below shadow prices 
(Perkins, 1988 1994). However, an element of profit retention was introduced into the 
banking system in 1981 with the sole purpose of developing business and rewarding 
employees in the form of bonuses. The Ministry of Finance ruled on what could 
constitute operating costs and an after tax profit retention rate was stated for the 
specialized banks8. Prior to the reform period the banks faced a highly centralized 
method of management with little discretion on personnel and business expansion.
* The practice of dictating the scope of operating costs and continuing to use commercial banks to prop 
up loss-making state and local industries gave bank managers ample room for 'rent-seeking' behaviour.
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Some discretion was allowed in the reform period relating to business expansion and 
hiring but this discretion was tempered by the continued interference by state and 
local governments, which led to the continued support of local and state industries by 
bank credit. Preferential rates of interest for selected industries existed and in 1984 
there were 47 kinds of preferential rates of interest to particular industries with the 
aim of encouraging capital accumulation. In an attempt to control the rapid growth of 
credit, the PBOC introduced credit ceilings and selective quotas for credit.
From 1996 onwards, foreign banks were allowed to open branches across China but 
their business was largely confined to the non-RMB market. As of the end of 2008, 
only 58 foreign bank branches (out of 116) and 27 locally incorporated foreign banks 
were licensed to engage in RMB business, of which only 7 foreign banks were 
approved to offer RMB retail business. Table 2.1 below shows the status of foreign 
banks in China.
Table 2.1 Status of Foreign Banks in China (as of end-2008)
Number of Banks Foreign
banks
Wholly
foreign-funded
banks
Joint-
venture
banks
Wholly
foreign-funded
finance
company
Total
Head offices of locally 
incorporated banks 28 2 2 32
Branches and
subsidiaries of locally 
incorporated banks 157 6 163
Foreign bank branches 116 116
Total 116 185 8 2 311
Source: CBRC annual report (2008)
Limited interest rate deregulation followed. In 2008, the Chinese banking system 
consisted of 5,634 legal entities, including 3 policy banks, 5 state-owned large
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commercial banks (big-5), 12 joint-stock commercial banks, 136 city commercial 
banks, 32 foreign banks and the rest was made of urban and rural credit cooperatives 
and other financial institutions.
Like many economies that have undeveloped financial and capital markets, the 
banking sector in China plays a pivotal role in financial intermediation. Table 2.2 
below shows that the ratio of total bank deposits to GDP has increased from 99.1% in 
1997 to 152% in 2008. The market is absolutely dominated by the five9 state owned 
banks, although their share of the market has been decreasing steadily through gains 
made by the joint-stock banks.
Table 2.2 Chinese Banking Market
Variable 1997 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Deposits * 
to GDP 99.1% 152% 158% 164% 164% 161% 152%
SOCB
Employment
(,000)
1,670.4 1,524.0 1,412.1 1,407.0 1,469.4 1,492.1 1483.3
SOCB Market 
share 
(% assets)
88% 71.4% 57% 56% 55% 53% 51%
ROAASOCB* 0.17% 0.25% 0.61% 0.58% 0.77% 0.90% 1.11%
Cost-Income 
Ratio SOCB* 52.7% 61.9% 45.4% 46.4% 46.1% 42.8% 35.9%
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Annual Accounts, The Banker, China Regulatory 
Banking Corporation website and Annual Reports, Almanac o f China’s Finance and Banking, National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, Author’s calculation, a) all data include foreign currency deposits, * 
weighted average by asset share
Faced with the potential of increased competition from 2007 onwards, the big banks 
have begun the process of restructuring and reducing unit costs. Employment in the 
state-owned banks has declined from a peak number of 1,524 thousand in 2002, return
9 Up until 2004, the CBRC classified the big-4 as the state owned banks which included Bank of 
China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank of 
China. From 2005-2006 the classification of state-owned bank was extended to include the Bank of 
Communications.
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on average assets have shown some improvement (partly as a result of the removal of 
a proportion of non-performing loans (NPLs) from the balance sheet and its 
transference to asset management companies and partly through a greater flexibility in 
setting loan rate margins). Significantly, the major banks have worked to reduce costs 
as shown in the sharp reduction in the weighted average cost-income ratio.
Up until 1995, control of the banking system remained firmly under the government 
and its agencies10. Under state control, the banks in China served the socialist plan of 
directing credits to specific projects dictated by political preference rather than 
commercial imperative. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial institutions were 
allowed to take a stake in selected Chinese banks. While control of individual Chinese 
banks remain out of reach for the foreign institution11, the pressure to reform 
management, consolidate balance sheets, improve risk management and reduce unit 
costs has increased with greater foreign exposure. As of end-2008,4 large commercial 
banks, namely the ICBC, BOC, CCB and BoCom, introduced 9 foreign institutional 
investors; 24 small and medium-sized commercial banks formed partnership with 33 
foreign institutional investors; and 3 rural cooperative financial institutions introduced 
3 foreign institutional investors, altogether taking in foreign equity investment of 
USD32.78 billion. Table 2.3 shows the entry of overseas investors in 2003 -  2008, 
while table 2.4 lists the detailed extent of foreign ownership of individual banks.
Over the period of 2003 to 2008 the number of domestic banks that have had an 
injection of foreign capital has increased from 5 to 31. However, this figure has
10 According to La Porta, et. al (2002), 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under 
the control of the government in 1995.
11 There is a cap of 25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of 20% for any single 
investor, except in the case of joint-venture banks.
Chapter 2 The State of Chinese Banking 24
increased with IPOs and foreign investment increasing through 2008 to the present 
day.
Table 2.3 Entry of Overseas Investors (2003 -  2008)
Unit: Number of )anks, US!DIOOmillion
Items / Year 2003
Cumulative
amount
2004
Current
amount
2005
Current
amount
2006
Current
amount
2007
Current
amount
2008
Current
amount
2008
Cumulative
amount
Number of banks with 
foreign capital 5 6 7 6 5 6 31
Total amount of 
investment 2.6 23.5 116.9 52.2 17.6 115.2 327.8
Total amount of capital 
raised in the listed 
overseas markets
- - 113.9 299.0 42.2 0 455.1
Total amount 2.6 23.5 230.8 351.2 59.8 115.2 782.9
Source: CBRC annual report 2008
Table 2.4 Foreign Bank Ownership Stake
Chinese Bank Foreign Bank (Stake %) AnnouncementDate
Bank of Shanghai HSBC (8%),International Finance Corporation (7%)
December
2001
Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank Citigroup (3.78%)
December
2003
Ping An Bank HSBC (16.78%) December2003
Industrial Bank Hang Seng Bank (12.78%) April 2004
Bank of Communications HSBC (18.60%) June 2004
Jinan City Commercial Bank Commonwealth Bank of Australia (11%) September2004
Xi’an City Commercial Bank
Bank of Nova Scotia (12.5%), 
International Finance Corporation 
(12.5%)
October 2004
Shenzhen Development Bank Newbridge Capital (16.76%) December2004
Bank of Beijing
ING (16.07%),
International Finance Corporation 
(4.04%)
March 2005
Hangzhou City Commercial 
Bank
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
(19.90%),
Asia Development Bank (4.90%)
April 2005
China Construction Bank
Bank of America (8.19%), 
Temasek (5.65%),
Reca Investment Limited (0.34%)
June 2005
Nanchong City Commercial 
Bank
DEG (10%), 
SIDT (3.3%) July 2005
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ICBC
Goldman Sachs (4.9%),
Dresdner Bank Luxembourg S.A.12 
(1.9%),
American Express (0.4%)
August 2005
Bank of China
Royal Bank of Scotland (8.25%), 
Temasek Holdings (4.13%),
UBS (1.33%),
Asia Development Bank (0.20%),
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. 
(0.19%)
August 2005
Tianjin Bohai Bank Standard Figureered (19.99%) September2005
Bank of Nanjing BNP Paribas (12.61%) September2005
Hua Xia Bank Deutsche Bank (9.90%), Sal Oppenheim Jr. (4.08%) October 2005
Tianjin City Commercial Bank Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (19.9%)
November
2005
Bank of Ningbo Overseas-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd (10%) January 2006
United Rural Bank of 
Hangzhou
Rabobank (10%),
International Finance Corporation (5%) July 2006
Shanghai Rural Commercial 
Bank
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group 
Ltd (19.9%) July 2006
China CITIC Bank BBVA (4.83%),Mizuho Corporate Bank (0.17%)
November
2006
Guangdong Development Bank Citigroup (20%), IBM (4.74%)
November
2006
Chongqing City Commercial 
Bank
Dah Sing Bank (17%), 
Carlyle Group (7.99%)
December
2006
Dalian City Commercial Bank Bank of Nova Scotia (20%), International Finance Corporation (5%) January 2007
Qingdao City Commercial Bank Intesa SanPaolo SpA (19.99%), Rothschild Merchant Banking (5%) July 2007
Chengdu City Commercial 
Bank Hong Leong Bank Bhd (19.99%) October 2007
Bank of Yingkou Co Ltd Bumiputra-Commerce Hldg Bhd (19.99%) March 2008
Xiamen City Commercial Bank Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd (19.99%) April 2008
Bank of Jilin Hana Bank (19.7%) July 2008
Changshang Commercial Bank BRED Banque Populaire (20%) August 2008
Source: Thomson One Banker, Company Website, Factiva
2.4 Banking and the Economy
This section deals with role of banking in the economy. Like many developing 
economies where the capital markets are as yet undeveloped, the principal vessel for
12 A wholly-owned subsidiary of Allianz Group
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financial intermediation is the banking system. Table 2.5 below shows the total 
savings of the domestic sector and the flow of funds counterparts. In 2004, nearly half 
of domestic savings is household savings and almost all of this is held in the form of 
bank deposits. Private securities accounted for 20.9% of domestic savings and nearly 
9% accounted for foreign investments including foreign currency deposits.
Table 2.5 Domestic Savings and Flow of Funds
(100 million Yuan, Flow of funds as % Savings in parenthesis)
Item 2000 2004
Savings (Domestic Sector) 34194.44 74450.4
Domestic Currency 1197.16(3.7%) 1722.3 (2.3%)
Domestic Deposits 16424.54 (48.0%) 33761.6(45.3%)
Securities 6149.29(18.0%) 15596.0 (20.9%)
Other Investments 4871.37(14.2%) 1938.6 (2.6%)
Foreign Investments 3178.76 (9.3%) 4547.0 (6.1%)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2003, 2007 by National Bureau o f Statistics China
Table 2.5 gives a snapshot of addition to financial assets from domestic savings. A 
more revealing picture is provided by Figure 2.3, which shows the ratio of aggregate 
banking assets to GDP from 1971 to 2008. The Figure shows that bank assets (credit) 
have been growing faster than GDP throughout this period but there was a shift in the 
trend rate of growth in the latter half of the 1980s. Despite the attempts by the PBOC 
to place constraints on lending, bank credit has grown rapidly and accelerated in 
2002-3. The rapid increase in bank credit relative to GDP indicates the important role 
of the banking sector in the economic development of China.
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The growth of bank credit is reflected in the continued dominance of the banks as the 
main source of financing by the private and public sectors. Figure 2.4 shows the 
percentage break down of the sources of financing. 70% of external financing by the 
borrowing sectors was from the banks in 2004. While equity has increased in recent 
years as an alternative source of financing, the dominant source remains bank loans. 
In this respect China is unique in the economic region. Figure 2.5 shows the relative 
position of China compared with other economies in the region for 2004.
Figure 2.3 Ratio of Banking Assts to GDP (1971 -  2008)
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Figure 2.4 Source of Financing in China
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Figure 2.5 Inter-regional Domestic Financing
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The use of the banks as a tool of socialist planning meant that the state-owned 
enterprise sector was the principal recipient of bank credit, even though they 
contributed less to GDP than other sectors. A recent study by McKinsey (2006) 
decomposed the contribution of the various sectors to GDP in China in 2003 into 
State Owned Enterprise, State dominated shareholding firms, Collective enterprises 
and Private and foreign enterprises. The analysis from McKinsey, shown in Figure 
2.6, reveals that SOEs receive 35% of the loans yet contribute only 23% to GDP. 
Together with the state dominated shareholding enterprises, these two sectors 
contribute 42% of GDP but have 62% of outstanding bank credit, whereas the private 
and foreign sector contributes 53% of GDP but only command 27% of outstanding 
bank credit. The Mckinsey (2006) thesis is also supported by Allen, Qian and Qian 
(2005b), who also argue that the most successful part of the economy is the hybrid 
non-state sector, which is sparsely funded by the banking sector.
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Figure 2.6 Economic Contribution and Bank Financing
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2.5 Structure and Performance
The evolution of Chinese banking from state planning to a market system has been 
gradual in keeping with the step-by-step reform policy initiated by the government. 
Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3 show the evolution of liabilities and assets and provide an 
indicator of the strong role the banking sector plays in the Chinese economy. 
However, this evolution was carried out with only gradual reforms to lending policies 
and the pricing of loans. The reforms to the banking system followed on from the 
setting up of the three-tier system. After the urban cooperatives were transformed into 
commercial banks, some foreign banks were granted licenses to operate under certain 
restricted areas of business. Initially, foreign banks were allowed only to serve foreign 
businesses on foreign currency transactions. Licenses were extended to non-state 
owned commercial banks. There was a gradual movement of removing government 
intervention in credit allocation and some loosening of interest rate controls. 
Importantly, there was a convergence on a common system of accounting although
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international standards of accounting are not as yet uniformly adopted. Appendix 2-1 
gives an up to date chronological list of major financial reforms.
However, the deregulation of interest rates on commercial deposits and on negotiated 
loans began in a piecemeal way from the year 2000 and was originally confined to 
non-RMB business. The strict control of lending rates and credit, particularly to 
state-owned enterprises meant that net interest margins (NIM) were set artificially low 
and did not reflect the risk premium that would be normally expected in economies in 
similar stages of development as China. Figure 2.7 shows that return on average 
assets (ROA) and net interest revenue as a percentage of average assets (Net Interest 
Margin NIM) weighted by assets for the 5 SOCBs have been increasing over the 
period. While NIM and ROA have converged on Western bank levels from below, it 
can be argued that they continue to under price risk in an economy at the current stage 
in development. For example NIM in India is in excess of 3 percent for the same 
period (Shirai, 2002).
Figure 2.7 ROA and NIM of SOCBs (1991-2007)
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Net interest margins look respectable compared with developed economies like the 
UK but do not reflect the implicit risk premium that would be usually associated with 
economies in the stage of development China is in. It is arguable that the SOEs are 
unlikely to be allowed to fail because of the government implicit guarantee which 
under-rights their losses. This creates a strong problem of moral hazard where the 
SOE does not have to improve its performance and the SOCB doesn’t have to demand 
a risk premium because of the implicit government guarantee.
The use of the state-owned banks to underpin credits to the state-owned enterprises 
has resulted in an uncomfortable increase in non-performing loans (NPLs). Accurate 
figures for NPLs in the distant past are unavailable; however official figures emerged 
from January 199813. Figure 2.8 shows the percent ratio of NPLs to total loans 
provided by official sources.
Figure 2.8 NPL Ratio of SOCBs 
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13 Pei and Shirai (2004)
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These estimates have been challenged by a number of studies. Shi Huaqiang (2003) 
estimated the NPL ratio of the SOCBs to 39% in 1999 and 29.2% in 2000. Moody’s 
Investor Service estimated the NPLs of SOCBs to be between 35% and 70% in 1996. 
Recognition of the NPLs problem and the potential it has to destabilize the financial 
system, the government established four Asset Management Companies in 1999 to aid 
the disposal of the NPLs from the big-4 SOCBs14. Prior to this a capital injection of 
RMB 270 million was made in 1998 to the big-4. In 1999 the AMCs transferred RMB
1.4 trillion ($169 billion) from the big-5 onto its books15. However, NPLs continued 
to grow and in 2003-4 a further $45 billion of foreign reserves was injected to the 
BOC and CCB and $15 billion to ICBC in 2005. A credit boom in 2002-3 saw the 
assets of the banking sector grew rapidly which has had the effect of reducing the 
NPL ratio to 7.5% by mid 2006, but in turn has raised doubts about the path of future 
NPLs16. It is also the case that the JSCBs have had a lower NPL ratio, indicating 
either a better starting position or superior management17.
Despite the movement in reforms and the encouragement of market based banking, 
the market structure is highly concentrated and dominated by the big 5 SOCBs. Table
14 Each AMC was exclusively assigned to an individual bank. Cinda was associated with China 
Construction Bank, Great Wall with the Agricultural Bank of China, Oriental with the Bank of China, 
and Huarong with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.
15 Most of the financing of the AMCs was through the issue of 10-year bonds but a sizeable portion is 
estimated to be cash financed by the PBOC (RMB 563 billion) , which has implications for monetary 
control. See Ma and Fung (2002).
16 The furore following the Ernst and Young report that estimated China’s NPLs to be $911 billion 
(40% of GDP) in 2006 is a good example.
17 Estimates of the NPL ratio of the JSCBs in 1997 obtained by annual accounts, web sources and 
bankscope suggest that this was 3% in 1997 and 51% for the SOCBs. In 2006 CBRC estimates put the 
NPL ratio for the JSCBs at 3.1% and SOCBs at 9.5%.
Chapter 2 The State of Chinese Banking 33
2.6 shows the 5-bank concentration ratio and Herfmdal-Hirschman index (HHI)18 
measure for selected years. There has been a modest decline in concentration in the 
very recent years but the dominance of the big 5 is still evident. This dominance is 
however being challenged by the growth of the joint-stock banks and latterly by the 
stronger city commercial banks (CCBs -  see also Chapter 6). By the end of 2008 the 
JSCBs had increased their collective share to 14% of the bank asset market. Figure 
2.9 shows banking sector market shares in 2008.
Table 2.6 Measures of Market Structure
Year 5-bank Concentration HHI
1991 0.91 5420.8
1993 0.91 2268.7
1998 0.87 2027.2
2000 0.84 1904.2
2002 0.78 1720.0
2004 0.79 1596.0
2005 0.54 783.5
2006 0.53 649.7
2007 0.53 708.3
2008 0.51 660.3
Source: Demirgug-Kunt and Levine (2001) and author calculations
'*The U.S. Department of Justice considers a market with a result of less than 1,000 to be a 
competitive marketplace; a result of 1,000-1,800 to be a moderately concentrated marketplace; and a 
result of 1,800 or greater to be a highly concentrated marketplace. As a general rule, mergers that 
increase the HHI by more than 100 points in concentrated markets raise antitrust concerns.
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Figure 2.9
Banking Sector Market Share by Total Assets
(2008 )
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Source: CBRC Annual Report 2008
2.6 Summary and Prognosis
This chapter has summarized the contextual framework in which the Chinese banks 
have operated. Banking in China has a venerable history but modem Chinese banking 
began in the late 19th century in answer to the competition from foreign banks. 
Banking flourished even in the turbulent years of the 1920s and 30s covering the 
Japanese war and the civil war. The use of the banking system as an arm of socialist 
economic planning reduced the banks to an arm of the government service and bank 
managers as civil servants. For 30 years since the establishment of the Peoples 
Republic of China, the banking sector acted as the financial arm of the government.
The reforms of the 1979-88 period focused on the changing the administrative 
structure and operations of the banking system. A two-tiered banking system replaced 
the mono-banking system of the strong planning period. However, the system still 
remained corralled by the central economic plan. In 1985 the banks were given 
greater scope in raising and allocating capital. Further reforms followed in the period
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1988-94, which also saw the development joint-stock banks that operated nationwide. 
The Central Bank Law of 1995 gave the PBOC greater autonomy. A process of 
deregulation followed (see Appendix 2-1) with the aim of improving the efficiency of 
the Chinese banking system and raising its profit capacity. According to Berger et al 
(2005) the tentative opening up of the banking market to foreign competition has had 
positive impacts on performance. The full opening up of the domestic banking market 
to foreign competition scheduled for end-2006 according to the WTO rules can be 
expected to add further competitive pressure on the Chinese banks. The theory of 
market contestability (Baumol, 1982) suggests that incumbent banks will restructure 
weak balance sheets, reduce costs, and improve efficiency in preparation from the 
threat of entry. Chinese banks should exhibit less inefficiency in 2005 than in 1997. 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate this process.
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Appendix 2-1 Significant events of major financial reforms
Year Type Details
1949 Major Banking Reforms The Chinese socialist banking system was established 
following the system in the former Soviet Union
1978 Major Banking Reforms The reform initiatives were undertaken by Deng Ziaoping
1979-1981 Foreign Entry Foreign banks were allowed to open representative offices
1982-1992 Foreign Entry Foreign banks were allowed to open operational branches in 
Special Economic Zones. Later, this geographical 
restriction was extended to most coastal cities. Early 
instances included Hong Kong banks operating in nearby 
Shenzhen.
Early 1980s New bank Entry Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was 
brought in the market in order to finance the industrial 
sector
1985 Scope of Business The restrictions that limit each bank to its own designated 
sector (i.e. industrial commercial) were lifted and banks 
were allowed to expand their scope of business and to 
compete with each other in providing loans and deposit 
services
1986 New bank entry Bank of Communications (BCOM) was re-established
1987 New bank entry Schezhen Development Bank (SDB) and China Merchants 
Bank (CMB) were established.
1988 New bank entry Guangdong Development Bank (GDB) was established
1991 New bank entry/IPOs SDB started to list on Shenzhen stock exchange
1992 Restructuring Guangdong Development Bank (GDB) was converted into 
a shareholding bank.
1994 Foreign Entry The “Regulation Directives of Foreign Financial 
Institutions in People’s Republic of China” were announced 
effective by the State Council, thus became the first 
regulation document regarding foreign financial institutions 
issued by the State Council of China. (This document was 
updated by “Revisions o f ‘Regulation Directives of Foreign 
Financial Institutions in People’s Republic of China’ by the 
State Council” that became effective on February 1,2002 to 
honour the WTO agreement.
1994-1995 Foreign Entry Foreign banks were permitted to operate in 23 cities
1995 Legislation Passed the Commercial Bank Law, PBOC Law, which 
separated commercial banks from policy banks, thus 
establishing a three-tier banking system.
1995 Major Banking Reforms The major state-owned banks were officially termed as 
“commercial banks” next to their respective names and 
were expected to operate on market principles and to 
maximize profit.
1995 Major Banking Reforms The central government began to allow local governments 
to establish local banks.
1995 Privatization Minsheng Bank was established as the first domestic 
private bank
1995 Prudence Capital Adequacy Requirement was applied to all 
commercial bank
1995 Scope of
Business/Prudence
Capital Adequacy Requirement was applied to all 
commercial banks. The government required all banks to 
divest themselves of investment banking affiliat4es and 
prohibited commercial banks from engaging in securities 
trading and underwriting, investment in nonblank financial 
enterprises and productive enterprises, investment tryst 
business under the Commercial Bank Law.
1996 Foreign Entry Foreign banks were allowed to open branches al over
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China.
1996 New Bank Entry China Misheng Banking Corporation (CMBC) was 
established
1996,Jan Integration The Interbank Markets were unified into a national market 
through a computer network system
1996,June Interest Rates Interest Rate was deregulated for Interbank Market—the 
Interbank Offered Rate was decided by the market 
conditions since then
1997,June Interest Rates InterBank Treasury Market was established, and at the 
same time, the repurchasing and trading interest rates of 
treasuries in the InterBank Market were allowed to float 
with market conditions.
1998 Interest Rates The floating range within which financial institutions were 
allowed to set their lending interest rates were raised from 
10% to 20%, while the floating range of lending interest 
rate of rural credit cooperatives were raised from 40% to 
50%.
1998, March Interest Rates The ‘rediscount rate and discount rate mechanism’ was 
reformed to allow these rates to float.
1998, Sept Interest Rates The interest rates of financial bonds issued by policy-banks 
were allowed to float with market conditions.
1998 Liberalization PBC removed the credit plan for both working capital loans 
and fixed investment loans, replacing it with an indicative 
non-binding target, which only serves as a reference for 
commercial banks.
1998 Prudence The loan classification system was reformed by introducing 
an international accepted five-tier classification of loans. 
However, few banks really followed these norms.
1998 Prudence State-owned banks introduced ‘lifetime responsibility 
system’ which penalized bank managers responsible for bad 
loans even after their retirement.
1998 Scope of
Business/Diversification
Major State-owned commercial banks began to provide 
money-managing services, such as foreign exchange 
transactions and personal finance.
1999, Oct Interest Rates Interest rates were allowed to be negotiated for large 
deposits from insurance companies: bilateral negotiations 
were allowed between insurance companies and 
commercial banks for deposits with values more than RMB 
30,000,000 and at least 5 years of deposit commitment.
1999, Sept Interest Rates Public bidding was invited for the interest rate on the 
treasury in the interbank treasure market for the first time.
1999 Interest Rates Lending interest rate for sub-county financial institutions 
were allowed to float within the range of 30%, and 
meanwhile, the allowance of 30% floating range of lending 
interest rate for small businesses were also applied to all 
mid-scale enterprises.
1999 Less Local government 
Intervention
PBOC (central bank) restructured its branches to centralize 
credit allocation decisions from branch level to 
headquarters.
1999, November Bank IPO Shanghai Pudong Development Bank started to list on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange.
2000 Liberalization PBC fully liberalized interest rates on foreign currency, 
loans and interest rats on foreign currency deposits for $3 
million or more.
2000, May Self-discipline China Association of Banks, a national-level 
non-government organization was established to promote 
self-discipline and cooperation in the domestic banking 
sector, also the authority to determine the interest rates on 
deposits of less than $3 million.
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2000, September Interest Rates Interest rates for foreign exchange began its liberalisation 
process in China: firstly, lending interest rates of foreign 
exchange were allowed to float; and meanwhile, the deposit 
Interest rates of foreign exchange were allowed to float: and 
meanwhile the deposit interest rates of large foreign 
exchange deposits of more than £3,000,000 were allowed to 
be set by negotiation between depositors and banks.
2000, December Bank IPO China Minsheng Banking Corporation started to list on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange.
2001 , July Scope of business PBC issued a provisional regulation on commercial bank’ 
intermediate business to promote business innovation, 
improve bank services and competitiveness, and reduce 
financial risks
2001 Prudence Prudential regulations and accounting standards were 
tightened in the face of the increasing challenges from 
globalisation and China's accession to WTO
2002, February Interest Rates Both deposit rates and lending rates were decreased by 
PBOC.
2002, April Bank IPO China Merchants Bank started to list on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange.
2003, March Major Banking Reforms 1st Meeting of the 10th National People's Congress 
approved the establishment of the CBRC
2003, April Major Banking Reforms CBRC was officially inaugurated in Beijing.
2003, May Major Banking Reforms CBRC adopted its banking reform strategy of "grasping 
both ends and facilitating development of the majority", 
prioritizing the reform of state owned banks and the RCCs 
on its work agenda. In the meantime, the reform of other 
institutions was scheduled and promoted together with the 
reform of the priority institutions.
2003, September Bank IPO Hua Xia Bank started to list on Shanghai Stock Exchange.
2003, December Foreign Entry Overseas financial institutions were allowed to participate 
in the reform and restructuring of local banking institutions 
on a commercial and voluntaiy basis.
2004, March Major Banking Reforms CBRC issued “the Guidelines on the Reform and Rules of 
Corporate Governance of Bank of China and China 
Construction Bank” to improve the corporate governance 
structure of state owned commercial banks by 
benchmarking against international best practices.
2004, June Restructuring/New Bank 
Entry
Zheshang Bank was established from the reorganization of 
Zhejiang Commercial Bank following the CBRC’s 
approval.
2004, October Bank IPO China Construction Bank started to list on Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange.
2004, October Interest Rates Both deposit rates and lending rates were increased by 
PBOC.
2004, December Foreign Entry Renminbi business operation of foreign-funded financial 
institutions was expanded to Kunming, Beijing, Xiamen, 
Xi'an and Shenyang.
2005, January Foreign Entry (Hong Kong) CBRC gave approval to the mainland branches of Hong 
Kong SAR banks to conduct insurance brokerage business.
2005, February Major Banking Reforms CBRC, together with PBOC and CSRC, jointly issued “the 
Rules on the Trial Establishment of Fund Management 
Companies by Commercial Banks”, to set up rules for 
establishing pilot fund management companies by 
commercial banks. Mixed operation is the future trend.
2005, May-June Major Securities Reforms The non-tradable shares reform programme began on May 
9 to end the split share structure, one of the major factors 
blamed for the country's sluggish stock market 
performances. Four companies were selected for the first
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round of the experiment, and 42 more were involved in the 
second phase launched on June 20.
2005, July Major Exchange Rate 
Reforms
With approval from the State Council, China will 
implement a regulated, managed floating exchange rate 
system based on market supply and demand and in 
reference to a package of currencies.
2005, December Foreign Entry Renminbi business was opened to foreign-funded financial 
institutions in Shantou and Ningbo and also in Harbin, 
Changchun, Lanzhou, Yinchuan and Nanning, ahead of the 
WTO accession schedule.
2005, December Restructuring CBRC approved the merger between 6 urban commercial 
banks and 7 UCCs within the jurisdiction of Anhui into 
Huishang Bank, which was the first commercial bank in 
China at provincial level.
2005, December New Bank Entry CBRC approved the Tianjin-based Bohai Bank Co. Ltd to 
start its business.
2006 Reserve Ratio The reserve ratio was increased three times in one year to 
solve liquidity.
2006, April Interest Rates Lending rates were increased by PBOC.
2006, April Major Reforms Domestic institutions and citizens were allowed to entrust 
commercial banks to make portfolio investments overseas.
2006, July Bank IPO Bank of China started to list on Shanghai Stock Exchange.
2006, August Interest Rates Both deposit rates and lending rates were increased by 
PBOC.
2006, September Bank IPO China Merchants Bank started to list on Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange.
2006, October Bank IPO ICBC started to list on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange on one day.
2006, November Restructuring/Foreign Bank Citigroup’s consortium successfully closed the agreement 
to acquire an 85.6% stake in Guangdong Development 
Bank. Citigroup owns a 20% stake in GDB, as do China 
Life, State Grid, and CITIC Trust. IBM holds a 4.74% 
stake. Thus, Citigroup was the first foreign bank to have 
significant management influence at domestic bank.
2006, December Foreign Entry 9 foreign banks received the CBRC's approval to convert 
their branches into local incorporations.
2006, December New Bank Entry China Postal Savings Bank was approved to open its 
business, and China Post Group, as the sole shareholder, of 
the new China Postal Savings Bank Co., Ltd.
2007, February Bank IPO Industrial Bank started to list on Shanghai Stock Exchange.
2007, February Scope of Business Chengdu Suburban Credit Cooperatives Union became the 
first authorized credit cooperative to engage in credit assets 
transfer business.
2007, March New Bank Entry Sichuan Yilong Huimin Village Bank, the first village bank 
in China, commenced its business.
2007, March New Bank Entry Sichuan Yilong Rural Lending Company, the first lending 
company in China, commenced its business.
2007, March Interest Rates Both deposit rates and lending rates were increased by 
PBOC.
2007, March New Bank Entry Baixin Rural Mutual Credit Cooperative in Yanjia Village 
of Lishu County, Jilin Province, commenced business as the 
first RMCC in China.
2007, March Foreign Banks CBRC approved four foreign banks, namely Citi Bank, 
HSBC, Standard Figureered Bank and Bank of East Asia to 
be locally incorporated. In such capacity, the four banks 
were permitted to engage in the RMB retail business.
2007, April Bank IPO China Citic Bank started to list on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange.
2007. May Interest Rates Both deposit rates and lending rates were increased by
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PBOC.
2007, May Prudence CBRC formally established the Reference Benchmark for 
Measuring Market Risk of Banking Institutions.
2007, May Bank IPO Bank of Communication started to list on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange.
2007, June Foreign Entry CBRC issued “the Notice on the Issues Relevant to the 
Engagement by Wholly Foreign-funded Banks and 
Joint-venture Banks in Bankcard Business”, which signified 
the permission to wholly foreign-funded banks and joint 
venture banks to conduct bankcard business where they are 
subject to the same licensing criteria as the Chinese banks.
2007, July Bank IPO Bank of Ningbo started to list on Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange.
2007, July Bank IPO Bank of Nanjing started to list on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange.
2007, July Interest Rates Both deposit rates and lending rates were increased by 
PBOC.
2007, August Interest Rates Both deposit rates and lending rates were increased by 
PBOC.
2007, September Bank IPO Bank of Beijing started to list on Shanghai Stock Exchange.
2007, September Interest Rates Both deposit rates and lending rates were increased by 
PBOC.
2007, September Bank IPO China Construction Bank started to list on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange.
2007, December Interest Rates Both deposit rates and lending rates were increased by 
PBOC.
Source: CBRC, PBOC, Factiva
The information for this appendix was updated from Berger et. al (2005)
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Chapter 3 
Bank Efficiency
“There are only two qualities in the world: efficiency and inefficiency; and only two 
sorts of people: the efficient and the inefficient.” George Bernard Shaw
3.1 Introduction
The term efficiency is commonly used in areas of engineering, physics, management, 
computing, accounting, economics and statistics. Dictionaries provide a very loose 
definition of the term (the ratio of the effective or useful output to the total input in 
any system), partly because of its strong contextual application. For the economist the 
term efficiency is a relationship between ends and means. Something is termed 
inefficient if the desired ends could be achieved with less means, or that the means 
employed could produce more of the ends desired19. This approach leads to the 
definition of efficiency in production as an allocation of resources such that no other 
allocation would permit more of one good to be produced without necessarily 
reducing another.
The economic concept of efficiency is operationalised with the use of a 
non-parametric methodology called Data Envelope Analysis (DEA). The technology 
of DEA is based on the seminal work of Farrell (1957) and elaborated later by Banker 
et al (1984) and Fare et al (1985). The purpose of this chapter is to outline the DEA 
methodology and its derivatives the Malmquist productivity measure and network 
DEA which is used in the following three empirical chapters in the examination of the
19 Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics vvww.econlib.org-library
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Chinese banking system. This chapter will also review the application to the banking 
literature in general and the main results for the Chinese banking sector in particular.
The next section sets out the theoretical concepts in a two-dimensional graphical 
framework. Section 3 outlines the mathematical problem in a multi-dimensional 
framework. Section 4 describes how the non-parametric approach can be used to 
examine the growth of productivity in the time dimension. Section 5 describes the 
principles of network DEA. Section 6 reviews the application of DEA in banking 
focusing on China in particular. Section 7 summarizes.
3.2 Efficiency: A two-dimensional description
Farrell (1957) developed the basis of standard efficiency methodology by 
decomposing overall efficiency (OE) of a production unit into two components: 
technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE). Farrell characterized the 
different ways in which a productive unit can be inefficient either by obtaining less 
than the maximum output available from a given set of inputs (technically inefficient) 
or by not purchasing the best package of inputs given their prices and marginal 
productivities (allocatively inefficient). The analysis of efficiency by Farrell (1957) 
can be explained in Figure 3.1:
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Figure 3.1 Overall, Technical and Allocative Efficiency
P
►  X .A ’C'
Assuming constant returns to scale (CRS), the production set is fully described by the 
unit isoquant YY' that captures the minimum combination of inputs per unit of output 
needed to produce a unit of output. In this framework, every combination of inputs 
along the unit isoquant is considered as technically efficient while any point above 
and to the right of it, such as point P, defines a technically inefficient producer since 
the input combination that is being used is more than enough to produce a unit of 
output. Hence, the distance RP along the ray OP measures the technical inefficiency 
of the producer located at point P. Geometrically, the technical inefficiency level 
associated to point P can be expressed by the ratio RP/OP, and therefore; the TE of 
the producer under analysis (1 -RP/OP) would be given by the ratio OR/OP.
If information on factor input prices is known and a particular behavioral objective 
such as cost minimization is assumed in such a way that the input price ratio is 
reflected by the slope of the isocost-line CC’, allocative inefficiency can also be 
derived from the unit isoquant plotted in Figure 3.1. In this case, the relevant distance 
is given by the line segment SR, which in relative terms would be the ratio SR/OR.
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With respect to the least cost combination of inputs given by point R’, the above ratio 
indicates the cost reduction that a producer would be able to reach if it moved from a 
technically but not allocatively efficient input point (R) to a both technically and 
allocatively efficient one (R’). Therefore, the AE at point P is given by the ratio 
OS/OR. Together with the concepts of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, 
Farrell describes a measure of overall efficiency (OE), which is TE multiplied by AE, 
or:
OE =  TE*AE =  (OR/OP) * (OS/OR) = OS/OP
Figure 3.2 illustrates the further decomposition of technical efficiency into measures 
of pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE).
Figure 3.2 Pure technical and scale efficiency
(output)
A (CRS)Y
V’ (VRS)
G
O
Assuming a case of one input, x and one output, y, OA represents a constant returns to 
scale frontier. Therefore, the measure of technical efficiency (TE) of the firm is the 
ratio of GH/GE. For the variable returns to scale frontier, represented by VV’, the
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measure of pure technical efficiency (PTE) can also be obtained as at point E, PTE 
equals to the ratio of GJ/GE. The measure of SE can be derived from the measures of 
TE and PTE. Hence, SE is the ratio of GH/GJ. That means SE equals TE divided by 
PTE. The value of SE is unity when operating under constant returns to scale. Values 
of less than unity reflect scale inefficiency.
The source of scale inefficiency can be attributed to either operating under increasing 
returns to scale or decreasing returns to scale. To examine this, another frontier 
allowing for non-increasing returns to scale is developed, presented by OBCV’. 
Decreasing returns to scale exists if SE is not equal to unity and PTE is equal to 
GH/GE.
There are two broad categories of methods for measuring efficiency. The first 
approach, called data envelopment analysis (DEA), involves solving linear programs 
in which an objective function envelopes the observed data and deriving efficiency 
scores by measuring how far an observation lies from the "envelope" or frontier. This 
approach is a nonparametric approach. The second is parametric approach which 
involves fitting structural models based on explicit behavioural assumptions, that is, 
estimating an economic function (cost or production functions) and deriving 
efficiency score from either the residuals or dummy variables. This is known as 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).
33 Efficiency: A multi-dimensional approach
DEA is a theoretically sound framework for performance analysis that offers many 
advantages over traditional methods such as performance ratios and regression
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analysis. Technically, it represents the set of nonparametric, linear programming 
techniques used to construct empirical production frontiers and evaluate the relative 
efficiency of production units. DEA is particularly effective in handling complex 
processes, where these Decision Making Units (DMUs), use multiple inputs to 
produce multiple outputs.
DEA identifies:
• The efficient frontier, or envelopment surface, consisting of the best practice units;
• Efficiency measures for each DMU that reflect its distance to the frontier;
• An efficient reference set, or peer group, which is a small subset of efficient units 
closest to the unit under evaluation, for each inefficient DMU;
• Efficient targets for each inefficient DMU (projections onto the frontier).
Other important results that can be obtained from DEA analyses include: returns to 
scale, technical inefficiencies and investigation of achievable targets for inefficient 
DMUs etc.
Further important characteristics are:
• DEA can handle multiple input and multiple output models;
• It doesn't require an assumption of a functional form relating inputs to outputs (as in 
regression approaches) (Banker et al, 1984; Al-Faraj et al., 1993; Burley, 1995);
• Inputs and outputs can have very different units without requiring an a priori weight 
(as in index number approaches);
• DMUs are directly compared against a peer or combination of peers;
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The same characteristics that make DEA a powerful tool can also create problems. 
DEA also has the following limitations:
• DEA assumes data to be free of measurement error (Mester, 1996). When the 
integrity of data has been violated, DEA results cannot be interpreted with confidence.
• The efficiency of a DMU estimated by DEA is relative efficiency not absolute 
efficiency. In other words, it can tell you how well you are doing compared to your 
peers but not compared to a theoretical maximum.
• The estimating results are influenced by the homogenous levels of DMUs. The 
higher homogenous of DMUs, the more reliable results of DEA.
• Since DEA is a nonparametric technique, statistical hypothesis tests are difficult;
Sample size should be larger than the product of the number of inputs and outputs 
(Dyson et al., 1988) or at least three times larger than the sum of number of inputs and 
outputs (Stem et al., 1994).
The early development of using linear programming to examine efficiency measures 
was developed by Chames, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) (CCR). The CCR model 
imposes three restrictions on the frontier technology: constant returns to scale, 
convexity of the set of feasible input-output combinations and strong disposability of 
inputs and outputs.
Assume that there are n DMUs to be evaluated. Each DMU consumes varying 
amounts of m different inputs to produce s different outputs. Specifically, DMUj
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consumes amount xy of input / and produces amount y rj  of output r. We assume that 
Xy > 0 ,yn > 0 and further assume that each DMU has at least one positive input and
one positive output value. One of the j  = I, n DMUs (DMUo) is singled out for 
evaluation.
2 X ^ 0
max: = -^-------  (3.1)
XX*7 0 
1-1
-=j s i  =
X > i * »
i«*l
Subject to — — >s ; r  = l, s  (3.2)
i-i
vi • i1—  > s \i  = 1,.....,m
2 ^ ,  i-i
Where s  is a non-Archimedean element smaller than any positive real number. 
DMUo’s maximum efficiency score will be <\ by virtue of the constraints.
The numerator in (3.1) represents a set of desired outputs and the denominator 
represents a collection of resources used to obtain these outputs. The optimal value 
obtained from this ratio satisfies 0 < < 1 and can be interpreted as an
efficiency rating in which -1  represents full efficiency and < 1 means 
inefficiency is present. Furthermore, i s invariant to the units of measure used for 
the input and output variables.
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The formulation in (3.1) and (3.2) makes it easy to relate DEA to the one output to 
one input ratio measures of efficiency utilized in engineering and the natural sciences. 
Indeed, as shown in Chames, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), the model in (3.1) and (3.2) 
generalizes the usual single output to single input efficiency measures used in these 
disciplines in a way that accommodates the case of multiple outputs and multiple 
inputs.
The problem would be computationally intractable if addressed directly. However, the 
theory of fractional programming, developed by Chames and Cooper (1962), makes it 
possible to replace the maximizing problem with an equivalent linear programming 
problem. The transformation can be represents in two versions, which are the 
input-oriented version and the output-oriented version. In what follows below is the 
description taken from Zhou (2003).
33.1 Input Orientated Version
j
maximize: ^ uryrQ
r« l
s m
subject to: “ Z v-X« (3-3)
r -  1 /-I
m
I v (xj0= l
/-I
u r9Vf ^0
Chapter 3 Bank Efficiency 50
The formulation in (3.3) provides contact with economics. This is accomplished by 
interpreting (3.3) so that the objective is to maximize virtual output subject to unit 
virtual input while maintaining the condition that virtual output cannot exceed virtual 
input for any DMU. As noted in Chames et al. (1985), this implies that the conditions 
for Pareto (or Pareto-Koopmans) optimality are fulfilled since further increases in this 
maximal value can be attained only if some of the input values jctj are increased or if 
some of the output values yrj are decreased.
For formulation (3.3) the LP dual problem is 
0* = min0
n
subject to: <0xlQ
7=1
n
07=1
JLj>0
Model (3.5) is sometimes referred to as the “Farrell model”, which is the one used in 
Farrell (1957). This model conforms to the assumption of strong disposability because 
it ignores the presence of non-zero slacks. The efficiency measured by this model is 
referred to as “weak efficiency”.
It is to be noted that the LP dual problem of Model (3.3) also can be solved as:
/ = l,...,m; (3.5)
r = l,
7=1,...,/!
m s
minimize: 0 - s ( £ S ~  + ^ S * )
/- I  r«l
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subject to: £ ^ + S , ‘ = to ,„ i = (3.4)
j-l
n
I V o  ~ Sr ~ J'Vo r —
y-1
Ay,S -,5 ;> 0V /,y ,r
where the S," and S’* are slack variables used to convert the inequalities in (3.4) to
equivalent questions. Here s  >0 is a non-Archimedean element and 9 is 
unrestricted in sign.
Note that any admissible choice of A, provides an upper limit for the outputs and a 
lower limit for the inputs of DMUo and against these limits 0 is tightened with 
A*, s~*, s** > 0 representing optimizing choices associated with minimize 9 - 0 *. The
collection of such solutions then provides an upper bound, which envelops all of the 
observations, and hence, leads to the name Data Envelopment Analysis.
DEA Efficiency (the input-oriented version): The performance of DMUo is fully 
(100%) efficient if and only if (i) 9* = 1 and (ii) all slacks s~* = s** = 0.
Weakly DEA Efficient (the input-oriented version): The performance of DMUo is 
weakly efficient if and only if both (i) 9* = 1 and (ii) s~* * 0 and/or s+r* * 0 for 
some / and r in some alternate optima.
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3.3.2 Output Orientated Version
m
Minimize:  ------
r» l
m
Z v<*«
Subject to:  >1 for j  = \9...,n; (3.6)
Z " ^ 7
r-1
wr,vl > f > 0  for all / and r 
where £ > 0 is the previously defined non-Archimedean element.
Again, the Chames-Cooper (1962) transformation for linear fractional programming 
yields model (3.7) (multiplier model) below, with associated dual problem (3.8) 
(envelopment model), as in the following pair,
m
Minimize: g = ^ViXi0
i-i
m s
Subject to: X v^ v _ Z “^ - °
i - l  r-1
Z«r>'n.= 1
r-1
wr,v, >£T,Vr,/
m s
maximize: 0 + e (£ S ^  + ^ S * )
i - l  r - l
n
subject to: Z  xtj -  xl0 + 5,' = 0
(3.7)
(3.8)
Chapter 3 Bank Efficiency 53
Z V r f e - ^ =,)
>1
kj > 0,/ = 1 ,...,m;r = = 1,...,«
Model (3.8) is calculated in a two-stage progress. First, we calculate </>* by ignoring
m s
the slacks. Then, optimize the slacks ( max ^  S~ + ^  S'*) by fixing (j>*.
i - l  r - l
DMUo is efficient if and only if *^ = 1 and sj* = s** = 0 for all z and r .
DMUo is weakly efficient if -1  and s"* * 0 and (or) s** 0 for some i and 
r  in some alternate optima.
Table 3.1 presents the CCR Model in input- and output-oriented versions, each in the 
form of a pair of dual linear programs.
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Table 3.1 CCRD»EA Model
Envelopment model Multiplier model
Input-oriented
min O - e & S '+'£%'>
i - l  r=1
subject to:
n
Y t^jxy +Si’ =0xio / = l,...,/w;
7-1
n
Y ,xsy<i~s *=y,<>
j-i
* j,s ; ,s ;  > o v / j , r
s
max
r-1
subject to:
5 m
s o
r=l i=l 
w
I > (0=1
i - l
ur,v, >s  >0
Output-oriented
max(<i+£(^sr
i - l  r-1
subject to:
n
Y 'ty u -X io + S ; = 0 i = 
j-1
E V r f e ' 5 * =0 r = l,...,j;
7-1
^  >0,y =!,...,«
m
mmq = Y .vix*
i- l
subject to:
m a 
i - l  r-1
= 1
r-1
Ur , V i >€>0
3 3 3  Banker, Charnes, and Cooper Version
Another version of DEA being used commonly is the Banker, Chames, and Cooper 
(BCC) (1984) model. The primary difference between this model and the CCR model 
is the treatment of returns to scale. The CCR version bases the evaluation on constant 
returns to scale. The BCC version is more flexible and allows variable returns to 
scale.
Minimize: 6 — e
m j
2 X +2 X
i - l r-1
(3.9)
Subject to: 6bci0 -  ^  xy ~
7 - 1
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n
(3.10)
The difference between the CCR model and the BCC model is that the X} is now
restricted to sum to one. This has the effect of removing the constraint in the CCR 
model that DMUs must be scale efficient. Consequently, the BCC model allows 
variable returns to scale and measures only technical efficiency for each DMU. That 
is, for a DMU to be considered as CCR efficient, it must be both scale and technical 
efficient. For a DMU to be considered BCC efficient, it only need be technically 
efficient.
The separate evaluation of returns to scale in the BCC model is more evident in the 
dual to (3.9 -  3.10) which can be written as follows.
s
Maximize: £ u,y,0 -u„ (3.11)
= 1
Subject to: -  ur < -e
— v, <—€
(3.12)
In this model, the u0 indicates the return to scale possibilities:
uQ <0 implies increasing returns to scale;
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u0- 0 means local constant returns to scale; 
u0 >0 shows decreasing returns to scale.
Note that the CCR model previously discussed simultaneously evaluates both 
technical and scale efficiency in the aggregate. The BCC model, however, separates 
the two types of inefficiencies in order to evaluate only technical inefficiencies in the 
envelopment model and scale inefficiencies in the dual to (3.11 -  3.12).
3.4 Productivity
The major drawback of the DEA approach is that the efficiency scores obtained from 
a particular sample at a particular time period are confined to that particular sample in 
that time period and cannot be compared with another sample in a different time 
period. This limitation means that improvements in efficiency and the measurement of 
productivity growth, as well as technical progress cannot be captured by DEA.
The idea of comparing the input of a decision making unit over two periods of time 
(period 1 and period 2) by which the input in period 1 could be decreased holding the 
same level of output in period 2 is the basis of the Malmquist Index . Fare et al. 
(1994) developed a Malmquist productivity measures using the DEA approach based 
on constant returns to scale21. The Malmquist productivity index (M) enables
20 Grosskopf (20 03) provides a brief history of the Malmquist productivity index and discusses the theoretical and empirical 
issues related to the index. For the decomposition o f Malmquist productivity index, see Lovell (2003).
21 Ray and Desli (1997) proposed the decomposition o f the same Malmquist index using a variable returns to scale frontier as 
the benchmark, which may lead to different conclusions concerning the sources o f productivity growth.
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productivity growth to be decomposed into changes in efficiency (catch-up) and to 
changes in technology (innovation).
Calculation of the Malmquist productivity index can follow one of two approaches. 
Caves et al. (1982) and Zhou (2003) employ the technology in period 2 as the 
reference technology. Alternatively, the technology in period 1 (base period) can also 
be used as reference technology. This is the approach taken by Casu et al. (2004), 
Canhoto and Dermine (2003), Wheelock and Wilson (1999) and Fare et al. (1994). 
The difference in the reference technology used affects the magnitude in interpreting 
the index. When the reference technology is based on period 2, then M > 1 implies 
deterioration in productivity over the period under study. Alternatively, when the 
reference technology is based on period 1, then M > 1 implies an improvement in 
productivity. An illustration using the one input one output case is shown in Figure 
3.3 below.
Figure3.3 Mamquist Measure
y
S2 frontier at time 2
Sj frontier at time 1
y i=a
0 Xl
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Points A and B represent observations in periods 1 and 2 respectively. The rays from 
the origin S/ and S2 represent frontiers of production for periods 1 and 2 respectively. 
Relative efficiency is measure in one of two ways. The relative efficiency of 
production at A compared to the frontier Si is d\(y\jc\) = Oa/Ob. But compared with 
the period 2 frontier S2 it is djiyijcfi = Oa/Oc. The relative efficiency of production at 
B compared to the period 2 frontier S2 is djiyiyX.?) = Od/Oe. Compared with the period 
1 frontier Si, the relative efficiency is difojci) ~ Od/Oc. The Malmquist index (M) of 
total factor productivity change is the geometric mean of the two indices based on the 
technology for periods 1 and 2 respectively. In other words:
M  = d,(yx,xx) d2(y„x |) d2(y2,x2) d ,(y2,x2)
(3.13)
An equivalent way of writing (2) is:
M  = dx(y„xx)
d2(y2,x2)
d2(y2,x2) d2(y„xx) 
dx{y2,x2) dx(yx,xx)_
(3.14)
or M  -  ET (3.15)
where
M= the Malmquist productivity index
E = a change in efficiency over the period t and t+1 (the term outside the square 
bracket)
T = a measure of technical progress measured by shifts in the frontier from period 1 
and 2 (the two ratios in the square bracket).
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When the reference technology is based in period 2 as in (3.14), then M  < 1 means 
that there has been a positive total factor productivity change between periods 1 and 
2 .
3.5 Network DEA
Earlier in this chapter I described the traditional DEA method as an approach for 
measuring the relative efficiency of DMUs that have multiple inputs and outputs. In 
the traditional DEA model, performance measurement is based on ‘black box’ process 
(Fare and Grosskopf, 2000). Inputs are transformed into outputs but the 
transformation process is implicit and unknown. Indeed the advantage of DEA is that 
it is structure-free. However, researchers impose some structure when applying DEA 
to specific problems. A common structure is the two-stage DEA22. The two-stage 
method has been applied to numerous cases. For example in the case of a bank, labour 
and equity capital can be used to generate deposits, which in turn is used to generate 
interest earning assets. The first stage is the input of labour and equity to create 
deposits. The deposits can be viewed as an intermediate output which is an 
intermediate input to produce interest bearing assets in the second stage of production. 
Recent expositions can be found in Chen and Zhu (2004), Kao and Hwang (2008) and 
Chen, Liang and Zhu (2009). Figure 3.4 demonstrates the process.
22 For this and other variants see Chames et al (1993)
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Figure 3.4 Network DEA Serial Process
Labour
STAGE 1 —► Deposits — STAGE 2 —» Earning assets
Equity
Adopting the notation of Chen and Zhu (2004) and Kao and Hwang (2008), formally, 
there are n DMUs (/ = 1,2,...w) which use m inputs in the first stage, xi y(/ = 1,2 m)
and D outputs from the first stage, zdJ(d = 1,2,..../)). These D outputs then become
the inputs to the second stage and are called intermediate measures. The outputs from 
the second stage aieyr J(r = 1,2,...-s). The efficiency scores of each stage based on the
CCR model can be expressed as follows;
D
Stage 1 6JX = ^ (3.16)
s
Stage 2 0J2 = (3.17)D
The efficiency score for two-stage process is expressed as;
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s
(3.18)
1-1
The input-oriented model for a given DMUo is given as;
s
Max9n„9„, =-^f
/ -I
S J  Oj'iZl Oj,2< iy j  (3.19)
wd =
From (3.19) it is clear that the two-stage process defined as above has the property 
that;
Howevr, the two-stage DEA model is only one of a family of DEA models that comes 
under the notion of a network DEA framework. Fare and Grosskopf (2000) (1996) 
develop a general formulation of the network DEA which attempts to provide deeper 
structure to the ‘black box’ transformation of the conventional DEA.
Hua and Bian (2008) illustrate the case of a general network model with several 
separate production nodes. Assume that each DMU consists of p  sub-DMUs and each 
sub-DMU (S(=\,2,...p) transforms inputs into outputs, producing Rt types of external 
outputs Y, and O, types of internal outputs Yit. By consuming /, types of external inputs
(3.20)
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Xt and K, types of internal inputs Yqt. The internal inputs Yqt are parts of outputs of 
other sub-DMUs, while internal outputs Yit are parts of internal inputs of other 
sub-DMUs. Figure 3.5 illustrates.
Figure 3.5 Illustration of network Structure of a DMU
Denote X t J =  ( xl , j ix 2 l j y . . j c, t y ),(/ = 1,2, p , j  = 1,2,...w) the external input vector
of the t* sub-DMU of the network DMUj. Let YqlJ = (yitqJj , y 2,q,tj^-yK,q,ij) t i^e 
internal input vector of the t* sub-DMU, Yt J = (yUJiy2t,t t J ) be the external 
output vector of the Xt h  sub-DMU and Yt i j = ,/,>»•— the internal
output vector of the Xt h  sub-DMU.
The external outputs YtJ and the internal outputs Yt i J are produced from the inputs 
X, j and Yq t j . Following Hua and Bian (2008) aggregate efficiency is defined as;
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Where /j, and v, are vectors of multipliers for outputs Yt and Yti of S, ,
respectively; con ut are vectors of multipliers for external inputs X, and internal
inputs Yq l of S ,. By the definition of the aggregate efficiency measure en J abov e,
the performance measure for the t01 sub-DMU of the network DMUj can be 
represented as;
A DMU is said to be efficient if its aggregate score is equal unity. It can be shown 
that the aggregate performance measure en j is a convex combination of all
sub-DMU’s performance measures et J(t - 1,3,..../?).
[Proof]
p p
M  M
M [a)2X 2J+u2Yg2J)
By the definition of the efficiency performance of the sub-DMU above;
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M \Y \J  + Vl l^, j j  j  +  U l^ g , \ , j  | f h X l J  + V 2 ^2 ,i,j
P ? .P. j
< * ° p ^ p j  +  u p ^ q . p j  j  
G)-\X-s j + u-,Y„G).X. , + u.Y„ p q .p .j (ep J
=p\e\j +Pieu + re  p. j
p
Since ^ P ,  =1
/ - i
p
Then en j = Y ip,e,J
[End proof]
This implies that the final efficiency score of the network DMU will be an arithmetic 
weighted average o f the sub-DMUs. The objective is to maximise the aggregate 
efficiency measure of a DMUO ( en 0). Following Chames and Cooper (1962) the 
non-linear programming problem becomes:
Max£n0 =
(3.23)
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Solving (3.23) yields the score and all the input and output weights[//,,vl,co[,ul] . By
using the estimates weights, the efficiency scores of the sub-DMUs of the network 
DMU can be calculated.
3.6 DEA in Banking
Most published studies on bank efficiency have focused on the developed 
economies23. However, some studies of developing and Far Eastern economies have 
emerged in recent years -  they are examined in studies such as those by Rezvanian 
and Mehdian (2002), Hardy and di Patti (2001), Karim (2001), Hashim (2001), 
Edwards (1999), Laevan (1999), Katib and Matthews (1999), Chu and Lim (1998), 
Bhattacharyya et al (1997) and Fukuyama (1995). But the number of the studies 
related to this region is small in comparison. Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey 130 
studies that have employed frontier analysis in 21 countries. Of these studies, only 8 
were of the developing and Asian countries (including 2 in Japan). Studies on US 
financial institutions were the most common, accounting for 66 out of 116 single 
country studies.
A number of studies of Chinese banking efficiency have been published in Chinese 
scholarly journals24 but to date there have been only a few studies that are available 
to non-Chinese readers25. There is no record on DEA application in China in the most 
comprehensive bibliography edited by Gabriel Tavares (2002). However, the DEA
23 Drake and Hall (2003), Cavallo and Rossi (2002), Elyasiani and Rezvanian (2002), Maudos et al 
(2002), Drake (2001), Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) and Molyneux and Forbes (1993)
24 For exa mple Qing and Ou, (2001); Xu, Junmin, and Zhensheng, (2001); Wei and Wang, (2000);
Xue and Yang, (1998) and Zhao (2000) have used non-parametric methods to examine banking 
efficiency.
25 A recent exception is a study using non-parametric methods by Chen et. al. (2005) and parametric 
methods by Fu and Heffeman (2005)
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approach has been applied extensively in China. The earliest literature about 
application of DEA is relevant to the investigation of efficiency in the Chinese 
industrial sector (Wei Quan Ling, 1988), furthermore its application expanded to 
other fields.
The applications of DEA to Chinese banking mainly focus on the evaluation of 
efficiency, the relationship between efficiency, market power, market structure and 
profitability. With the innovation of the Chinese financial sector and the increasing 
competition in the banking system, the study of banking efficiency is put into 
perspective.
Wei Yi and Wang Li (2000) evaluated the technical efficiency for a sample of 12 
banks including four state-owned and eight other commercial banks in 1997. Taking 
the number of full time employees, physical capital and loanable fund as inputs and 
selecting interest income and non-interest income as outputs, they reported an average 
technical efficiency 77.19%. In contrast with the other studies outsides China, they 
discovered the bank’s size is negatively related to technical efficiency. Big banks 
suffer mainly from pure technical inefficiency, while small banks’ inefficiency mainly 
comes from scale inefficiency. With respect to scale efficiency, big technical 
inefficiency banks represent decreasing return to scale, while small technical 
inefficiency banks embody increasing return to scale.
Zhao Xu (2000) used 15 banks as a sample to study the relationship between market 
structure and performance in Chinese banking by using a direct measure of DEA 
efficiency on the basis of analysis of traditional collusion hypothesis (structure
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re-behaviour-performance paradigm ) versus efficient structure hypothesis. Selecting 
the number of full time employees, the deposit interest rate, and the depreciated value 
on physical equipment as inputs, and deposit, loan and profit as outputs, they 
discovered that efficiency is the main determinant of bank profitability, but that 
market concentration and market share is negatively correlated with efficiency.
The most recent study of bank efficiency in China (Chen et al, 2005) looked at
efficiency pre- and post-deregulation examining the relative efficiency of the
stat-owned banks, national joint-stock banks and the regional city commercial banks.
The conclusions of the study that the deregulation programme provided a burst of
efficiency gains that petered out in later years. In common with Zhao (2000), the
paper finds that the SOBs are more efficient than other banks and argues that the
decline in efficiency in recent years was due to domestic and international factors
0(\including the Asian financial crisis and the growth in NPLs .
The use of the Malmquist method of evaluating productivity performance of banks
has also been a growth area of academic enquiry. Berg et al (1992) examined
Norwegian banks 1980-89 and found productivity regress prior to deregulation and
strong productivity gains due to catch-up after deregulation. The Malmquist
decomposition was used by Wheelock and Wilson (1999) to examine bank
productivity in the USA for the period 1984-93. They report a general drop in average
productivity caused by failure to catch-up with outward shifts of the production
26 There are a number of reasons why these arguments are not convincing. The main one being that the 
NPLs are included in the loans used as an output and would therefore show an increase in output of 
perhaps dubious value. The period when NPLs were divested from the SOBs to the Asset Management 
companies would affect the efficiency of the SOBs for the two periods when the transfers occurred. 
However, in the main the SOBs are the benchmark banks and the reduction of the loan book would 
make the other banks look better by moving them closer to the efficiency frontier.
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frontier. Alam (2001) found that the deregulation period resulted in a productivity 
surge in the first half of the 1980s followed by a productivity regress in the second 
half for large US banks. These results were confirmed by Mukheijee et al (2001) who 
also uses panel estimation to explain productivity growth in terms of bank size, 
product-mix and capitalisation.
Other studies of bank productivity using the Malmquist method have been Drake 
(2001) for the UK, Grifell-Tatj eand Lovell (1997) for Spain, Canhoto and Dermine 
(2003) for Portugal, Noulas (1997) for Greece and Isik and Hassan (2003) for Turkey. 
A pan-European study was conducted by Casu et al (2004) who compare parametric 
with the Malmquist method. There finding is that productivity growth in European 
banking has been largely brought about by technological change rather than efficiency 
improvement. Outside Europe, Worthington (1999) finds that Australian Credit 
Unions exhibited strong technological progress after deregulation and Neal (2004) 
found that productivity improvements were mostly shifts in the frontier with the 
majority of banks having negative catch-up over 1995-99.
The productivity of Chinese banking has also been the subject of numerous studies by 
Chinese scholars. Chen (2002), Zhang and Wu (2005) and Tang and Wang (2006) use 
the Malmquist method to examine the productivity trend of Chinese banks over the 
1994-1999, 1999-2003 and 1997-2003 periods respectively. Their basic findings were 
that the large state-owned banks exhibited lower average growth compared with the 
joint stock banks. In general average productivity growth was dominated by catch-up 
rather technical innovation but that there had been a marked improvement in Total
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Factor Productivity (TFP) in the latter years27. In contrast Ni and Wan (2006) found 
strong productivity improvement led by technical improvement rather than catch-up, 
whereas Sun and Fang (2007) pose the question, whether foreign banks have 
stimulated an improvement in Chinese bank productive efficiency? Sun and Fang 
(2007) find that average TFP improved during the period 2001-2004 consistent with 
the hypothesis that the threat of entry has had significant efficiency effects on 
incumbent banks. Appendix 3-1 provides a brief tabulated summary of studies of bank 
productivity using the Malmquist method.
In contrast to the application of DEA and Malmquist in studies of banking efficiency 
and productivity, very little has been produced using network DEA. While some 
applications have emerged in the academic literature , the only known study in 
banking is an unpublished paper by Avkiran and Fukuyma (undated).
3.7 Summary
This chapter has outlined the methodology of the non-parametric approach to 
measuring relative efficiency. As its blue print the chapter has outlined the framework 
set out in the CCR and BCC models and developed further by Zhou (2003). One of 
the problems of the DEA approach is that it is a relative measure that is not time 
transferable. This chapter explains the use of the Malmquist index as a measure of 
productivity that can be used to examine growth in efficiency over time, which also 
decomposes the growth into shifts in the frontier and movements towards the frontier.
27 See also Hou (2006) which uses a two-stage panel estimation to explain productivity but 
inappropriately uses operating expenses as an explanatory variable when it is also an input in the 
construction of the M index.
2* Prieto and Zofio (2007) on OECD countries; Lewis and Sexton (2004) on major league baseball; 
and LOthgreen and Tambour (1999) on pharmacies.
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The application of non-parametric methods for evaluating bank efficiency in China is 
a growing industry in academic circles. Compared to the findings obtained from other 
countries’ DEA application in banking system with that in China, the disagreement 
exists on the importance of scale effects on efficiency as well as the relationship 
between efficiency, market structure and profitability. It is not the purpose of the 
research to replicate these results but to add to the literature by using DEA to provide 
an alternative decomposition of technical efficiency in the form of rational efficiency 
or rent-seeking. It will address the non-stochastic problem associated with DEA by 
using a bootstrap method so that statistical inference is potentially possible.
Finally I have outlined the framework of network DEA which is a relatively recent 
innovation in the DEA literature. Chapter 5,6 and 7 will apply these methodologies in 
analyzing the efficiency and productivity of Chinese banks.
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Appendix 3-1 Summary of Studies on bank productivity
Study Country Period Inputs Outputs Results
Berg et al 
(1992)
Norway 1980-89 Labour
hours,
operational
expenses
deflated by
materials
price index
Short-term 
loans, 
long-term 
loans, deposits 
and loan losses 
treated as 
negative output
Low TFP growth but 
strong catch-up following 
deregulation. Big banks 
had stronger productivity 
growth than smaller banks.
Wheelock 
and Wilson 
(1999)
USA 1984-93 Labour,
physical
capital,
purchased
funds
Four categories 
of loans, 
demand 
deposits
Decline average 
productivity over the 
period. The benchmark 
banks improved technical 
productivity through 
technical innovation but 
average efficiency 
declined.
Alam
(2001)
USA 1980-89 Two
categories of
deposits,
other
purchased
funds,
capital,
labour,
equity.
Securities, 
three categories 
of loans.
Lag in effect between 
regulatory reform and 
growth in productivity. 
Improvements in 
productivity obtained from 
technical innovation rather 
than efficiency gains.
Mukherjee 
et al (2001)
USA 1984-90 Labour, 
physical 
capital, 
equity, two 
categories of 
deposits.
Three
categories of 
loans,
investments,
non-interest
income
Productivity growth of 
large banks was generally 
positive in this period but 
productivity growth 
fluctuated with respect to 
size.
Drake
(2001)
UK 1984-95 Physical
capital,
labour,
(deposits)
Loans, Other
investments,
Non-interest
income,
(deposits)
Uses both intermediation 
and production methods. 
Productivity growth driven 
by technical progress. 
Slower TFP under the 
intermediation approach.
Grifell-Tatje 
and Lovell 
(1997)
Spain 1986-93 Labour,
non-labour
operating
expenses
Loans, Savings
deposits,
demand
deposits (all 
deflated by 
CPI)
Savings bank productivity 
driven by technical 
progress and catch-up. 
Commercial bank 
productivity declined in 
latter half of period.
Canhoto and
Dermine
(2003)
Portugal 1990-95 Labour,
physical
capital
Loans,
deposits,
securities,
interbank
assets/liabilities
Strong technological 
progress following 
deregulation. Catch-up 
weakened as benchmark 
banks grew strongly.
Noulas
(1977)
Greece 1991-92 Labour,
physical
capital,
deposits
Liquid assets, 
loans,
investments
State owned banks 
experienced faster TFP 
than private banks. 
Catch-up was faster in 
private banks. State-owned 
banks experienced stronger 
technical progress
Isik and Turkey 1981-90 Labour, | Short-term Productivity loss 1982-86.
Chapter 3 Bank Efficiency 72
Hassan
(2003)
physical
capital,
deposits
loans, 
long-term 
loans, other 
earning assets, 
non-interest 
income
Productivity growth 
1987-90. Strong catch-up 
in 1987-90 following 
deregulation but low 
technical progress.
Casu et al 
(2004)
Europe 1994-00 Wage
bill/Assets,
deposits,
physical
capital
Loans, other 
earning assets, 
non-interest 
income.
Productivity growth 
supported by technological 
progress rather than 
efficiency gains, except in 
the UK where catch-up was 
stronger.
Worthington
(1999)
Australia 1993-97 Labour,
physical
capital,
non-deposit
liabilities
Demand 
deposits, time 
deposits, three 
categories of 
loans, other 
investments
Technological regress but 
high variability within 
credit unions. Technical 
progress occurred after 
deregulation. Efficiency 
gains due to technical 
efficiency rather than scale 
efficiency.
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Chinese Studies of Bank Productivity
Study Period Inputs Outputs Results
Chen (2002) 1994-99 Physical assets,
operating
expenses
Deposits, loans, 
profit
Technological regress but 
strong catch-up drives TFP. 
JSCB exhibited higher TFP 
variation
Ni and Wan 
(2006)
1998-02 Labour, physical 
assets, branches, 
op expenses
Deposits, loans, op 
revenue
Positive TFP. Joint stock 
banks more productive than 
SOB. Productivity growth 
driven by technical progress.
Tan and Wang 
(2006)
1997-03 Labour, physical 
assets, deposits
Profit, gross 
income
TFP growth negative until 
final year, driven by 
technological regress. 
Efficiency improvements
Hou (2006) 1996-02 Deposits, 
physical assets, 
op. expenses
Interest earnings,
non-interest
earnings
Declining trend in technical 
efficiency. TFP driven by 
technological progress
Zhang and Wu 
(2005)
1999-03 Labour,
non-deposit
funds
Deposits, Profits TFP driven by efficiency 
catch-up. SOCBs driven by 
technical progress
Xu and Zhong 
(2005)
2001-02 Capital, net fixed 
assets, total 
expenses
Deposits, loans, 
profit before tax
Adopted bootstrapping 
method to re-examine the 
efficiency results. Capital, 
fixed assets and deposits 
have significant impact on 
bank efficiency, while fixed 
assets, loans and profits have 
no significant impact.
Zou (2008) 1996-05 Deposits, net 
fixed assets, Op. 
expenses
Investments, loans TFP driven by technical 
progress. Listed banks are 
more efficient than 
non-listed. The latter is 
better than SOB. Ownership 
is the key factor. Bank size is 
positive correlated to 
technical progress and 
efficiency catch-up.
Yan (2008) 1995-04 Op. expenses, 
deposits, number 
of staff
Loans, profits Banking market 
concentration is declining, 
which caused bank 
efficiency improvement. 
Competition level is 
positively correlated with 
efficiency,
Sun and Fang 
(2007)
1996-04 Interest
expenses, other 
expenses, 
operating 
expenses, total 
assets
Interest earnings, 
other earnings, 
profit before tax
From 1996 till 2001, TFP 
was less than 1. Foreign 
banks entry ha no significant 
impact on Chinese banking 
efficiency improvement.
2001-04, TFP, TE is positive 
greater than 1. As China 
joined WTO, foreign entiy 
has limited impact on 
Chinese banking.
Pang (2006) 2000-04 Deposits, net 
fixed assets
Loans, investments TFP improved, driven by 
technical progress. Size 
matters.
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Zhu (2006) 2000-04 Labour, net fixed 
assets, deposits
Operating income, 
net income
The average TE is 0.87. SOB 
less productive than JSCB. 
TFP decreased caused by 
technical regress.
Tan and Wang 
(2006)
1997-03 Labour, next 
fixed assets, 
deposits
Income, profits Declining trend in efficiency. 
TFP driven by frontier shift.
Hou and Wang 
(2006)
1996-02 Deposits, net 
fixed assets, 
operating 
expenses
Interest earnings,
non-interest
earnings
TFP is not driven by 
technical progress.
Ni and Wan 
(2006)
1998-02 Net fixed assets, 
number of 
outlets, labour, 
operating 
expenses
Gross income, 
deposits, loans
Efficiency improved, driven 
by technical progress. 
Ownership matters.
Zhang and Wu 
(2005)
1999-03 Net fixed assets, 
labour, loanable 
funds
Deposits, profits TFP improved. For SOB, 
driven by AE, whilst 
technical progress 
contributed to TFP increase 
in JSCB.
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Chapter 4 
Banking Data
“Errors using inadequate data are much less than those using no data at all.”
Charles Babbage
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data used for analysis in the following 
three chapters. Additionally this chapter will provide some descriptive statistics of the 
key variables used in the analysis. These variables are the key items of the bank’s 
balance sheet and income accounts. Finally, the chapter will present the data sets used 
in each of the empirical chapters to follow.
Clearly the method of data collecting and the veracity of the sources are vital in 
determining the success of research. There are three methods of collecting data. These 
are first, primary data obtained from questionnaire-based information and surveys. 
Second, data obtained from documented or published sources. Third, data obtained 
from experimental exercises. The data used in this research comes from the reported 
balance sheet and income statements of individual banks.
The next section will describe the sample of banks used throughout the thesis and the 
principal sources. The following sections will examine the key variables used in the 
empirical chapters and I will outline the methods and assumptions used to fill the gaps 
in missing or unrecorded data. The final section comments on the distribution of the
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data on factor prices and the methodology of estimation used to soften the potential 
bias that may be associated with mis-measurement of important banking data.
4.2 Sample Size and Sources of Data
The three empirical studies employ annual data from 1997 to 2009 for the five 
state-owned commercial banks (SOCB or big-5), nine joint-stock commercial banks 
(JSCB)29 and 47 city commercial banks (CCB). Chapter 5 uses the big-4 state owned 
banks and 10 joint-stock banks for the period 1997-2006 including the Bank of 
Communications which was re-designated as a SOCB. Chapter 6 extends the data to 
include 2007 and aggregates the SOCBs to include Bank of Communications and also 
combines the national based banks with the city commercial banks (CCBs). The final 
empirical chapter utilises the data of the SOCBs and JSCBs for the period 2007-2009 
but examines the internal working of the financial flows between the Consumer, 
Corporate and Treasury sections of the bank. The full sample consisted of a balanced 
set of data for the national banks and an imbalanced set of data for the CCBs. In total, 
the sample consisted of 370 bank year observations.
As of the year-end of 2007, there were totally 5 SOCBs and 12 JSCBs and 124 CCBs 
in Chinese banking system. The collected data sample size accounts for 100%, 75% 
and 38% of SOCBs, JSCBs and CCBs respectively. The main source of data was 
Fitch/Bankscope, individual annual reports of banks, the Almanac o f China’s Finance 
and Banking (various issues) and governor/chairman’s speeches from web sources. 
The sampled banks are listed below in Table 4.1.
29 The China Regulatory Banking Commission (CBRC) had designated the big-4 banks, BOC, ICBC, 
CCB and ABOC as the state-owned banking sector. Since 2006, the SOCB sector included the Bank of 
Communications.
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Table 4.1 List of banks and sample periodm' zmmsten -  ‘r ^  * "! ' £ * **>< 
State-owned Commercial Banks (SOCB)
1 ICBC Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd.
2 CCB China Construction Bank Corp.
3 ABC Agricultural Bank of China
4 BOC Bank of China Ltd.
5 BoCom Bank of Communications Co. Ltd.
Joint Stock Commercial Banks (JSCB)
6 CMB China Merchants Bank Co.Ltd.
7 CMBC China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd.
8 crrie China CITIC Bank Co.Ltd.
9 SPDB Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co.Ltd.
10 CIB China Industrial Bank Co. Ltd
11 CEB China Eveibright Bank Co.Ltd.
12 HUAXIA Hua Xia Bank Co.Ltd.
13 GDB Guangdong Development Bank Co.Ltd.
14 SDB Shenzhen Development Bank Co.Ltd.
City Commercial Banks (CCB)
15 BEIJING Bank of Beijing
16 SHANGHAI Bank of Shanghai
17 Ping An Ping An Bank/Shenzhen Commercial Bank
18 TIANJIN Tianjin City Commercial Bank/Bank of Tianjin
19 NANJING Nanjing City Commercial Bank/Bank of Nanjing
20 DONGUAN Dongguan City Commercial Bank
21 WUXI Wuxi City Commercial Bank
22 CHONQING Chongqing Commercial Bank
23 XIAMEN Xiamen International Bank
24 NINGBO Ningbo Commercial Bank /Bank of Ningbo
25 XIAN Xi'an City Commercial Bank
26 WUHAN Wuhan Urban(City) Commercial Bank/HanKou Bank
27 QINGDAO Qingdao City Commercial Bank
28 JINAN Jinan City Commercial Bank
29 DALIAN Dalian City Commercial Bank/Bank of Dalian 
Bank of Hangzhou Co Ltd/Hangzhou City Commercial
30 HANGZHOU Bank
31 CHANGSA Changsha City Commercial Bank Co Ltd.
33 SHIJIAZHUANG Shijiazhuang City Commercial Bank
34 SHAOXING Shaoxing City Commercial Bank
35 JINGZHOU Jingzhou City Commercial Bank
Laishang Bank Co Ltd/Laiwu City Commercial Bank Co
36 LAIWU Ltd
37 JIU JIANG Jiujiang City Commercial Bank
38 PANZHIHUA Panzhihua City Commercial Bank
39 DONGYING Dongying City Commercial Bank
40 ZHENGZHOU Commercial Bank of Zhengzhou
41 WEIFANG Weifang City Commercial Bank
43 LINYI Linyi City Commercial Bank Co.Ltd
44 XINXIANG Xinxiang City Commercial Bank
45 LIUZHOU Liuzhou City Commercial Bank
46 HUZHOU Huzhou City Commercial Bank
47 KARAMAY Karamay City Commercial Bank
Sample Period
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2009
1997-2007
1997-2007
1997-2007
1997-2007
1999-2007
1999-2007
1999-2005
1999-2007
1999-2007
2000-2007 
2000-2006
2001-2007 
2001-2007
2001-2007 
2000-2007
2000-2007
2002-2007
2003-2005
2003-2007 
2006-2007
2004-2007
2004-2006
2004-2005
2004-2006
2005-2006 
2005-2006 
2003-2007 
2005-2007 
2005-2007 
2005-2007 
2005-2006
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48 HUANGSHI Huangshi City Commercial Bank 2006-2007
49 XUCHANG Xuchang City Commercial Bank 2006-2007
50 JINING Jining City Commercial Bank 2006-2007
51 CHENGDE Chengde City Commercial Bank 2005-2007
52 HENGYANG Hengyang City Commercial Bank 2006-2007
53 GANZHOU Ganzhou City Commercial Bank 2006-2007
54 GUILIN Guilin City Commercial Bank 2006-2007
55 MIANYANG Mianyang City Commercial Bank 2006-2007
56 JIAOZUO Jiaozuo City Commercial Bank Co Ltd 2006-2007
57 DEYANG Deyang City Commercial Bank 2006-2007
58 MINTAI Zhejiang Mintai Commercial Bank 2006-2007
59 CHOUZHOU Zhejiang Chouzhou Commercial Bank 2006-2007
60 ZHANJIANG Zhanjiang City Commercial Bank Co ltd 2006-2007
61 JIAXING Jiaxing City Commercial Bank Co Ltd 2006-2007
62 TAILONG Zhejiang Tailong Commercial Bank Co Ltd 2006-2007
63 WEIHAI Weihai City Commercial Bank Co Ltd 2006-2007
Source: Bankscope and individual websites
43 Input and Output Selection
The correct definition of the inputs and outputs for banks is not straightforward and 
controversy remains in the literature, giving rise to alternative approaches. Most 
banking studies have tended to adopt either the “intermediation” or the “production” 
approach. The intermediation approach developed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) 
recognises the main function of the bank is to conduct financial intermediation. Under 
the intermediation approach, bank assets measure outputs and liabilities measure 
inputs. The popularity of the intermediation method in large part is to do with the 
availability of balance sheet data of banks. In contrast, the production approach 
recognises that the bank provides intermediation services and payment services to 
depositors. The outputs are loans, savings and account activity as measured by the 
number of transactions processed. It is common to group these transactions according 
to the type, complexity or function, which helps the interpretation of the results 
obtained. The inputs considered are physical inputs such as capital (fixed assets) and
Chapter 4 Banking Data 79
labour. Interest costs and revenue are excluded from this approach since only physical
o n
inputs are needed to perform transactions or provide other types of services .
It can also be argued that deposits are both inputs and outputs depending on its use in 
intermediation services or payments services31 and suggests a weighting mechanism 
similar to the divisia approach of Barnett et al (1984). Demand deposits are used by 
customers to pay bills, standing orders, direct and debits by electronic transfer. The 
transactions incurred through the demand deposit account can be viewed as valid 
output of the bank under the production approach. Whereas time deposits in the 
thinking of Pesek and Saving (1967) represents largely a store of value function that 
reduces the ‘moneyness’ or medium of exchange function. To separate the total of 
borrowed funds of a bank into demand and time accounts would require information 
about the term maturity of deposits. This information is not easily available for banks 
in China and in any case up until very recently deposit interest rates were regulated 
and did not reflect market fundamentals.
In addition to the conventional output vector of banks, non-performing loans (NPLs) 
can be thought of as an undesirable output in the same way as pollution can be 
thought of as a necessary but undesirable output of a manufacturing firm. NPLs are 
by-product of the creation of loans. Bank managers have an expectation of default 
which is covered by provisions and capital adequacy. When defaults rise above the 
level of capital and other non-deposit liabilities, the bank is technically insolvent. 
Implicit guarantees and expected recapitalisation of the Chinese banks by the Chinese 
government enabled the banking system to continue to exist while technically
30 Freixas and Rochet (1997) propose a third approach that recognises the specific activities of banks 
such as risk management and information processing.
31 See for example Goldschmidt (1980)
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insolvent. In the following two empirical chapters the research models NPLs as an 
undesirable output.
In this research, I adopt a variant of the production approach to examine the Chinese 
bank efficiency, and a hybrid between the intermediation and production approaches. 
The variant of the production approach uses net interest income and non-interest 
income as measures of output as a proxy measures for the number of transactions 
produced by the bank32. The variant production approach is used in the analysis of 
productivity in chapter 6. The hybrid intermediation-production approach is used in 
Chapter 5 and uses labour, fixed assets and deposits as inputs. For outputs I use loans, 
other earning assets and non-interest income and also performing loans as output to 
allow for NPLs as a negative output. In chapter 6 the hybrid intermediation- 
production approach uses overhead costs as a proxy measure for labour as a factor 
input. In addition the variant of the production approach is used as one of the models 
and NPLs are treated as an undesirable output. In Chapter 7 I use the profit efficiency 
model of DEA. The input set is interest expenses and operational expenses of each 
profit centre while the output is net interest income and net fee revenue of each profit 
centre.
Table 4.2 and 4.3 provide the mix of input and output and the summary statistics of 
the input and output date for 1997, 2006 and 2007 as a snapshot indicator of the scale 
of the variables used.
32 The two income flows are closer in spirit to the neo classical production function which uses flow 
measures of output produced by stocks of factor inputs.
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Table 4.2 Input and output set
Input Output
Variable Description Variable Description
LAB Number of employees 
FA Fixed assets 
DEP Total deposits 
OHD Overheads
LOANS Stock of loans
PLOAN Performing loans (loans less NPLs)
NPLs Non-Performing loans (bad output)
OEA Stock of other earning assets
Nil Net interest income
FEE Net fee income
DEP Total deposits
PL Price of labour: Personnel costs/LAB 
PK Price of capital: Other operational expenses/FA 
PF Price of fund: Interest payments/DEP
Table 4.3 Input and Output Variables for 1997,2000,2004 and 2007 (million RMB) per bank group
Year BankGroup FA LAB DEP LOANS Nil OEA FEE NPL PLOAN OHDS
SOCB 33778 288059 1596856 1148219 34338 521323 2172 588223 559996 22368
Mean JSCB 1193 3515 52368 31079 2544 29423 135 3764 27314 998
CCB 499 39563 17721 21617 43 2074 15646 962
Std.
Dev.
SOCB
JSCB
19207
612
186360
1620
814482
32216
632539
18454
24965
1489
316913
20135
2940
120
364005
3205
323600
16195
9031
615
1997 CCB 190 5517 4190 1106 33 841 5030 341
SOCB 3422 45447 392001 233746 7548 193925 191 40835 192911 10817
Min. JSCB 356 1186 15939 6255 563 9198 8 101 6154 225
CCB 365 35661 14758 20835 20 1480 12089 721
SOCB 54398 528540 2422305 1987200 65144 1021901 7351 1032549 954651 33277
Max. JSCB 2166 5729 105366 59301 5030 67182 318 10185 54090 2009
CCB 633 43464 20683 22399 66 2669 19203 1203
SOCB 52979 308150 2267541 1421227 45519 923743 2964 453942 967285 27512
Mean JSCB 2698 6428 116867 69143 2746 58408 89 10499 58643 1670
431 25171 12847 12073 15 1754 11093 355
Std.
Dev.
SOCB
JSCB
27834
1136
192900
3216
1225061
55813
735353
29071
22755
1134
566117
29801
3580
73
309776
8053
480935
24040
12480
721
2000 CCB 233 27400 12764 13645 12 1275 11732 299
SOCB 5125 47121 379994 329668 10920 262809 452 60166 269502 6820
Min. JSCB 3393 9636 148407 81554 3382 77030 248 23148 71785 847
CCB 85 5930 3407 2096 0 383 2193 107
SOCB 72615 509572 3572262 2402477 73160 1697294 9219 830999 1571478 38631
Max. JSCB 901 2124 53414 36585 1163 26376 22 1532 28338 2645
CCB 731 88065 41017 44617 33 4333 37850 944
Year BankGroup FA LAB DEP LOANS Nn OEA FEE NPL PLOAN OHDS
SOCB 63192 292686 3448298 2094270 78482 1402844 6205 327340 1766930 42250
Mean JSCB 4282 10190 350848 244739 8282 141265 325 13743 230997 4152
CCB 507 36244 20788 17867 31 1167 19621 412
Std.
Dev.
SOCB
JSCB
24747
1227
177589
3901
1520617
112010
903086
74337
37688
3242
593405
39319
2694
229
351565
11818
667420
76847
14927
1602
2004 CCB 430 52398 27158 26316 32 1206 26275 466
SOCB 19919 54408 1036623 629557 19300 455302 1626 18550 611007 15677
Min. JSCB 2607 6382 148715 121355 4793 77448 157 3778 108657 1307
CCB 30 2422 1404 787 -1 46 1343 24
SOCB 79302 489425 5256157 3040627 117743 1965356 8557 728544 2312083 50385
Max. JSCB 6366 17829 540212 363119 14149 208128 889 41471 353662 6757
CCB 1631 205746 105390 106131 135 4615 102478 2220
SOCB 67524 286712 5237027 2859403 144435 2812504 24609 230295 2629108 73944
Mean JSCB 5068 14876 683500 428102 19556 347084 1874 9590 418512 8227
CCB 354 36359 20246 20143 40 414 19461 374
Std.
Dev.
SOCB
JSCB
23399
2223
146000
6025
2144809
294569
1066789
156797
69128
8072
1271540
148344
10711
1826
331013
4137
977922
157601
30136
3775
2007 CCB 521 62949 31257 37634 71 878 32692 509
SOCB 32199 68083 1894385 1085724 54144 968331 7095 22694 1063030 21518
Min. JSCB 1995 8573 258339 215790 9606 129323 451 4583 203315 1853
CCB 12 2972 613 1390 0 4 609 25
SOCB 91094 447519 7774462 3838922 224465 4459941 34384 817973 3702086 93400
Max. JSCB 8444 28971 1212697 654661 33902 629934 6439 18749 644267 14653
CCB 2788 311615 153324 190882 307 4373 150084 2524
Source: Bankscope and individual bank websites
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4.4 Efforts to Reduce Non-performing Loans
A major issue of the output data is the quality of total loans. The loan data on a bank’s 
balance sheet provide no clue as to its quality in terms of risk characteristics or 
distance to default. With Chinese banks, this is a particularly important issue as 
estimates of non-performing loans have at time put the number at nearly 50% of 
GDP33. Failing to account for the existence of NPLs could bias the efficiency scores 
as SOCBs have the largest share of loan stocks but also have the highest proportion of 
NPLs. Normally there are two approaches to mitigate the impact by NPLs: either use 
the performing loans by netting out NPLs from the total loans or treat NPLs as an 
undesirable output. Both methods have been used in a number of studies.
Park and Weber (2006) consider loans less non-performing loans (NPLs) as well as 
deposits as a valid output of the bank in their study of bank productivity in Korea, 
where NPLs are viewed as an undesirable output. Hua and Bian (2008) demonstrate 
the treatment of undesirable outputs in a network Data Envelope Analysis framework. 
However, one of the problems for the researcher is estimating the size and distribution 
of NPLs for the sample period. Disclosure of NPLs according to international norms 
was not made a regulatory requirement in China until 1999. Researchers such as Ma 
and Fung (2002), Rodman (2005) and Huang (2002) and many others have made 
estimates of the size of the NPLs but typically these are for the sector as a whole or 
for state owned banks as an aggregate. In this chapter I have collected NPL data from 
a mixture of official sources, web and newspaper sources, confidential sources and 
estimates based on reasonable assumptions. Below are the stages showing Chinese 
banks’ efforts to reduce NPLs.
33 See Ma and Fung (2002) and Rodman (2005)
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There are two methods to recognize NPLs: accounting methods vs. problem 
recognition methods. The former approach categorized loans into 4-categories based 
on delinquency days, named “pass”, “overdue less than 2 years”, “overdue more than 
2 years” and “legacy loss loan”. The last three categories were NPLs. In 1998, a new 
5-catagory method was introduced by Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) to Chinese 
banking, which focused on the repayment capacity of borrowers and problem early 
recognition. These are “Pass”, “Special Mention”, “Substandard”, “Doubtful” and 
“Loss”. The latter three are recognized as NPLs. From 2004 onwards, only 5-category 
NPLs have been reported.
Stage 1: Prior to 1993, no NPLs were reported as almost 100% bank lending 
was to State Owned Enterprise (SOEs) based on the central planning 
allocation.
Stage 2: from 1994 to 1998. During this transit period from central planning 
system to market economy, many SOEs lost their market share and 
experienced financial difficulties, therefore defaulted the due obligations. At 
the same time, banking reform started and SOCBs operated more 
independently guided under the Commercial Bank Law. Banks started to look 
at the NPL recognition and reporting. In 1998 almost all SOCBs set up NPL 
resolution departments to manage the NPLs. In 1998 the NPL ratio of SOCBs 
was about 45% by accounting approach (author’s calculation).
Chapter 4 Banking Data 86
Stage 3: from 1999 to 2000, the first wave of NPL transfer to asset 
management companies (AMCs). To sort out the huge amount of legacy NPLs 
on the book of SOCBs, the State set up four asset management companies to 
take the NPLs from the big-4 SOCBs. Totally RMB 1,300 billion NPLs were 
removed from the banks’ balance sheets in 1999 and 2000. The NPL ratio 
therefore decreased to 28% in 2000 (author’s calculation).
Stage 4: from 2001 to 2006, the second wave of NPL transfer from SOCBs 
for overseas Initial Public Offering (IPO) purpose. In 2005, CCB became the 
first SOCB listed in HK stock exchange. Following CCB’s step, BOC and 
ICBC listed in HKSE in 2006. Before IPO, all these three banks had 
transferred and written off large amount of NPLs to AMCs/ State Treasury to 
meet the international standards. In 2004, BOC disposed NPLs of RMB254 
billion and reduced the NPL ratio to 5.12% from 16.28% in the previous year. 
Another SOCB CCB reduced NPL ratio from 15.17% in 2002 to 3.92% in 
2004. The biggest bank in China ICBC switched totalling RMB 176 billion 
loss loans together with RMB70 billion of non-credit risky assets to State 
Treasury for government bonds at the book value in year of 2005. The last 
listed SOCB ABOC was supported by State Treasury to sell RMB816 billion 
NPLs at the book value in 2007.
The Figure 4.1 below shows the NPL ratio from 1998 to 2007 for the SOCBs. The 
NPL ratios of the SOCBs have declined rapidly during this period due to a mixture of 
circumstances. There has indeed been some recovery of NPLs (and write-offs), but 
mostly the NPL ratio has fallen because of the operations of AMC and the rapid
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growth of the loan book over this period (see Rodman 2005). However, the China 
Bank Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has set targets for the NPL ratio and the 
absolute levels of NPLs. Figure 4.2 below shows the evolution of NPLs in total for 
the SOCBs and JSCBs over the sample period.
Figure 4.1 NPL ratio of state owned commercial banks 1997-2007
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Figure 4.2 NPL (RMB billion) SOCBs and JSCBs 1997 -  2007
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4.5 Assumptions for Missing Data
A further problem for the researchers into Chinese banks is that consistent data that 
meets international norms is available only in recent years. As mentioned above, NPL 
data are not available in late 90’s for SOCB, while personnel costs are only disclosed 
by the SOCB ABOC in recent years. To fill in the missing data, a number of working 
assumptions are made as discussed below.
4.5.1 NPLs
For year 1997, NPLs of the big-4 SOCB were not available. Therefore the same NPL 
ratio in 1998 was applied to estimate the NPLs in 1997. In 1999 and 2000, totally 
1294 billion NPLs were transferred to AMCs, with breakdown as below:
Table 4.4 Transference of NPLs from SOCBs to AMCs in 1999 and 2000
BOC RMB267,400 million
CCB RMB273,000 million
ICBC RMB407,700 million
ABOC RMB345,800 million
Total RMB 1293,900 million
The above information was used to derive the NPLs in 1998 by adding NPLs amount 
back to the available NPL figures in 2000 for respective banks. For NPLs of year 
1999, totally RMB350,000 million NPLs were transferred out from banks’ balance 
sheets, accounting for 27% of total NPLs being transferred. Therefore, 27% was 
adopted to estimate the NPLs taken away from big-4 in 1999. The estimated NPLs for 
each big-4 are the NPLs in 1998 plus the NPLs having been transferred.
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A few other banks did not publish NPLs for some years, the average NPL ratio of the 
previous and following year is used to fill in the gap or use the next available year’s 
ratio. These banks are:
CITIC: No NPLs in 1999 and 2000, therefore the average NPL ratio of 1998 and 
2001 is used.
GDB: Missing NPLs in 1997, 98 and 1999, applied NPL ratio in 2000 to estimate.
- BoCom: no data in 1997, 99 and 2000. Used the ratio of 1998 as the ratio for 1997 
and used the average ratio of 1998 an 2001 as the ratio to derive NPLs for 1999 
and 2000.
4.5.2 Estimation of Personnel cost
As mentioned above, personnel costs were unavailable in some years for some banks 
and not available at all for ABOC up until 2007. In most cases the ratio of personnel 
costs to operational expenses in the nearest year were used as an estimate. In the case 
of ABOC the first estimate was obtained by assuming that the non-personnel costs as 
a percentage of operational costs, was similar to BOC which had a similar fixed assets 
profile. The figures were then readjusted to conform to the results of a survey of 
salaries in banks carried out in 2002/3 shown below in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5 Survey of Chinese Bank Salaries
Bank Staff Aver. Wages (Yuan) /year
BOC 140450 35091
ICBC 375781 37005
ABOC 489425 32845
BOC 220999 42969
CCB 310391 45814
BoCom 54408 43393
Citic 11598 79031
CEB 8906 52191
CMBC 6382 55036
SPDB 8817 56800
Huaxia 7007 73860
CMB 17829 93040
GDB 11714 42148
IBC 8050 66357
SDB 6999 45600
Hengfeng 1365 40904
Source: Chinese Banker, ‘Competitive Evaluation o f Chinese Banks' 2003
4.6 Labour
Although the SOCBs have been losing their market share due to fierce competition 
from the JSCBs, the big-5 are still the market giants in terms of assets as discussed in 
the chapter 2. Being state-owned banks, the big-5 have social responsibility to keep a 
large number of staff. Below Figure 4.3 shows the employee allocation in the 
SOCBs and JSCBs. It is clear that SOCBs have more than 90% of the total 
employees. An effort to reduce the total employee by SOCBs has been made in the 
sample period: the allocation ratio dropped to 91% in 2007 from 98% in 1997. The 
Figure 4.4 shows more of the reduction of staff number of SOCBs.
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Figure 4.3 Comparison of employee number in SOCBs and JSCBs
«, 1800 
?  1600 
|  1400 
© 2 1200 
|  H 1000 
|  800
m 600
400 
200 
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
□ SOCB ■ JSB
Source: Banks cope and china Banking Almanac
Among the big-5, only BOC and BoCom continued with recruitment in the sample 
period although at a slow pace, while the other three banks continue the efforts to 
reduce the staff number. As a result, the total employee numbers of ABOC, CCB and 
ICBC dropped by 17%, 26% and 30% respectively in 2007 from the peak.
Figure 4.4 Total employee number of big-5 1997 - 2007
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4.7 Fixed Assets
During the sample period, both SOCBs and JSCBs have seen the monetary value of 
fixed assets nearly double. This may in part be due to the increased expenditure on 
branch expansion and technical renovation on computer system and new office 
buildings. However, it is contradictory to the efforts to reduce employee and “get fit”. 
The Figure 4.5 and 4.6 discloses the growth of fixed assets and the fixed assets per 
capita for SOCBs and JSCBs. It is clearly that the JSCB on average has the higher 
fixed assets per heads but SOCBs are catching up year by year. Especially in recent 
years, BOC and BoCom even exceeds the JSCBs. Considering that JSCBs are the 
late comers in the market. Therefore they should not have the legacy of technology 
problems. JSCBs can be treated as benchmark. In this regard, SOCBs, especially 
ICBC, ABOC and CCB have long way to go to continuing solve the problem of 
over-staffing. Chapter 5 discusses more of this.
Figure 4.5 Growth of fixed assets of SOCBs and JSCBs 1997 ~ 2007
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
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Source: Bankscope
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Figure 4.6 Fixed assets per capita of SOCBs and JSCBs 1997 ~ 2007
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4.8 Deposits and Loans
The CBRC stipulates a strict maximum of loan to deposit ratio of 75%. There is little 
interbank activity in volume terms and no possibility of overseas borrowing. The 
implication is that the trends in deposits and loans match each other. Figure 4.7 shows 
the general trend in deposits and Figure 4.8 shows the trend in loans.
Figure 4.7 Total deposits of SOCBs and JSCBs 1997 ~ 2007
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Figure 4.8 Total loans of SOCBs and JSCBs 1997 ~ 2007
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It is clear from the data that the SOCBs dominate both sides of the balance sheet. 
Deposit growth in the sample is an indication of the rapid growth in the Chinese 
economy and particular that of household asset holdings. The limited savings outlets 
for households in China (bank deposits, the stock market and property being the main 
outlets) means that deposits grow faster than the economy with the increase in the 
average propensity to save in income. Deposits increased by 282% for aggregation of 
JSCBs and SOCBs (2007 to 1997). The growth of the JSCBs is faster than SOCBs. 
SOCBs average growth is 228% vs. JSCBs 1205% starting from a low base. CMB is 
the fastest growing bank in terms of deposit -  52 times larger than its 1997 level.
In the case of JSCBs, no one bank dominates the JSCBs market share. The leading 
JSCB is China Mingsheng Bank, only by 4 per cent to the 2nd best. Figure 4.9 gives a 
share breakdown of deposits in the JSCB sector.
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Figure 4.9 Deposit breakdown of JSCBs in 2007
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A similar breakdown for loans shows that no particular bank in JSCB sector 
dominates, which suggests a strongly competitive environment for loans and deposits 
within the JSCB sector.
Figure 4.10 Loan breakdown of JSCBs in 2007
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4.9 Interest and Non-interest Income Flows
Net interest income has grown at the same pace of the growth in loans over 11 years 
of the sample. While the loan market is still dominated by the SOCBs, the decline in 
market share by the state owned sector is indicative of the aggressive growth of the 
JSCBs. Once again the share of net interest earnings in the JSCB sector mirrors that of 
the loan market as seen in Figure 4.12.
Figure 4.11 Net interest income 1997-2007
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Figure 4.12 Net interest income share among JSCBs in 2007
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Non-interest fees and other off-balance sheet income have been a relatively recent 
development in Chinese banks. In the past, services are almost free charge to 
customers. Given that interest spreads were regulated by the central bank (PBOC), 
free consumer banking was effectively a subsidy to the household sector paid for by 
the government. However, the reforms in recent years have led banks to move 
towards market rates and fees based on direct costs. In this aspect the SOCBs are in 
better position than JSCBs from the position owning large national branch network. 
Many JSCBs only have branch networking in major developed cities. For 
competition, JSCBs attempt to offer free services to customers but has been banned 
by CBRC as “unfair competition”.
Unlike the developed economies, fee incomes are not related to on-balance sheet 
activities. For example, only 3.2% and 4.3% fee income of the China Construction 
Bank CCB was directly from guarantee and loan commitment in 2007 and 2006. The 
sharp increase in fee income in 2007 was largely due to the booming stock market 
where the banks performed as sales agents for mutual fund companies. Agent fee 
incomes accounted for 50% of total fee income for CCB in 2007.
By 2007 non-interest income had grown to an average of 17 percent of total income, 
compared with 3-4% at the beginning of the sample.
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Figure 4.13 Non-interest Income 1997-2007
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4.10 O verheads
Overheads or operational costs are associated with the business volume, personnel 
costs and the financing of fixed assets. SOCBs’ overheads all grew fast. China 
Construction Bank has the biggest increase in overhead: 455% (2007 to 1997).
Figure 4.14 SOCBs overheads 1997 ~ 2007
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Figure 4.15 JSCBs overheads 1997 ~ 2007
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If looking closer at the overheads it can be seen that about 50% of overheads are 
personnel costs (see Figure 4.16). The fast growth of overheads is driven by the 
increasing labor costs. The unit price for a Chinese banker is more and more 
expensive, which adds further impetus for the correction of rent-seeking inefficiency 
in the form of allocative inefficiency
Figure 4.16 Personnel cost to overheads, 2007
Source: Bankscope and individual bank websites
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4.11 Price of Factor Inputs
The price of factor inputs were obtained from actual and estimated figures derived 
from the income account. In the case of the unit price of labour, actual and estimated 
personnel costs were divided by total recorded personnel. The price of fixed assets 
were obtained by dividing other operational expenses (operational expenses less 
personnel costs) by fixed assets. The cost of funds was obtained by dividing interest 
payments by total deposits. The unit price of labour was calibrated to conform with 
the survey of bank salaries carried out in 2002/3.
Table 4.6 shows the summary statistics of price of factor inputs and relative 
dispersion. The relative dispersion suggests that the unweighted distribution of factor 
prices is similar across all three prices. As expected the mean and median indicate left 
skewness for the price of capital maintenance and price of labour (positive skewness), 
but what is surprising is that the cost of funds also exhibits the same pattern. The 
likely cause of this is that some banks offer longer term maturities of deposits with 
higher deposits rates than the median banks. The left skewness in the price of capital 
and labour is due to the unweighted nature of the statistics which give equivalent 
weight to the big-4.
Table 4.6 Summary Statistics Price of Factors
Price of Capital Price of Labour Price of Funds
Mean 0.5478 0.1136 0.0239
Median 0.4764 0.0927 0.0190
Standard Deviation 0.2893 0.0783 0.0129
Coefficient of 
Variation % 52.8 68.9 53.9
Skewness 2.23 1.28 2.58
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The rising cost of personnel in banking mentioned above is shown in Figure 4.17. The 
Figure shows the dramatic rise in banker’s pay over this period which has grown at an 
annual rate in excess of 14 per cent per year.
Figure 4.17 Unit Personnel Cost in Banking 1997-2007
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4.12 Summary
This chapter has described the main data used in the following three chapters. Most of 
the data was obtained from secondary sources and principally from Fitch/Thompson 
Bankscope. Supplementary sources were the Chinese Banking Almanac (various 
issues) and the CBRC website. Additional data for the City Commercial banks was 
obtained from their individual websites. Data on NPLs were obtained from a variety 
of official and unofficial sources supplementing Bankscope. Where data was missing 
or unavailable reasonable working assumptions were employed to fill the gaps.
Chapter 4 Banking Data 102
Chapter 7 uses the basic consolidated balance sheet and income statement data which 
can be obtained from the conventional sources. However, the network DEA requires a 
description of the internal flow of funds of each bank. Data for this was obtained from 
individual bank annual reports. Where data on internal flows were incomplete this 
was obtained through simulation. Chapter 7 explains the details fully.
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Chapter 5
Rent Seeking Versus X-Efficiency: An Interpretation of Inefficiency
in Chinese Banking
“Microeconomic theory focuses on allocative efficiency to the exclusion of other 
types of efficiencies that, are in fact, are much more signigficant.” Harvey Leibenstein
5.1 Introduction
The principal aim of this chapter is to address the question, how efficient is Chinese 
bank management34? The way this will be done is by evaluating the relative efficiency 
of Chinese banks over the period 1997 to 2006. Vickers (1993) argues that there is a 
direct link between the efficiency of an institution and managerial performance and 
explains differing degrees of inefficiency which constitute what Leibenstein (1966) 
calls X-effciency theory. In the Vickers (1993), firm-owner -  firm-manager model, 
manager compensation is related to performance which in turn is a function of 
managerial effort, ability and luck. While the distributions of ability and luck may be 
known, the distribution of effort is not35. Hence it is possible to argue that average 
overall efficiency of the firm is related to managerial effort.
In a recent study of the success of privatizations in the former Soviet Union, Barberis 
et al (1996) survey 452 Russian retail privatizations between 1992 and1993 and pose 
the question, what explains the success of privatization -  incentives or training
34 An earlier version of this chapter was published in the China Finance Review and covered the year 
1997 ~ 2003. Matthews et al (2007).
35 Psychologists typically assume that IQ is normally distributed and it is acceptable to assume that 
luck is also normally distribusted with a mean of zero.
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(human capital)? In the same way, the question which is posed in this chapter is what 
can improve Chinese bank management performance, incentives or training? A safe 
answer is of course both, but which is more important? In this chapter bank efficiency 
is treated as a proxy for bank management efficiency. This chapter presents the results 
in trying to measure and Figure the evolution of relative efficiency in Chinese banks. 
In evaluating the path of inefficiency/efficiency, it will aim to decompose cost 
inefficiency into allocative inefficiency and X-inefficiency in the sense of 
Leibenstein. The main hypothesis is that relative inefficiency should decline as we get 
closer to the date when the banking market opens to foreign competition in China. 
This is known as the efficiency convergence hypothesis. The secondary hypotheses 
are in two parts. The first part is that cost inefficiency can be decomposed into 
X-inefficiency and allocative inefficiency. It will be argued that allocative 
inefficiency is symptomatic of rent-seeking behaviour and is therefore the outcome of 
rational optimizing managers. If it is found rent-seeking inefficiency is larger than 
X-inefficiency then it may be concluded that incentives are more important than 
training. However, if X-inefficiency is larger than rent-seeking inefficiency, then it 
may be argued that training is more important than incentives.
In theory, the Chinese banking market has been open to foreign competition since the 
end of 2006. The strategy of allowing a larger stake holding in the Chinese banking 
system by foreign banks as a means of improving efficiency has a good academic 
pedigree. The link between privatization and efficiency improvement in former 
government owned enterprises is now very much an established finding (Megginson 
and Netter, 2001). The link between privatization of banking and efficiency 
improvement is an emerging research area (see Megginson, 2005 for a survey).
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Given the recent listing of the major state owned banks and the tacit acceptance of 
larger stakes by foreign banks in the smaller commercial banks, it is not surprising 
that bank efficiency in China has become a popular subject of research in recent 
years. A number of studies of Chinese banking efficiency have been published in 
Chinese scholarly journals36 but to date there have been only a few studies that are 
available to non-Chinese readers37.
While the gradualist economic reform policies of Deng Xiao Ping have transformed 
management practice and corporate efficiency in the manufacturing sector, it can be 
argued that the mindset of the corporatist thinking in management continues in much 
of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, including its banks.
Cost inefficiency relative to 'best practice' is usually blamed on bad management and 
poor motivation. As already mentioned in terms of Leibenstein (1966) this efficiency 
gap is termed 'X-inefficiency'. However, in the context of an economy that has only 
recently begun to open its banking sector, this chapter argues that a significant cause 
of bank inefficiency is ‘rent seeking’ behavior, rather than X-inefficiency.
This research has three objectives. First it aims to decompose the measure of Cost 
inefficiency in Chinese banks into Technical inefficiency (sometimes viewed as 
X-inefficiency), and Rent-seeking inefficiency. This chapter argues that while the
36 For example Qing and Ou, (2001); Xu, Junmin, and Zhensheng, (2001); Wei and Wang, (2000); Xue and Yang, (1998) and 
Zhao (2000) have used non-parametric methods while Liu and Song (2004), Zhang, Gu and Di (2005), Sun (2005) and Qian 
(2003) have used parametric methods.
Recent exceptions are studies using non-parametric methods by Chen et. al. (2005) and parametric methods by Fu and 
HefTeman (2005). Other recent studies in English are, Lin and Zhang (2008), Berger et. al. (2008) and Fu and Heffemen (2008).
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underutilization of factors is consistent with the notion of X-inefficiency, the wrong 
factor-mix is indicative of 'rent-seeking'. The decomposition of cost inefficiency into 
X-inefficiency (technical inefficiency) and rent-seeking inefficiency allows us to 
examine their evolution over the sample period. Second, this chapter aims to provide 
an inferential capability to the point-estimates of inefficiency through the use of 
bootstrapping methods. Third, the bootstrap estimates of inefficiency are used to test 
various hypotheses regarding the levels and trends in X-inefficiency and rent-seeking 
inefficiency. The threat of entry of foreign banks into the Chinese market should lead 
to improved management, which should result in improved technical efficiency and 
lower cost-inefficiency as incumbent banks attempt to cut costs and consolidate their 
balance sheets.
This chapter is organized on the following lines. The next section briefly describes the 
methodology of the non-parametric method of estimating bank efficiency and the 
application of bootstrapping technology. Section 3 reviews the literature and discusses 
the concept of X-inefficiency and the implications for its measurement in the context 
of banking. Section 4 and 5 discusses the data and the results. Section 6 concludes.
5.2 Background and Methodology
Up until 1995, control of the banking system remained firmly under the government 
and its agencies39. Under state control, the banks in China served the socialist plan of 
directing credits to specific projects dictated by political preference rather than 
commercial imperative. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial institutions were
38 A detailed examination is in Chapter 3
39 According to La Porta, ct. al (2002), 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under the control of the 
government in 1995.
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allowed to take a stake in selected Chinese banks. While control of individual Chinese 
banks remain out of reach for the foreign institution40, the pressure to reform 
management, consolidate balance sheets, improve risk management and reduce unit 
costs has increased with greater foreign exposure. The theory of market contestability 
(Baumol, 1982) suggests that incumbent banks will restructure weak balance sheets, 
reduce costs, and improve efficiency in preparation for the threat of entry. Chinese 
banks should exhibit less inefficiency, whichever way measured, in 2006 than in 
1997.
The basis of the non-parametric method of Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) is the 
extension by Chames et al. (1978) (CCR) 41 of the single input-output model of 
Farrell (1957) to a multiple input-output generalisation. Technical efficiency (TE) is 
measured as the ratio of projected output (on the efficient frontier) to actual input 
used. There are a number of papers that describe the methodology of DEA as applied 
to banking42, and therefore will not be elaborated here. Chapter 3 provides an 
overview of the basic methodology. A two-input single-output illustration will aid the 
understanding of the decomposition of cost inefficiency into its technical 
(X-inefficiency) and rent-seeking components.
Figure 5.1 shows an isoquant qq producing a given output with factor inputs xj and X2 
and isocost ww, which traces the ratio of factor prices. The efficient cost minimising 
position is shown at e where ww is tangential to qq. However, employing a factor
40 There is a cap o f  25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum o f 20% for any single foreign investor, except in the 
case ofjoint-venture banks.
41 Chames et al. (1978) popularised the DEA method. According to Tavares (2002) who produces a bibliography of DEA 
(1978*2001), there are 3203 DEA authors whose studies cover a wide range o f fields. Banxia.com also compiles DEA chapters 
from 1978 to the present.
42 The most recent being Drake (2004)
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combination shown by point c, which is to the right of the isoquant qq indicates that 
the firm is technically inefficient. Efficiency is decomposed into technical efficiency 
(TE) and allocative efficiency (AE).
Figure 5.1 Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency
w
O
w
Technical efficiency is measured by the ratio Oa/Oc (Technical inefficiency is given 
by ac/Oc). The cost to the firm is shown by w V " which is parallel to ww and passes 
through point c. Cost efficiency (CE) is measured by Ob/Oc and Ob/Oa gives AE .
DEA constructs a non-parametric frontier of the best practices amongst the 
decision-making units (DMUs). An efficiency score for each DMU is measured in 
relation to this frontier. DEA is relatively insensitive to model specification (input or
43 It can be seen from this decomposition that under the assumption o f constant returns to scale that AE -  CE/TE.
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output orientation) and functional form44, however the results are sensitive to the 
choice of inputs and outputs. The weakness of the DEA approach is that it assumes 
data are free from measurement errors. Furthermore, since efficiency is measured in a 
relative way, its analysis is confined to the sample used. This means that an efficient 
DMU found in the analysis cannot be compared in a straightforward way with other 
DMUs outside of the sample.
One of the criticisms levelled at the DEA approach is that it produces estimates of 
efficiency that are not open to statistical inference. In other words if a DMU has a 
score of 0.95, in what statistical sense is it 5% inefficient relative to the benchmark? 
Without the capability for statistical inference, non-parametric methods would be 
weak alternatives to parametric methods of estimating efficiency. However, 
uncertainties also exist in the estimation of efficiency using DEA. The most obvious 
uncertainty is what comes from measurement error. Measurement error in the context 
of data on Chinese banks is particularly marked. There are three potential sources of 
error: firstly differences between local bank's accounting procedures and those of 
international bodies; secondly differences between local bank's accounting 
conventions and thirdly, researcher assumptions relating to the generation of missing 
observations. Other uncertainties arise from the estimation of the efficiency frontier; 
changes to the inputs and/or outputs can cause large differences in the resulting 
scores. Furthermore there may be errors in the sampling variation caused by the 
difficulty in obtaining a sufficiently large and consistent sampling frame.
44 Hab abou (2002) and Avkiran (1999) provide a relatively thorough discussion o f the merits and limits of the DEA.
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The bootstrap procedure for non-parametric frontier models is set out in Simar and 
Wilson (1998, 2000a, 2000b). The efficiency scores calculated with the original data 
are used to construct pseudo data. The bootstrap procedure is based on the idea that 
there exists a Data Generating Process (DGP), which can be determined by Monte 
Carlo simulation. By using the estimated distribution of the DGP to generate a large
A
number of random samples, a set of pseudo estimates of the efficiency scores 0t are
obtained. However this 'naive1 bootstrap yields inconsistent estimates (Simar and 
Wilson, 2000a). The author followed the homogeneous bootstrap procedure that
A
produces consistent values of 0, from a kernel density estimate as given in Simar
and Wilson (2000b). Following the Simar-Wilson method, 1000 bootstrap values of 
the individual DMU for all types of efficiency scores are generated in each year45. 
The appendix 5-1 to this chapter provides a description of the algorithm.
5.3 X-Efficiency and Literature Review
Most studies of banking efficiency have focussed on the developed economies46. 
While there have been some studies of other Far Eastern economies47, the number is 
small in comparison. Indeed, from Berger and Humphrey's (1997) survey of 130 
studies of frontier analysis in 21 countries, only 8  were about developing and Asian 
countries (including 2 in Japan). Studies on US financial institutions were the most 
common, accounting for 6 6  out of 116 single country studies.
45 Recent bootstrapping applications to DEA have been conducted by LOthgren and Tambour (1999); in the case of banking 
efficiency by Casu and Molyneux (2003); and in the case o f Chinese rural credit cooperatives, Dong and Featherstone (2004).
46 See for example Drake and Hall (2003), Cavallo and Rossi (2002), Elyasiani and Rezvanian (2002), Maudos et al. (2002), 
Drake (2001) Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) and Molyneux and Forbes (1993)
47See Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002), Hardy and di Patti (2001), Karim (2001), Laevan (1999), Katib and Matthews (1999), 
Chu and Lim (1998), Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) and Fukuyama (1995)
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A number of efficiency studies of Chinese banks have emerged in recent years, using 
both DEA and stochastic frontier analysis48. The consensus of finding from the DEA 
studies is threefold. First, because of the continued banking reform programme 
technical inefficiency has been declining over time. Second, average bank efficiency 
is lower in the state owned banks (BIG-4s) than in the joint stock banks. Third, the 
gap between the two has been narrowing in recent years.
Studies of bank efficiency have used the terms technical efficiency and X-efficiency 
interchangeably as if they were the same thing. While similar in concept they are not 
necessarily the same. The concept of technical efficiency derives its basis in the 
neo-classical theory of the firm and assumes profit maximising behaviour. A firm or a 
bank may be technically inefficient for technical reasons such as low training or low 
human capital levels of managers and workers, or the use of inferior or out-of-date 
technology. The diffusion of new technology is not instantaneous and some firms or 
banks may lag behind others in the acquisition and utilisation of new technology. 
With further training and updating of capital, the firm or bank can expect to move 
towards the efficient frontier described by the isoquant in Figure 5.1. X-inefficiency is 
not caused by the variability of skills or the time variability of technology diffusion 
but by the use and organisation of such skills and technology.
Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) argue that X-inefficiency constitutes 20% or more 
of bank costs. Poor motivation and weak pressure resulting in under utilization of 
factors of production, is part of what Leibenstein (1975) describes as ‘organisational
48 In addition to the studies cited in chapter 3, other studies by Chinese scholars that have used non-parametric techniques 
include Xu, Junmin and Zhensheng (2001), Zhang and Li (2001), Fang et. al. (2004). Studies using parametric methods include 
Zhang, Gu and Di (2005), Chen C and Song W (2004), Liu and Liu (2004), Sun (2005), Qian (2003), Chi, Sun and Lu (2005), 
Yao, Feng and Jiang (2004)
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entropy*. X-inefficiency arises as a result of low pressure for performance. Some 
institutions would be protected by government regulation that would reduce the 
external pressure of competition. But even with a higher degree of pressure from the 
environment, firms may have organisational deficiencies so that management signals 
and incentives are lost in the hierarchy of the organisation.
An alternative interpretation of X-inefficiency is ‘rent seeking’ in the sense of 
Buchanan (1980) and Tullock (1967, 1980). Rent seeking in its basic form is the 
appropriation of surplus in the process of production or exchange without any real 
contribution to the process of either. Where there are government regulations on 
enterprise, barriers to entry and other anti-competitive rules, officials have the 
opportunity to extract rents through the mechanism of bribery and corruption. 
Therefore the term rent seeking has been generally associated with extortion, bribery 
and corruption. It is certainly the case that corruption is seen to be endemic in the 
financial sector in China. Recent high profile cases are Wang Xue Bing, former 
Governor of Construction Bank of China, jailed for 12 years -  bribes of RMB 1.2 
million and Vice-Chairman of BOC under a suspended death sentence for embezzling 
RMB 14.5 million.
However, a hidden but much more pervasive type of rent seeking is the extraction of 
larger budgets for bureaucracies and what results in the non-pecuniary rewards to 
workers in government owned enterprises49. The prestige of the senior bureaucrats 
is enhanced if the size of the workforce is expanded to be larger than necessary to
49 See Tullock (196 7) or McKenzie and Tulloch (1975) Chapter 17.
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meet production targets. Similarly, offices are more grandiose, holidays are longer, 
and benefits are greater and so on.
Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) suggest that the existence of X-inefficiency in 
production is the outcome of a rational decision making process that represents 
on-the-job compensation to managers. Whereas X-inefficiency is viewed by 
Leibenstein (1966, 1978) as non-maximising behaviour, Stigler (1976) argues that its 
existence is symptomatic of firms maximising their individual utility functions. Given 
a production function, a given set of inputs and factor prices, the bureaucrat 
minimises costs subject to a Williamson (1963) type utility function that includes in 
its arguments the level of output and a subset of factor inputs50.
For purposes of presentation, assume that the bank produces a single earnings asset 
(A). In reality this will consist of a combination of commercial loans, mortgages, 
government bonds, short-term bills, etc. Assume that this earning asset is produced by 
the inputs, deposits (Z)), labour (L) and fixed capital assets (K) 51.
A = Da(l/’K'-fiY °  (1)
The price of inputs are, the cost of deposits (r), the cost of labour (w) and the cost of 
fixed assets (p). The bank manager/bureaucrat has a utility function that includes an
50 In the case of Williamson (1963) the utility function of the manager includes reported profit and 
expenditure on staff.
51 This uses the assumption of the intermediation approach that recognises that the outputs are the 
interest earning assets while deposits and borrowed funds are included with capital labour as inputs. 
See Sealey and Lindley (1977).
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output objective and as well as an employment objective given by rent-seeking 
preferences.
U = U(A,L) = \xiA + \xiL (2)
The objective of the manager/bureaucrat is to minimise costs subject to his utility.
Min pK + wL + rD -A (a\nD  + ( l-a )p ln L  + ( l-a )( l- /3 ) \n K  + \n L ~ u )  (3)
The first order conditions are:
cfk _ r Xa _ o 
~dD~r ~ ~ D ~
a _ „ ,  4 i - a ) / M _ 0 (4)
dL L w
—  = a  InZ> + (l + (1 -  a)/?)ln L + ((1 -  «)(1 -  /?))ln K -  U = 0 
dX
The FOC show that an allocative inefficiency is created that result in higher factor 
inputs of labour above that implied by the optimal factor mix. If the optimal labour 
input in a non-rent seeking environment is denoted as L*, and the rent-seeking labour 
input is denoted as Lr. Then it can be shown that:
a
II
 ^
1 ( l-a ) /?  + 0 a + /? (l-a )
U* J (1 - a ) p  J
In Figure 5.1, point e defines the optimal factor mix given the observed factor prices, 
but point'a ' while allocatively inefficient is the optimal position for the rent-seeking 
manager. A bank can organise its input factors to be on its production frontier but by
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using the wrong factor mix. Rent seeking in monopolistic public utilities involves 
over-staffing, 'elaborate offices and a lot of trips to important conferences' or 
'expensive subsidised restaurants' (McKenzie and Tullock, 1975). The wrong factor 
mix in the case of the Chinese banking sector can be interpreted as excess staffing52. 
The management of the banks may reduce technical inefficiency (X-inefficiency as it 
has been sometimes interpreted) by moving the cost frontier from w"w" to w'w', but 
would still remain cost inefficient as shown by the gap ab/Oa. The gap between the 
minimum cost optimal factor mix and the technically efficient minimum cost 
associated with the efficient production frontier with the sub-optimal factor mix (or 
allocative inefficiency) can be interpreted as the inefficiency associated with 'rent 
seeking'53.
5.4 Data and Results
This study employs annual data (1997-2006) for 14 banks; the four state-owned banks 
(Big-4), and ten joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB including Bank of 
Communications which was latterly designated as a SOCB). Data for one of the 
joint-stock banks was unavailable for 2004 - 2006 (China Everbright); and in those 
years 13 banks data was used. The total sample consisted of 137 bank year 
observations. The main source of the data was Fitch/Bankscope, individual annual 
reports of banks and the Almanac o f China’s Finance and Banking (various issues). 
See also Chapter 4. The choice of banks was based on the fact that they face a 
common market and compete nationwide.
52 In the case o f pre-reform China, the bureaucratic bank manager would have been instructed to employ a quota o f graduates 
from the central bank sponsored universities, and schools as well as retirees from the Peoples Army Officer Corps.
53 Cra in and Zardkoohi (1980) suggest that X-inefftciency and rent seeking co-exist and that changes to X-inefficiency are 
offset by equal changes in rent seeking, so that there is a trade-off between one type o f inefficiency against another.
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In this study, three sets of outputs are considered. First, use three inputs and three 
outputs selected under the intermediation approach for the estimation of technical 
efficiency. Inputs are the number of employees {LAB), fixed assets {FA) and total 
deposits {DEP). Outputs are total loans {LOANS), other earning assets {OEA), and net 
interest income {Nil).
Second, consider the quality of the loan portfolio by stripping out non-performing 
loans (NPLs) from the stock of loans for each bank {PLOAN). In both cases, the 
vector of inputs is the same as in the first case. The argument for adjusting loans for 
NPLs is to mitigate the effect of the large loan portfolios held by the big SOCBs on 
the efficiency calculation. The unadjusted loan portfolio would bias the efficiency 
score upwards for the SOCBs which have the largest share of loans but also the 
highest proportion of NPLs.
The inputs for the construction of cost-efficiency additionally require the factor prices 
of the relevant inputs above. The price of labour {PL) is obtained as the ratio of 
personnel expenses to employees. The price of fixed capital {PK) is obtained as 
operating expenses less personnel expenses divided by fixed assets (less 
depreciation). The price of funds (PF) is obtained from the ratio of interest paid to 
total funds.
The availability of uniform and comparable data on Chinese banking is a very recent 
development. Researchers have typically made a number of working assumptions to 
fill the gaps in data (see chapter 4). In general, balance sheet data is available 
although the data revisions alter the figures from year to year and up until recently the
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accounting standards of Chinese banks differed from international standards (Ng and 
Turton 2001). The number of employees are available for the big four state owned 
banks but not for all of the joint-stock banks over all years. Similarly, the availability 
of personnel expenses varies across banks. In the years that personnel expenses were 
not available, the ratio of personnel expenses to total operating expenses in the most 
recent year to the missing was applied (see also chapter 4). In the years where the 
number of employees was not available, the ratio of labour to fixed assets in the most 
recent year available was applied54. Where there were no personnel expenses 
available, survey data were used to construct personnel costs55.
Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics of the input and output data for 1997 and 
2006 as a snapshot indicator of the scale of the variables used. The high standard 
deviation is an indication of the dominance of the 4 state owned banks. The table 
shows how fast earnings assets have grown over this period. The total stock of loans 
has grown on average by 173% but subtracting for NPLs the growth has been faster 
by 362%. Other earning assets have grown by 405% in part reflecting the activities of 
the asset management companies that swapped tranches of the NPLs of the BIG-4s 
for bonds in 1999 and 2001. The most remarkable growth is in non-interest earnings 
which have grown by 503% reflecting an increasing source of profit for banks that 
have traditional depended on the banking book for the generation of income.
54 Fu and Heffeman (2005) assume that the employee growth matches the growth of total assets and 
they use the average wage paid by state-owned and other types of financial institutions to estimate 
labour cost.
55 This was only in the case of the Agricultural Bank of China. One year (2003) data was available 
from an independent survey. The Bank of China was used as the benchmark the relative wage for 
ABOC for the other years. See chapter 4.
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5.5 Empirical Results
Table 5.2 illustrates the results of the bootstrap method for 1997 and 2006 in the case 
of Technical Efficiency (X-efficiency) for both the NPL-unadjusted and 
NPL-adjusted loan portfolio of the banks. The appendix 5-II shows the pure DEA 
results for cost efficiency, and Technical efficiency (X-efficiency) compared with the 
bias adjusted bootstrap values and the confidence intervals at the conventional 9 5 % 
level.
Table 5.1 Output-input Variables 1997 - 2006 (million RMB)
Variable Description Mean 1997 SD 1997 Mean 2006 SD 2006
LOANS 
RMB mill
Total stock of 
loans
430033 657201 1174038 1213224
OEA
RMB mill
Investments 205103 301626 1037659 1203155
Nil
RMB mill
Net Fees and 
Commissions
862 1922 5200 6141
LOANSQ 
RMB mill
Loans less 
NPLs
246365 320844 1139258 1124600
LAB Total
Employed
105138 175233 125953 164260
DEP
RMB mill
Total stock of 
Deposits
604013 891353 2167172 2258284
FA
RMB mill
Fixed assets 12831 19398 32562 38745
PL Unit price of 
labour
.0631 .0380 .1663 .0811
PF Unit price of 
funds
.0502 .0202 .0172 .0025
PK Unit price of 
fixed assets
.6528 .5282 .6478 .2242
Sources: Fitch/Bcmkscope, Almanac o f China’s Finance and Banking (various) and author calculations 
from web sources.
Table 5.2 shows the median56 of the pure bootstrap estimates, the bootstrap 
bias-adjusted values and the confidence intervals of the pure bootstrap results. Simar 
and Wilson (2000a, 2000b) show that the bootstrap estimates are biased but a bias 
correction will introduce extra noise that may result in a mean-square error (MSE)
56 The median estimate provides a more robust measure of the score when the distributions are skewed 
as in DEA.
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greater than the MSE of the bias-unadjusted bootstrap values. In the limit the bias 
corrected MSE will be three times that of the uncorrected estimate and Simar and
Wilson caution against the bias correction unless the ratio is greater than
unity. Where B is the bias correction and <r2 is the sample variance of the 
uncorrected bootstrap values. This condition was satisfied 78-84% of the time for 
each year in the sample. Although the bias-corrected estimates are reported, the non 
universal satisfaction of the bias correction condition means that the median estimates 
must be treated with caution.
Table 5.2 Bootstrap Estimates of Technical efficiency (Bias corrected, median
Bank Output 1997 2006
Pure
Boot
TE
Bias
Adjusted
Confidence 
intervals 95% 
-pure boot
Pure
Boot
TE
Bias
Adjusted
Confidence 
intervals 95% - 
pure boot
ABOC Unadjusted .9286 .8487* .8971 .9976 1.0091 .9152* .9572 1.678
Adjusted .4836 .3054* .4183 .6124 .9482 .7475* .8952 1.186
BOC Unadjusted 1.519 .6555 .3619 9.2055 1.3029 .7602* 1.0192 2.7772
Adjusted 1.4811 .6647 .2369 5.7010 1.3114 .7573* 1.0283 2.3151
CCB Unadjusted 1.6778 .5959* 1.2848 2.3951 .9999 .9194* .9695 1.0723
Adjusted 1.5431 .5635* 1.083 2.4132 1.0112 .8938* .9742 1.1175
ICBC Unadjusted 1.0241 .9202* .9663 1.9762 1.1463 .6562* .9494 2.1750
Adjusted .5462 .2762* .4348 .8265 1.1633 .6411* .9555 2.331
BoCom Unadjusted 1.7939 .5570* 1.4080 2.4404 1.4504 .6600* 1.1548 2.0092
Adjusted 1.6506 .6050* 1.2892 2.2381 1.3978 .6278* 1.1331 1.8989
CITIC Unadjusted 1.5565 .6379* 1.1937 2.0459 1.4158 .6766* 1.1723 1.914
Adjusted 1.3964 .7182* 1.1345 1.8470 1.4083 .6295* 1.1670 1.8631
CMB Unadjusted 1.5789 .6279* 1.2867 2.1975 1.3855 .6990* 1.1908 1.6847
Adjusted 1.5613 .6431* 1.2238 2.2317 1.3806 .6814* 1.1856 1.6763
CMBCL Unadjusted 1.9288 .5150* 1.5810 2.6368 1.1009 .8136* .9937 1.3612
Adjusted 1.7305 .5863* 1.1903 2.5958 1.0988 .7630* .9839 1.3716
EVERBRT Unadjusted 1.0345 .7732* .9402 1.2845 - - - -
Adjusted .8768 .4507* .6921 1.2044 " - - -
GDB Unadjusted 1.6470 .6030* 1.2551 2.1861 1.3251 .6625* 1.0678 1.7580
Adjusted 1.4875 .6751* 1.1845 1.9952 1.2821 .6262* 1.0639 1.6831
HUAXIA Unadjusted 3.3857 .2944* 2.0423 5.3428 1.6716 .5809* 1.2880 2.0847
Adjusted 3.4962 .2855* 2.2137 5.3695 1.6464 .5576* 1.3208 2.0790
IBCL Unadjusted 1.2858 .7795* .7931 4.867 1.1351 .5808* .8422 3.1528
Adjusted .5601 .2714* .4360 .8632 1.1194 .8552* .8764 2.4531
SDB Unadjusted 1.0533 .9107* 1.0038 1.2363 1.2583 .7768* 1.1027 1.6326
Adjusted .9119 .3332* .6608 1.3266 1.1938 .7464* 1.0349 1.5603
SPB Unadjusted 2.0651 .9107* 1.5949 2.8071 1.5465 .6232* 1.2231 2.1256
Adjusted 15.918 .0595* 3.815 47.25 1.4914 .5769* 1.1965 2.0215
significantly different from biars corrected at the 95% level o f confidence
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Table 5.3 presents the results of bias corrected bootstrap estimation of X-inefficiency 
and rent-seeking inefficiency for the Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) assumption. 
For reasons of brevity four years for both types of output are shown in the table.
Table 5.3 Bootstrap Estimates of Inefficiency (Bias corrected, median estimates) 
1997-2006 (%) CRS ____________ ____________ ____________ _______
Bank Output 1997 2000 2003 2006X-ineff Rent X-ineff Rent X-ineff Rent X-ineff Rent
ABOC Unadjusted 14.5 50.5 27.6 36.6 4.7 54.3 8.5 47.5
Adjusted 69.5 27.8 54.8 21.1 28.5 38.9 25.3 37.2
BOC Unadjusted 34.5 25.6 33.9 0.0 43.9 0.0 24.0 8.6
Adjusted 33.5 55.1 31.9 0 44.1 0 24.3 10.4
CCB Unadjusted 7.9 52.9 42.7 25.3 16.0 37.0 34.7 13.2
Adjusted 72.4 23.8 42.0 24.8 15.5 35.3 35.9 13.7
ICBC Unadjusted 22.1 30.2 36.2 25.1 19.4 23.9 12.6 26.8
Adjusted 72.9 23.7 48.7 17.8 11.4 36.2 14.4 27.0
BoCom Unadjusted 40.1 15.7 46.3 0 17.1 38.7 8.5 42.4
Adjusted 43.7 50.0 45.9 0 19.2 37.2 10.6 40.7
CITIC Unadjusted 44.3 6.7 39.3 23.8 36.6 10.6 34.0 8.3
Adjusted 39.5 49.3 38.0 22.8 38.1 11.2 37.2 6.2
CMB Unadjusted 36.2 17.6 25.4 34.6 52.1 0 32.3 3.1
Adjusted 28.1 64.1 24.0 26.5 52.1 0 37.1 0
CMBC Unadjusted 37.2 17.1 22.1 26.5 25.2 13.1 30.0 0
Adjusted 35.7 51.0 18.2 28.7 25.7 11.2 31.9 0
EVERBRT Unadjusted 48.5 2.9 41.5 16.0 35.1 6.1 - -
Adjusted 41.4 51.5 38.8 17.9 32.5 21.5 - -
GDB Unadjusted 22.7 37.9 29.5 34.6 15.3 33.6 18.6 22.0
Adjusted 54.9 38.5 35.9 28.3 16.1 48.0 23.7 19.4
HUAXIA Unadjusted 39.7 15.4 23.6 36.0 31.0 20.0 33.7 11.8
Adjusted 32.5 59.1 30.4 19.7 28.1 22.3 37.4 10.0
IBCL Unadjusted 70.6 0 26.6 34.4 32.4 18.1 41.9 0
Adjusted 71.4 0 22.9 33.2 28.9 21.3 44.2 0
SDB Unadjusted 8.9 56.3 23.1 41.3 18.1 29.2 22.3 18.1
Adjusted 66.7 26.3 31.7 32.8 21.4 28.4 25.4 18.5
SPB Unadjusted 51.3 0 33.9 31.6 40.9 0.9 37.8 0
Adjusted 94.4 0 33.3 30.5 44.7 0 42.0 17.0
The adjustment of loans for NPLs has had a significant effect in worsening the 
X-inefficiency score of a number of banks but in particular the SOCBs (excluding 
Bank of China). This should not be a surprise as the SOCBs have a larger 
concentration of NPLs than the JSCBs over the sample. However by 2006 the NPL
Chapter 5 Rent Seeking Versus X-Efficiency 121
ratio for all the banks declined significantly so that the difference between the two 
measures produces minimal difference between the two measures of X-inefficiency.
Three questions can be asked about the bootstrap estimates as a whole and three 
hypotheses can be tested. First, is there a significant difference between the level of 
X- and rent-seeking inefficiency between the BIG-4s and JSCBs and what differences 
do the NPL adjustment to loans make? According to Crane and Zardkoohi (1980) in a 
rent seeking society, firms are motivated to be X-efficient so that they can generate 
rent seeking investment in order to influence government so as to meet their profit 
needs. X-inefficiency is therefore not a free good. Greater X-inefficiency means less 
of another type of inefficiency. Hence there is a trade-off between the two types of 
inefficiency. If there is a strong preference for rent-seeking, X-inefficiency should be 
lower relative to Rent-seeking inefficiency. Figure 5.2 illustrates this trade-off. At 
point [c] the bank manager is X-inefficient and is rent-seeking by utilising the wrong 
factor mix. But for the same cost, the bank manager can use more of factor xi by 
moving to point [d]. By remaining at point [c] the manager is not maximising his/her 
utility by extending the scale of rent-seeking as shown by the dashed line at point [d]. 
The manager has an incentive to minimise X-inefficiency so as to maximise 
rent-seeking. In reality X-inefficiency may be inherited because of existing staff 
contracts and type of personnel.
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Figure 5.2 Trade off between X-efficiency and Rent Seeking
O
w w ’ w n XI
So the second question is, is there evidence that inefficiency is being reduced over 
time? The impending opening up the banking market under WTO rules would suggest 
that all banks would be ‘upping their game’ by improving relative cost efficiency, 
which implies that relative X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency should 
decline over the period. Third, if there is evidence of inefficiency reduction, is there a 
difference between the speed of reduction of X-inefficiency and Rent-Seeking 
inefficiency? 57 These questions are examined in turn.
Table 5.4 below examines the difference in group means of inefficiency using a
non-parametric (Mann-Whitney) test. The first two rows of Table 5.4 show that mean
estimate of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency don’t come from the same
population and that contrary to the prediction of the rational inefficiency hypothesis,
57 The BIG-4s have in the past been used by the state to employ graduates from the central bank 
sponsored universities and to place retiring officers from the Peoples Liberation Army. Consequently, 
rent-seeking inefficiency should decline at a slower rate than X-inefficiency
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rent-seeking inefficiency is not greater than X-inefficiency on either measure of 
output. The first two rows of Table 5.4 show the means of X-inefficiency and 
rent-seeking inefficiency for all the banks with the two different measures of output.
Table 5.4 Mean inefficiency, Unadjusted loans and NPL adjusted loans
Measure X-inefficiency Rent-seeking
Inefficiency
Z Value
Unadjusted 34.0% 18.5% 4.59***
NPL - Adjusted 28.1% 18.8% 7.35*''
Unadjusted BIG-4 28.9% 19.4%
Unadjusted JSCB 36.1% 18.2%
Z value 1.33 0.74
Adjusted BIG-4 16.1% 23.8%
Adjusted JSCB 32.9% 16.8%
Z value 4.74*** 2.19**
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%
There is a clear statistical difference between the mean level of X-inefficiency and 
rent-seeking inefficiency over the full sample period. Average rent-seeking 
inefficiency is lower than X-inefficiency for all banks. Stronger differences emerge 
when the sample is split between BIG-4s and JSCBs. The next four rows show the 
mean inefficiency breakdown separated by BIG-4 and JSCB for the two different 
measures of output. There is no statistical difference in the mean levels of 
X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency of the BIG-4s and the JSCBs when loans 
are unadjusted. However, stripping out NPLs from loans produces clear differences. 
Rent-seeking inefficiency is significantly higher in the BIG-4s than JSCBs. So 
evidence of rational inefficiency is more prevalent in the BIG-4s once the loan 
portfolio is adjusted for quality.
The second and third questions are addressed by modelling the dynamics of both type 
of inefficiency. Pooling the data, we use SURE estimation to model the rate of 
convergence of X-inefficiency (XI) and rent-seeking inefficiency (RI). The dependant
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variable is respectively the change in X-inefficiency (AXI) and rent-seeking 
inefficiency (ARI). The speed of convergence is captured by the negative coefficient 
on the lagged values of XI and RI respectively. The larger the absolute value of the 
negative coefficient, the faster the rate of convergence.
I use lagged values of bank-specific variables as controls. A one-year lag is specified 
as a means of eliminating potential endogeneity in the determining variables. The 
lagged bank cost-income ratio (COST1), which is operational cost to total revenue, 
is an indicator of management competence; the higher the cost-income ratio, the 
higher the level of inefficiency. The lag of the natural logarithm of total assets is used 
as a proxy for the size of the bank (SIZE l). The lag of fee income (FEE l) as a 
percent of total revenue is an indicator of management flexibility in diversifying the 
output of the bank and higher values would be expected to be associated with lower 
levels of inefficiency. The variable FOR indicates the share of foreign ownership of 
the bank and may be associated with lower levels of inefficiency. Interaction terms for 
different speeds of adjustment between the big 4 BIG-4s and the joint-stock banks are 
captured by B4*XI_1 and B4*RI_1. The Non-performing loans ratio (NPL) indicates 
past management failures and would be associated with higher levels of inefficiency. 
Table 5.5 presents some selected results.
The first thing to note about the results of Table 5.5 is that the coefficient on the 
lagged measures of inefficiency are negative and statistically significant indicating a 
significant decline in both types of inefficiency over time. The negative effect of the 
lag in rent-seeking inefficiency on the level of X-inefficiency highlights the trade-off 
between the two types of inefficiency. The lagged operational cost-income ratio
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explains rent-seeking inefficiency rather than X-inefficiency indicating the focus of 
costs towards factor hoarding.
Table 5.5 All banks, 1997-2006, SURE estimation, SE values in parenthesis
Unadjusted Adjusted
Dep Variable AXI ARI AXI ARI
Intercept .6624***
(.146)
.2484**
(.124)
.6075***
(.141)
-.0077
(.0400614)
Ln(SIZE_l) -.0293***
(.010)
-.0260***
(.010)
-.0261***
(.009)
-
FEEl -.0215***
(.007)
0.0114*
(.006)
-.0195***
(.005)
-
COSTJ - 0.0025***
(.001)
- 0.0012*
(.001)
FOR - 0.0041***
(.002)
-
NPL - .0012***
(.001)
- -
RJ_1 -.1363**
(.066)
-.7403***
(.071)
-.2908***
(.071)
-.3111***
(.060)
XI_1 -.7335***
(.074)
-.6373***
(.088)
-
B4*XI_1 .2044***
(.007)
- - -
B4*RI_1 - 0.4051***
(.109)
- -
R* 0.4118 0.5031 0.3496 0.1888
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, *significant at the 10%.
Looking at the NPL unadjusted results first it can be seen that an interaction term for 
the BIG-4s show that the speed of decline in both types of inefficiency was faster in 
the case of the JSCBs than the BIG-4s. However, the rate of decline in X-inefficiency 
was faster than the rate of decline of rent-seeking in the BIG-4s. In this respect, the 
results of this chapter differ strongly from the findings of Chen et al (2005) who find 
no trend improvement in bank efficiency .
58 C hen et. al (200S) uses a wider data frame o f banks, including regional joint-stock banks and international trust and 
investment companies. It can be argued that the use o f DMUs that do not compete in the same geographical market or product is 
a violation of the homogeneity requicment o f DEA.
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Once loans are adjusted for NPLs the speed of decline slows and there is no statistical 
difference in the speed of decline of inefficiency between the two types of banks. 
However, the speed of decline of rent inefficiency is slower than the decline in 
X-inefficiency. This is explained by the extraordinary increase in the balance sheets 
of the Chinese banks that has resulted in the reduction in X-inefficiency for the 
non-benchmark banks. However, the social problems associated with dealing with 
inherited over-staffing and over-branching is likely to produce a slower speed of 
adjustment of rent-seeking inefficiency particularly in the case of the state-owned 
banks.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has used non-parametric methods to conduct an analysis of inefficiency 
in a sample of Chinese banks. The estimates of bank inefficiency were buttressed with 
bootstrapping techniques to enable statistical inference. In general, the estimates from 
bootstrapping support the view that relative efficiency has improved. We have 
partitioned cost inefficiency into X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency in the 
spirit of the rational inefficiency model. Inefficiency in Chinese banking is made up 
of both X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency. Adjusting for the quality of the 
loan portfolio, this chapter shows that bureaucratic rent-seeking is more prevalent in 
the state-owned banking sector than in the JSCBs.
Bureaucratic rent seeking is a rational response to a particular set of incentives based 
on protectionist policy. It would be no surprise to learn that over the years of 
protected growth, as the banks were vessels for the channelling of unprofitable loans 
to state-owned enterprises, the banking sector was forced to develop rent seeking
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strategies and acted as employment sponges for the educated youth in China. While 
the dismantling of protection and the listing of the state-owned banks and the plans to 
list joint stock banks will alter the incentive structure for managers, the trend 
reduction in rent-seeking inefficiency will be balanced by social and political 
constraints -  particularly those faced by the BIG-4s.
I find that once loans are adjusted for NPLs, the speed of decline of rent-seeking 
inefficiency is slower than that of X-inefficiency. This suggests that banks have 
inherited rent-seeking strategies that are more difficult to reduce than X-inefficiency. 
The finding that X-inefficiency is being reduced faster than rent-seeking inefficiency 
is an indicator that Chinese bank managers are doing the best they can in improving 
efficiency given the constraints.
However, I must still interpret the results with caution. The improvement in efficiency 
is in terms of the benchmark banks, which are themselves 'best-practice' Chinese 
banks. The real benchmarks should be foreign banks competing on an equal footing or 
foreign banks operating in their home countries under similar conditions of 
development and risk. However, the argument of this chapter is that there have been 
significant improvements in bank efficiency. The main message of this chapter is that 
while Chinese banks may not be in the best shape they could be to meet the 
challenges of post 2007, they are in better shape than they have ever been.
But what off the question posed about the relative merits of training versus 
incentives? It can be seen that from Table 5.4 rent-seeking inefficiency is mostly less
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than X-inefficiency59 (except for the case when NPL is adjusted for the BIG-4s). It is 
also seen from Table 5.5 that rent-seeking inefficiency is being reduced at about the 
same rate for the JSCBs but at a slower rate for the BIG-4s. If the argument that 
training can be targeted at reducing X-inefficiency is accepted and rent seeking being 
symptomatic of rational behaviour would respond to incentives, the weighting of 
resources to improve Chinese bank management should be skewed towards training 
rather than incentives.
59 This supports the conjecture of Leibenstein (1966) that X-inefficiency is larger than Allocative 
inefficiency
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Appendix 5-1 Bootstrap Algorithm
The bootstrap algorithm is summarised in the following steps. The algorithm is run on 
MATLAB and the codes are available from the authors on request.
Step 1. Compute the original DEA efficiency scores using the linear programming
a  a
model (equation 1) and let St =1/0,;
Step 2. Since radial distances are used, we will refer to the polar coordinate of the 
input vector of each DMU x defined by its modulus co -  co(x) = yfx^x and its angle
rj = Tj(x)e
«■?
K - \
where for j=l,..., K-l, rjl,=  arctan(xy+1 /*,) if x ,>0  and
n
77, = — if x, = 0. Then translate the data into polar coordinates: (yt,rjt, £,), z = 1,. 
. . , K. And form the augmented matrix L by: L = [y, 77, St J , 
LR=[y, n, 2-^J, 1 =
Step 3. Compute the estimated covariance matrices 'Zl , S2 of L and Lr by
A2,=
L
Ld
A A
' S u
1
A
2  =
1 r ..<NCo"1
Six s 22J _ *^ 21 S22 J
where Su is (M + N - l) x (M  + N S l2 = S'2I is (M + A^-l)xland S22 is
A
scalar, and compute the lower triangular matrices Z,, and L2 such that 2, = LXL[ 
and 2 2 = L2L'2 via the Cholesky decomposition.
Step 4. Choose an appropriate bandwidth h as described in Simar and Wilson (2000b)
AW A A
using the information in L , 2 ,, 2 2.
Step 5. Draw K rows randomly, with replacement from the augmented matrix L and 
denote the result by the K x(M  + N) matrix T ; compute z*, the K x 1 row 
vector containing the means of each column of L*.
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Step 6. Use a random number generator to generate a K  x (M + N) matrix s  of i.i.d. 
standard normal pseudo-random variates; let sr  denote the rth row of this matrix. 
Then compute the K x(M  + N) matrix e* with the rth row e* given by
e* = sLLj so that e* ~ Nm+n(0,S7 ) where j=l if the rth row of L* was drawn
from rows 1 , . . . ,  K  of L , or j=2 if the rth row of L* was drawn from rows (K + 1), 
. . . ,2 K o f  L .
Step 7. Compute the K x (M + N ) matrix T = (1 + h2)~112(ML* + he*) + iK ® z* 
where M -  IK -  (1 / K)iKi'K is the usual K x K ce ntring matrix with IK denoting 
an identity matrix of order AT, iK an K  x 1 vector of ones, and 0  denotes the 
Kronecker product.
Step 8. Partition T so that T = | / ;1 yi2 yl3 ], where yn e R+ , yl2 e [0,7r / 2]^ _1 
and yi3 e (-oo ,+oo) for r = 1 , . . . ,  K. Define the K  x (M + N) matrix of bootstrap 
pseudo-data Z* such that the r the row z* of L* is given by
z> \ (r„ ra r,i) i
LO'i! Ya 2 - r , 3 > Otherwise
Step 9. Translate the polar coordinates in Z,* to Cartesian coordinates. This yields the 
bootstrap sample {(x*,y* )}^ .
Step 10. For the given point (x, y \  compute 6* (x,y) b y solving the DEA program
taking { ( * , ' , as the benchmarks and compute the bias-corrected efficiency
scores 0 ( x ,y ) - 0 2!0*
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Step 11. Repeat Steps 5-11, obtain another group of bias-corrected efficiency scores,
reducing the input vector of each DMU x into Ox. Compute the cost efficiency scores 
using equation(2 ) from the reduced inputs and outputs.
Step 12. Similar to Step 11, obtain rent-seeking-efficiency scores (the difference 
between cost-efficiency score and technical (x)-efficiency score)
Step 13. Repeat Steps 5-12 B (=1000) times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates
(*» >o}a. i cost efficiency scores and x-efficiency scores.
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Appendix 5-II Bootstrapped Estimations of Efficiencies (1,000 bootstrap, Biars 
corrected) * indicates significant bias at the 5% level of significance___________
Year Bank
X-Efficiencv - NPL unadjusted Cost Efficiency - NPL unadjusted
Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
1997 ABOC 0.89 * 0.85 0.77 0.89 0.79 * 0.35 0.00 0.49
1997 BOC 1.00 0.66 0.09 1.98 0.95 * 0.39 0.00 0.52
1997 BoCom 1.00 0.60 0.40 0.79 0.92 * 0.44 0.00 0.54
1997 CCB 0.97 0.92 0.36 0.97 0.89 * 0.37 0.00 0.55
1997 CITIC 1.00 0.56 0.40 0.72 1.00 * 0.48 0.00 0.61
1997 CMB 1.00 0.64 0.47 0.85 0.99 * 0.47 0.00 0.59
1997 CMBC 1.00 0.63 0.42 0.77 1.00 * 0.46 0.00 0.58
1997 CEB 1.00 0.52 0.38 0.63 1.00 * 0.46 0.00 0.58
1997 GDB 0.89 0.77 0.62 0.85 0.83 * 0.39 0.00 0.48
1997 HUAXIA 1.00 0.60 0.44 0.78 1.00 * 0.45 0.00 0.59
1997 CIB 1.00 0.29 0.18 0.50 1.00 * 0.29 0.00 0.49
1997 ICBC 1.00 0.78 0.01 1.21 1.00 * 0.46 0.00 0.63
1997 SDB 0.98 0.91 0.76 0.95 0.84 * 0.34 0.00 0.47
1997 SPDB 1.00 0.49 0.35 0.64 1.00 * 0.47 0.00 0.62
1998 ABOC 0.98 0.90 0.44 0.98 0.85 * 0.44 0.48 0.41
1998 BOC 1.00 0.63 0.12 1.73 1.00 * 0.61 0.08 0.91
1998 BoCom 1.00 0.62 0.41 0.77 0.95 * 0.45 0.09 0.58
1998 CCB 0.96 0.90 0.56 0.95 0.83 * 0.42 0.09 0.56
1998 erne 1.00 0.54 0.40 0.70 1.00 * 0.51 0.10 0.67
1998 CMB 0.79 0.55 0.43 0.66 0.73 * 0.35 0.07 0.45
1998 CMBC 1.00 0.63 0.49 0.78 1.00 * 0.51 0.10 0.66
1998 CEB 1.00 0.49 0.36 0.63 1.00 * 0.47 0.09 0.61
1998 GDB 6.97 0.76 0.58 0.88 0.88 * 0.47 0.08 0.61
1998 HUAXIA 1.00 0.59 0.45 0.75 1.00 * 0.51 0.11 0.66
1998 CIB 0.88 0.64 0.52 0.75 0.73 * 0.36 0.07 0.47
1998 ICBC 1.00 0.74 0.20 1.11 1.00 * 0.52 0.11 0.68
1998 SDB 1.00 0.93 0.85 0.97 0.89 * 0.46 0.09 0.60
1998 SPDB 1.00 0.60 0.45 0.73 1.00 * 0.54 0.10 0.68
1999 ABOC 0.85 0.74 0.41 0.83 0.72 * 0.36 0.16 0.46
1999 BOC 1.00 0.59 0.15 1.15 1.00 * 0.59 0.14 0.95
1999 BoCom 1.00 0.53 0.38 0.72 1.00 * 0.50 0.22 0.64
1999 CCB 0.74 0.58 0.32 0.68 0.63 * 0.33 0.13 0.41
1999 CITIC 0.94 0.49 0.35 0.69 0.79 * 0.37 0.16 0.48
1999 CMB 0.76 0.55 0.43 0.67 0.65 * 0.29 0.12 0.38
1999 CMBC 1.00 0.71 0.51 0.85 0.97 * 0.51 0.16 0.72
1999 CEB 1.00 0.44 0.31 0.62 0.89 * 0.41 0.18 0.53
1999 GDB 0.95 0.78 0.55 0.91 0.80 * 0.47 0.12 0.76
1999 HUAXIA 0.89 0.57 0.42 0.74 0.79 * 0.37 0.16 0.48
1999 CIB 0.81 0.58 0.46 0.70 0.64 * 0.27 0.12 0.36
1999 ICBC 0.88 0.76 0.37 0.92 0.84 * 0.42 0.18 0.54
1999 SDB 0.89 0.77 0.68 0.85 0.65 * 0.30 0.13 0.39
1999 SPDB 0.99 0.57 0.42 0.77 0.70 * 0.34 0.13 0.43
2000 ABOC 0.84 0.72 0.48 0.82 0.67 * 0.35 0.19 0.48
2000 BOC 1.00 0.66 0.15 1.35 1.00 0.65 0.13 1.24
2000 BoCom 1.00 0.54 0.40 0.73 1.00 * 0.52 0.28 0.72
2000 CCB 0.72 0.57 0.51 0.65 0.61 * 0.32 0.16 0.44
2000 CITIC 1.00 0.61 0.47 0.75 0.71 ♦ 0.37 0.18 0.50
2000 CMB 0.91 0.75 0.62 0.83 0.75 * 0.39 0.20 0.53
2000 CMBC 0.69 0.7fc 0.63 0.89 0.92 * 0.51 0.17 0.70
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Year Bank
X-Efficiency - NPL unadjusted Cost Efficiency - NPL unadjusted
Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
2000 CEB 1.00 0.58 0.47 0.71 0.82 * 0.43 0.18 0.56
2000 GDB 0.83 0.71 0.64 0.77 0.68 * 0.36 0.18 0.49
2000 HUAXIA 1.00 0.76 0.60 0.88 0.78 * 0.41 0.20 0.55
2000 CIB 0.91 0.73 0.62 0.81 0.75 * 0.39 0.17 0.51
2000 ICBC 0.78 0.64 0.37 0.74 0.73 * 0.38 0.20 0.52
2000 SDB 0.92 0.77 0.70 0.84 0.68 * 0.36 0.17 0.48
2000 SPDB 1.00 0.66 0.50 0.81 0.66 * 0.35 0.17 0.46
2001 ABOC 0.80 0.70 0.63 0.78 0.60 * 0.33 0.19 0.45
2001 BOC 1.00 0.67 0.19 1.14 1.00 * 0.65 0.19 0.92
2001 BoCom 1.00 0.56 0.45 0.80 1.00 * 0.55 0.35 0.79
2001 CCB 0.72 0.56 0.44 0.64 0.63 * 0.35 0.21 0.49
2001 CITIC 0.98 0.62 0.50 0.77 0.75 * 0.41 0.25 0.56
2001 CMB 1.00 0.65 0.55 0.78 0.96 * 0.52 0.28 0.66
2001 CMBC 1.00 0.81 0.69 0.90 0.95 * 0.53 0.23 0.71
2001 CEB 1.00 0.60 0.49 0.75 0.82 * 0.45 0.27 0.60
2001 GDB 0.91 0.79 0.72 0.85 0.79 * 0.43 0.25 0.60
2001 HUAXIA 1.00 0.64 0.53 0.79 0.98 * 0.52 0.24 0.67
2001 CIB 1.00 0.79 0.64 0.89 0.95 * 0.51 0.28 0.68
2001 ICBC 0.78 0.62 0.28 0.77 0.76 * 0.41 0.23 0.58
2001 SDB 1.00 0.78 0.67 0.90 0.89 * 0.48 0.27 0.63
2001 SPDB 1.00 0.65 0.53 0.82 0.85 * 0.46 0.24 0.59
2002 ABOC 0.93 0.86 0.57 0.92 0.70 * 0.38 0.19 0.48
2002 BOC 1.00 0.59 0.19 1.04 1.00 0.59 0.17 1.03
2002 BoCom 0.88 0.77 0.68 0.84 0.78 * 0.43 0.19 0.58
2002 CCB 0.81 0.74 0.67 0.79 0.70 * 0.39 0.17 0.54
2002 CITIC 0.94 0.58 0.43 0.75 0.93 * 0.49 0.25 0.62
2002 CMB 1.00 0.46 0.38 0.60 1.00 * 0.45 0.29 0.58
2002 CMBC 1.00 0.70 0.61 0.83 1.00 * 0.54 0.26 0.71
2002 CEB 1.00 0.61 0.47 0.79 0.98 * 0.51 029 0.63
2002 GDB 0.80 0.72 0.63 0.77 0.76 * 0.41 0.20 0.52
2002 HUAXIA 1.00 0.62 0.50 0.81 0.99 * 0.49 0.24 0.64
2002 CIB 1.00 0.63 0.51 0.79 1.00 * 0.48 0.29 0.61
2002 ICBC 1.00 0.83 0.44 1.31 0.97 * 0.53 0.23 0.72
2002 SDB 1.00 0,74 0.57 0.88 1.00 * 0.53 0.29 0.66
2002 SPDB 1.00 0.56 0.43 0.72 1.00 * 0.53 0.31 0.67
2003 ABOC 1.00 0.95 0.64 1.12 0.70 * 0.40 0.18 0.51
2003 BOC 1.00 0.56 0.18 0.94 1.00 * 0.55 0.18 0.93
2003 BoCom 0.91 0.83 0.71 0.88 0.75 * 0.44 0.18 0.60
2003 CCB 0.90 0.84 0.51 0.88 0.79 * 0.46 0.18 0.65
2003 CITIC 0.99 0.63 0.49 0.82 0.92 * 0.52 0.26 0.65
2003 CMB 1.00 0.48 0.38 0.65 1.00 * 0.47 0.27 0.63
2003 CMBC 1.00 0.75 0.63 0.87 1.00 * 0.62 0.29 0.79
2003 CEB 1.00 0.65 0.49 0.83 1.00 * 0.57 0.30 0.72
2003 GDB 0.94 0.85 0.73 0.92 0.84 * 0.51 0.23 0.66
2003 HUAXIA 0.96 0.69 0.55 0.87 0.89 * 0.49 0.26 0.61
2003 CIB 0.96 0.68 0.55 0.83 0.92 * 0.49 0.26 0.62
2003 ICBC 1.00 0.81 0.31 1.25 0.95 * 0.55 0.23 0.76
2003 SDB 0.97 0.82 0.65 0.93 0.90 * 0.51 0.26 0.65
2003 SPDB 1.00 0.59 0.44 0.80 1.00 * 0.56 0.30 0.71
2004 ABOC 1.00 1.32 0.57 1.06 0.78 ♦ 0.48 0.19 0.66
2004 BOC 1.00 * 0.55 0.17 0.96 1.00 ♦ 0.55 0.17 0.90
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Year Bank
X-Efficiencv - NPL unadjusted Cost Efficiency - NPL unadjusted
Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
2004 BoCom 0.99 ’' * 0.94 0.84 0.98 0.85 * 0.48 0.19 0.68
2004 CCB 1.00 * 0.83 0.42 0.99 0.91 * 0.53 0.19 0.76
2004 e r n e 1.00 * 0.65 0.48 0.86 0.91 * 0.49 0.26 0.61
2004 CMB 1.00 ♦ 0.46 0.32 0.68 1.00 * 0.45 0.30 0.65
2004 CMBC 1.00 * 0.79 0.66 0.89 1.00 * 0.64 0.27 0.85
2004 GDB 0.99 * 0.89 0.74 0.97 0.87 * 0.55 0.24 0.72
2004 HUAXIA 1.00 * 0.71 0.54 0.90 0.89 * 0.47 0.24 0.59
2004 CIB 1.00 - * 0.59 0.47 0.73 1.00 * 0.53 0.29 0.67
2004 ic p p 0.87 * 0.82 0.77 0.85 0.75 * 0.47 0.18 0.63
2004 SDB .0J99 * 0.95 0.85 0.98 0.82 * 0.44 0.21 0.58
2004 SPDB 1.00 * 0.57 0.40 0.80 1.00 ♦ 0.51 0.31 0.67
2005 ABOC 0.97 * 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.71 * 0.46 0.29 0.53
2005 BOC 1.00 * 0.68 0.27 0.98 1.00 * 0.61 0.27 0.72
2005 BoCom 0.98 * 0.93 0.87 0.96 0.82 * 0.48 0.30 0.56
2005 CCB 1.00 * 0.77 0.46 0.97 0.91 * 0.55 0.31 0.64
2005 CITIC 1.00 * 0.78 0.56 0.94 0.88 * 0.48 0.36 0.58
2005 CMB 1.00 * 0.55 0.39 0.75 1.00 * 0.54 0.38 0.70
2005 CMBC 1.00 * 0.67 0.55 0.79 1.00 * 0.66 0.46 0.78
2005 GDB 0.78 * 0.64 0.53 0.74 0.70 * 0.45 0.33 0.52
2005 HUAXIA 0.98 * 0.73 0.53 0.91 0.92 * 0.50 0.36 0.62
2005 CIB 1.00 * 0.53 0.43 0.68 1.00 * 0.53 0.40 0.68
2005 ICBC 0.93 0.90 0.44 0.94 0.78 * 0.47 0.26 0.54
2005 SDB 1.00 * 0.87 0.69 0.97 0.90 * 0.51 0.30 0.62
2005 SPDB 1.00 * 0.63 0.44 0.85 0.97 * 0.53 0.38 0.66
2006 ABOC 0.96 ♦ 0.92 0.61 0.95 0.66 * 0.42 0.25 0.50
2006 BOC 1.00 ♦ 0.76 0.27 0.99 1.00 * 0.64 0.26 0.78
2006 BoCom 0.96 * 0.92 0.85 0.95 0.80 * 0.49 0.30 0.58
2006 CCB 0.91 * 0.66 0.32 0.88 0.79 * 0.52 0.28 0.64
20Q6 e r n e 1.00 ♦ 0.66 0.48 0.86 0.92 * 0.56 0.39 0.69
2006 CMB 1,00 * 0.68 0.50 0.85 1.00 * 0,63 0.44 0.76
2006 CMBC 1.00 * 0.70 0.57 0.83 1.00 * 0.68 0.42 0.82
2006 GDB 0.96 * 0.81 0.66 0.92 0.89 * 0.59 0.37 0.70
2006 HUAXIA 0.96 * 0.66 0.50 0.85 0.92 * 0.54 0.38 0.66
2006 CIB 1.00 * 0.58 0.45 0.74 1.00 * 0.58 0.41 0.73
2006 ICBC 1.00 0.87 0.27 1.21 0.95 * 0.58 0.26 0.70
2006 SDB 1.00 ♦ 0.78 0.60 0.92 0.98 * 0.59 027 0.73
2006 SPDB 1.00 ♦ 0.62 0.45 0.81 1.00 * 0.60 0.43 0.75
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Year Bank
X-Efficiency - NPL adjusted Cost Efficiency - NPL adjusted
Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
1997 ABOC 0.38 * 0.31 0.24 0.35 0.35 * 0.02 0.01 0.11
1997 BOC 1.00 0.66 0.16 3.63 0.80 * 0.11 0.04 0.26
1997 BoCom 0.93 ♦ 0.56 0.36 0.78 0.80 * 0.05 0.01 0.23
1997 CCB 0.39 * 0.28 0.18 0.35 0.37 * 0.03 0.01 0.12
1997 CITIC 1.00 ♦ 0.61 0.44 0.78 1.00 * 0.09 0.03 0.33
1997 CMB 1.00 * 0.72 0.54 0.88 0.99 * 0.06 0.02 0.29
1997 CMBC 1.00 * 0.64 0.45 0.81 0.98 * 0.12 0.04 0.32
1997 CEB 1.00 * 0.59 0.37 0.83 0.79 * 0.05 0.01 0.23
1997 GDB 0.63 * 0.45 0.31 0.56 0.57 * 0.05 0.02 0.19
1997 HUAXIA 1.00 ♦ 0.68 0.49 0.85 0.99 * 0.06 0.02 0.30
1997 CIB 1.00 * 0.29 0.19 0.45 1.00 * 0.26 0.11 0.40
1997 ICBC 0.39 * 0.27 0.17 0.35 0.38 * 0.02 0.01 0.11
1997 SDB 0.55 * 0.33 0.23 0.46 0.48 * 0.06 0.02 0.16
1997 SPDB 1.00 * 0.06 0.02 0.30 1.00 * 0.06 0.02 0.30
1998 ABdC 0.3? * 0.29 0.25 0.34 0.35 * 0.18 0.09 0.23
1998 BOC l.oi) 0.63 0.18 1.69 1.00 ♦ 0.62 0.17 0.92
199k BoCom 1.00 * 0.61 0.42 0.79 0.92 * 0.45 0.28 0.58
1998 CCB 0.65 * 0.54 0.44 0.62 0.58 * 0.30 0.18 0.39
1998 CITIC 1.00 * 0.55 0.42 0.70 1.00 * 0.52 0.21 0.67
1998 CMB 0.7? * 0.56 0.48 0.66 0.73 * 0.36 0.18 0.46
1998 CMBC 1.00 * 0.63 0.46 0.77 1.00 * 0.54 0.30 0.67
1998 CEB 1.00 * 0.49 0.35 0.63 1.00 * 0.48 0.28 0.62
1998 GDB 0.92 * 0.69 0.54 0.81 0.86 * 0.46 0.23 0.57
1998 HUAXIA 1.00 ♦ 0.60 0.46 0.74 1.00 * 0.52 027 0.66
1998 CIB 0.87 * 0.62 0.53 0.74 0.71 * 0.37 0.20 0.47
1998 ICBC 0.65 * 0.53 0.33 0.62 0.61 * 0.31 0.19 0.40
1998 SDB 0.91 * 0.74 0.59 0.87 0.81 * 0.44 0.25 0.56
1998 SPDB 1.00 * 0.55 0.39 0.74 1.00 ♦ 0.54 0.33 0.71
1999 ABOC 0.50 * 0.39 0.33 0.46 0.43 * 0.23 0.11 0.29
1999 BOC 1.00 0.61 0.16 1.48 1.00 * 0.61 0.16 0.99
1999 BoCom 1.00 * 0.50 0.37 0.69 1.00 * 0.50 0.30 0.68
1999 CCB 0.67 * 0.51 0.31 0.61 0.57 * 0.30 0.14 0.38
1999 CITIC 1.00 * 0.55 0.41 0.73 0.79 * 0.39 0.20 0.49
1999 CMB 0.76 * 0.54 0.45 0.65 0.65 * 0.33 0.16 0.41
1999 CMBC 1.00 * 0.67 0.52 0.81 1.00 * 0.56 0.22 0.73
1999 CEB 1.00 * 0.45 0.33 0.62 0.89 * 0.42 0.20 0.52
1999 GDB 1.00 * 0.83 0.67 0.94 0.89 * 0.53 0.16 0.82
1999 HUAXIA 1.00 * 0.66 0.50 0.82 0.83 * 0.42 0.23 0.53
1999 CIB 0.81 * 0.57 0.47 0.70 0.64 * 0.31 0.16 0.39
1999 ICBC 0.68 * 0.51 0.27 0.62 0.66 * 0.34 0.17 0.43
1999 SDB 0.83 * 0.64 0.53 0.75 0.65 * 0.33 0.17 0.41
1999 SPDB 1.00 * 0.53 0.39 0.70 0.76 * 0.39 0.21 0.49
2000 ABOC 0.56 * 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.45 * 0.24 0.15 0.33
2000 BOC 1.00 * 0.68 0.09 0.73 1.00 0.67 0.09 1.32
2000 BoCom 1.00 * 0.54 0.40 0.75 1.00 * 0.53 0.35 0.75
2000 CCB 0.73 * 0.58 0.44 0.66 0.61 * 0.33 0.21 0.45
2000 c r r ic 1.00 * 0.62 0.46 0.77 0.73 * 0.39 0.25 0.54
2000 CMB 1.00 * 0.76 0.57 0.89 0.90 * 0.48 0.31 0.66
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X-EfOciency - NPL adjusted Cost Efficiency - NPL adjusted
Year Bank Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
2000 CMBC 1.00 * 0.82 0.67 0.91 0.92 * 0.53 0.24 0.72
2000 CEB 1.00 * 0.61 0.50 0.71 0.82 * 0.43 0.22 0.59
2000 GDB 0,77 * 0.64 0.55 0.71 0.66 * 0.36 0.22 0.49
2000 HUAXIA 1.00 * 0.70 0.51 0.85 0.93 * 0.49 0.31 0.67
2000 CIB 0.94 * 0.77 0.62 0.87 0.82 * 0.43 0.26 0.58
2000 ICBC 0.66 * 0.51 0.34 0.60 0.62 * 0.33 0.20 0.45
2000 SDB 0.85 ♦ 0.68 0.60 0.76 0.67 * 0.35 0.22 0.48
2000 SPDB 1.00 * 0.67 0.49 0.81 0.68 * 0.36 0.23 0.49
2001 ABOC 0.59 * 0.03 0.44 0.55 0.44 * 0.04 0.16 0.33
2001 BOC 1.00 0.33 0.22 1.20 1.00 * 0.20 0.22 0.95
2001 BoCom 1.00 * 0.08 0.47 0.78 1.00 * 0.09 0.41 0.77
2001 CCB 0.74 * 0.05 0.46 0.68 0.65 * 0.06 0.25 0.49
2001 CITIC 1.00 * 0.08 0.48 0.80 0.80 * 0.06 0.31 0.58
2001 CMB 1.00 ♦ 0.06 0.49 0.76 1.00 * 0.07 0.40 0.72
2001 CMBC 1.00 * 0.05 0.69 0.89 0.96 * 0.10 0.32 0.73
2001 CEB 1.00 * 0.07 0.48 0.75 0.83 * 0.07 0.33 0.60
2001 GDB 0.90 * 0.04 0.65 0.83 0.84 * 0.09 0.30 0.63
2001 HUAXIA 1.00 ♦ 0.06 0.52 0.77 0.98 * 0.08 0.33 0.67
2001 CIB 1.00 * 0.09 0.51 0.85 1.00 * 0.09 0.39 0.75
2001 ICBC 0.72 * 0.20 0.26 0.69 0.70 * 0.07 0.25 0.52
2001 SDB 0.98 * 0.07 0.59 0.88 0.92 * 0.07 0.36 0.65
2001 SPDB 1.00 * 0.07 0.49 0.78 0.88 * 0.06 0.34 0.62
2002 ABOC 0.70 ♦ 0.61 0.53 0.67 0.51 * 0.27 0.16 0.35
2002 BOC 1.00 0.59 0.19 1.13 1.00 0.57 0.17 1.02
2002 BoCom 0.86 * 0.73 0.64 0.80 0.74 * 0.40 0.21 0.59
2002 CCB 0.84 ♦ 0.75 0.51 0.81 0.70 * 037 030 0.55
2002 erne 1.00 * 0.49 0.34 0.73 1.00 * 0.49 0.33 0.66
2002 CMB 1.00 ♦ 0.45 0.37 0.59 1.00 * 0.45 0.34 0.59
2002 CMBC 1.00 ♦ 0.71 0.59 0.83 1.00 * 0.53 0.31 0.71
2002 CEB 0,92 * 0.58 0.47 0.77 0.81 * 0.40 0.20 0.52
2002 GDB 0.53 ♦ 0.46 0.39 0.52 0.38 0.17 0.06 0.41
2002 HUAXIA 1.00 * 0.62 0.50 0.80 0.99 * 0.48 035 0.63
2002 CIB 1.06 * 0.61 0.45 0.79 0.99 * 0.46 0.34 0.58
2002 ICBC 0.98 0,82 0.38 1.58 0.83 * 0.44 0.23 0.68
2002 SDB 0,95 * 0.65 0.46 0.83 0.89 * 0.43 0.30 0.57
2002 SPDB 1.00 * 0.52 0.37 0.71 1.00 * 0.49 0.34 0.63
2003 ABOC 0.79 ♦ 0.72 0.66 0.76 0.54 * 0.33 0.23 0.43
2003 BOC 1.00 * 0.56 0.29 0.96 1.00 * 0.56 0.29 0.96
2003 BoCom 0.90 ♦ 0.81 0.72 0.87 0.74 * 0.43 0.28 0.59
2003 CCB 0.91 * 0.84 0.46 0.90 0.78 * 0.46 0.30 0.65
2003 CITIC 0.98 * 0.62 0.45 0.82 0.92 * 0.50 0.38 0.63
2003 CMB 1.00 * 0.48 0.38 0.64 1.00 * 0.48 0.37 0.64
2003 CMBC 1.00 * 0.74 0.60 0.86 1.00 * 0.63 0.45 0.80
2003 CEB 0.94 * 0.68 0.55 0.86 0.88 * 0.46 0.32 0.61
2003 GDB 0.88 * 0.84 0.77 0.88 0.64 * 0.35 0.18 0.58
2003 HUAXIA 0.99 * 0.72 0.54 0.89 0.89 * 0.49 0.37 0.61
2003 CIB 0.99 * 0.71 0.54 0.88 0.95 * 0.49 0.37 0.62
2003 ICBC 1.00 0.89 0.46 1.35 0.89 * 0.52 0.34 0.74
2003 SDB 0.95 * 0.79 0.59 0.91 0.88 * 0.49 0.36 0.62
2003 SPDB 1.00 * 0.55 0.39 0.78 1.00 * 0.54 0.38 0.70
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Year Bank
X-Efficiency - NPL adjusted Cost Efficiency - NPL adjusted
Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
Pure
DEA
Boot
Median L-B U-B
2004 ABOC 0.91 * 0.84 0.65 0.89 0.74 * 0.45 0.24 0.65
2004 BOC 1.00 * 0.60 0.28 0.99 1.00 * 0.60 0.28 0.89
2004 BoCom 0.99 ♦ 0.94 0.84 0.98 0.85 * 0.50 0.30 0.68
2004 CCB 1.00 0.84 0.49 1.01 0.91 * 0.55 0.32 0.75
2004 c m c 1.00 ♦ 0.66 0.49 0.88 0.91 * 0.50 0.36 0.61
2004 CMB 1.00 * 0.47 0.33 0.71 1.00 ♦ 0.47 0.33 0.68
2004 CMBC 1.00 * 0.79 0.64 0.88 1.00 * 0.68 0.41 0.85
2004 GDB 0.93 * 0.85 0.75 0.91 0.80 * 0.52 0.31 0.67
2004 HUAXIA 0.99 * 0.72 0.56 0.89 0.89 * 0.48 0.35 0.60
2004 CEB 1.00 * 0.59 0.46 0.72 1.00 * 0.55 0.40 0.67
2004 ICBC 0.86 * 0.79 0.74 0.83 0.74 * 0.48 0.29 0.63
2004 SDB 0.94 * 0.88 0.79 0.93 0.80 * 0.45 0.30 0.58
2004 SPDB 1.00 ♦ -0.59 0.41 0.83 1.00 * 0.53 0.38 0.69
2005 ABOC 0.91 * 0.84 0.60 0.90 0.71 * 0.46 0.42 0.49
2005 BOC 1.00 0.71 0.37 1.00 1.00 * 0.63 0.60 0.70
2005 BoCom 0.98 * 0.94 0.87 0.97 0.82 * 0.50 0.46 0.55
2005 CCB 1.00 * 0.83 0.47 0.99 0.91 * 0.56 0.52 0.61
2005 CITIC 1.00 * 0.80 0.57 0.96 0.86 * 0.48 0.45 0.62
2005 CMB 1.00 * 0.56 0.38 0.76 1.00 * 0.55 0.51 0.78
2005 CMBC 1.00 * 0.68 0.57 0.80 1.00 * 0.67 0.60 0.70
2005 GDB 0.77 * 0.61 0.49 0.73 0.69 * 0.45 0.40 0.49
2005 HUAXIA 0.97 ♦ 0.73 0.53 0.92 0.91 * 0.50 0.47 0.68
2005 CIB 1.00 * 0.53 0.43 0.70 1.00 * 0.53 0.51 0.62
2005 ICBC 0.93 0.89 0.57 0.96 0.78 * 0.48 0.45 0.53
2005 SDB 0.91 * 0.78 0.63 0.87 0.82 * 0.49 0.45 0.61
2005 SPDB 1.00 * 0.64 0.45 0.87 0.96 * 0.53 0.49 0.73
2006 ABOC 0.80 ♦ 0.75 0.68 0.79 0.61 ♦ 0.38 0.24 0.46
2006 BOC 1.00 0.76 0.38 1.01 1.00 * 0.64 0.37 0.77
2006 BoCom 0.96 * 0.89 0.79 0.95 0.80 * 0.48 0.35 0.57
2006 CCB 0.91 * 0.64 0.31 0.89 0.79 * 0.51 0.31 0.63
2006 cm c 1.00 ♦ 0.63 0.46 0.83 0.92 * 0.55 0.42 0.69
2006 CMB 1.00 * 0.63 0.48 0.81 1.00 * 0.61 0.46 0.76
2006 CMBC 1.00 * 0.68 0.55 0.83 1.00 * 0.67 0.47 0.82
2006 GDB 0.94 * 0.76 0.60 0.89 0.86 * 0.56 0.40 0.67
2006 HUAXIA 0.95 * 0.63 0.48 0.81 0.92 * 0.52 0.40 0.66
2006 CIB 1.00 * 0.56 0.45 0.71 1.00 * 0.56 0.44 0.72
2006 ICBC 1.00 0.86 0.38 1.19 0.95 * 0.57 0.36 0.68
2006 SDB 0.98 * 0.75 0.56 0.90 0.92 * 0.55 0.28 0.69
2006 SPDB 0.76 * 0.58 0.45 0.71 0.69 * 0.40 0.31 0.49
L-B and U-B mean lower and upper bounds defined by the 95% confidence interval
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Chapter 6
Productivity in Chinese Banks: An Exercise in Measurement60
“ Life is the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient premises.” Samuel 
Butler
6.1 Introduction
Banking sector reform in China has been a gradual and on-going process since 1978. 
A further stage of reform was announced in 1993 with the objective of creating an 
efficient commercial banking sector. Following the conditions of the WTO, the 
Chinese banking market has been open to foreign competition since the end of 2006. 
Chinese banks have been encouraged to allow foreign banks and investors to take 
minority shareholding positions. The listing of four of the big five banks on the 
international exchange during 2006-7 is supposed to usher in, not only foreign capital 
but also foreign managerial expertise to improve bank management, performance and 
productivity. Given the acceptance of larger stakes by foreign banks in the smaller 
commercial banks (to a specified limit of 25% share); it is no surprise that Chinese 
bank productivity has become a popular topic of research in recent years.
There have been a number of studies of Chinese banking productivity that have been 
published in Chinese scholarly journals, but to date only a few studies are available to 
non-Chinese readers61. The gradualist reforms of the banking sector and the potential
60 A earlier version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in the China Economic Review. A 
conceptual version with a shorter data span and only the national banks was published in The Chinese 
Economy (2009).
61 A recent exception is a study using non-parametric methods by Matthews et al (2009) and 
parametric methods by Khumbhaker and Wang (2007)
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of foreign competition would be expected to improve efficiency and productivity in 
the banking sector. Evidence of improved performance has begun to emerge.
This chapter is an empirical exercise in measurement and convergence. Its principal 
aim is to measure the productivity of the commercial banks in China for the period 
1997-2007. Three issues are addressed in this paper, namely measurement, modeling 
strategy, and convergence. First, the measurement of output (and input) of banks is 
not a simple matter. Numerous studies of bank productivity by Chinese scholars 
employ a bewildering mix of inputs and outputs. I therefore consider several 
alternative measures of output as a means of obtaining robust results.
Second, I use the Malmquist index of total factor productivity (TFP) as a means of 
translating inputs and outputs into a measure of productivity growth. The Malmquist 
index has the advantage of being able to decompose productivity growth into 
technological change, which captures a shift in the production frontier from efficiency 
improvement, which captures the movement towards the frontier. One of the 
problems associated with this approach is that it is constructed within the framework 
of Data Envelope Analysis (DEA), which is a non-parametric linear programming 
method that applies observed input and output data to create a ‘best practice’ frontier. 
The main drawback of the DEA approach is that it assumes the inputs and outputs are 
measured without error and therefore do not permit statistical evaluation. This paper 
provides an inferential capability to the point-estimates of productivity through the 
use of non-parametric bootstrapping methods.
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Third, I use the concepts of conditional beta-convergence from the growth 
convergence literature (Barro and Salai-i-Martin, 1991, 1992) to examine the 
properties of convergence of TFP. This paper poses the following questions. What has 
been the total factor productivity (TFP) growth of Chinese banks over the period 1997 
-  2007? What have been the driving factors in TFP growth? Has there been a 
significant improvement in TFP growth in the second half of the period consistent 
with an increase in the pace of reform prior to the opening up of the banking market 
according to the WTO treaty? What is the effect on the measurement of TFP if 
non-performing loans are treated as ‘bad’ outputs? Finally, is there evidence of the 
convergence of TFP to peer group clusters?
The contribution of this chapter is to extend the analysis of Matthews et al (2009) to 
obtain a more robust statement of bank productivity growth by expanding the data set 
to include city commercial banks; to model non-performing loans in a consistent 
manner as a separate but undesirable output; to extend the range of models 
considered; and to extend the data by a further year. This paper uses 1570 bank-year 
observations to 492 bank-year observations in the previous study. The results confirm 
the main findings of Matthews et al (2009) that the productivity of state-owned banks 
was neutral over this period and that technical progress was offset by negative 
catch-up (lead banks widening the gap with laggard banks). The value-added of this 
paper is to show that the productivity of city commercial banks outstripped the 
national commercial banks and to identify the main driver of TFP growth of the CCBs 
as ‘catch-up’ based on cost saving efficiencies. This paper identifies the benchmark 
banks in each bank category and analyses the factors that determine conditional 
convergence of productivity and its decomposition. The results of this paper confirm
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the findings of Ferri (2009) that city commercial banks have improved their 
performance and pose a challenge to the national commercial banks.
The chapter is organized on the following lines. The next section outlines the 
background to the Chinese banking system. Section 3 discusses the methodology and 
literature relating to the Malmquist method of estimating bank productivity. Section 4 
presents the banking data. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6  concludes.
6.2 Chinese Banking
In 2007, the Chinese banking system consisted of 8,877 institutions, including 3 
policy banks, 5 large state-owned commercial banks (SOCB), 12 joint-stock 
commercial banks (JSCB), 124 city commercial banks (CCB), 29 locally incorporated 
foreign bank subsidiaries and the rest made up of urban and rural credit cooperatives 
and other financial institutions62.
Like many economies that have undeveloped financial and capital markets, the 
banking sector in China plays a pivotal role in financial intermediation. Table 6.1 
below shows that the ratio of total bank assets to GDP has increased from 125% in 
1997 to 213% in 2007. The market is absolutely dominated by the five state owned 
banks, although their share of the market has been decreasing steadily through 
competition from the other commercial banks (JSCBs and CCBs).
62 CBRC Annual Report 2007
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Table 6.1 The Chinese banking Market
Variable 1997 2 0 0 0 2007
Total Assets to 
GDP
125.6% 147.1% 213.4%
SOCB employment 
(,0 0 0 )
1,670.4 1,540.8 1,492.1
Market share 
SOCB (% assets)
8 8 .0 % 71.4% 53.2%
NPL ratio SOCB 49.8% 30.8% 8 .1%
ROAA SOCB* 0 .2 % 0 .2 % 0.9%
NIM SOCB* 2.4% 2 .0 % 2.7 %
Cost-Income Ratio 
SOCB*
52.7% 55.8% 42.8%
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Individual Bank Annual Accounts, China Regulatory 
Banking Corporation Annual Report, Almanac o f  China’s Finance and Banking, Fitch-Bankscope data 
base, National Bureau of Statistics of China, * weighted average by asset share. SOCBs are 
Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China and Bank of Communications.
Net-interest margins (NIM) and return on average assets (ROAA) of the SOCBs are 
respectable by western standards but are well below levels that would be consistent 
with economies in the same stage of development (as for example India where NIM 
would be in the region of 3.5%). Part of the reason is that interest rates were heavily 
controlled during this period and the remaining reason is the large amount of 
non-performing loans on the books of the commercial banks. The non-performing 
loans (NPL) ratio of the SOCBs has been falling from around 50%63 in 1997 to 
around 8 % in 2007.
With the encouragement of the regulatory authorities, Chinese banks have in recent 
years, had to restructure their balance sheet, develop modem risk management
63 Estimate based on 1998 values. The 1998 values were obtained by adding back the Asset 
Management Company operations in 1999 back to the reported figures. This is the basic assumption 
used by Rodman (2005). An overestimate is likely to be small as Huang (2002) suggests that the 
mid-2002 official NPL ratio at 23% is underestimated by 12%.
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methods, improve capitalization, diversify earnings, reduce costs and improve 
corporate governance and disclosure64.
Up until 1995, control of the banking system remained firmly under the government 
and its agencies65. Under state control, the banks in China served the socialist plan of 
directing credits to specific projects dictated by political preference rather than 
commercial imperative. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial institutions were 
allowed to take a stake in selected Chinese banks. While control of individual Chinese 
banks remain out of reach for the foreign institution66, the pressure to reform 
management, consolidate balance sheets, improve risk management and reduce unit 
costs has increased with greater foreign exposure. Table 2.4 in chapter 2 shows the 
extent of foreign strategic investment in individual Chinese banks.
The theory of market contestability (Baumol, 1982) suggests that incumbent banks 
will restructure weak balance sheets, reduce costs, and improve efficiency in 
preparation for the threat of entry. In their annual report on foreign banks in China, 
Pricewaterhouse-Coopers67 refer to the China Bank Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
report on the opening up of the banking sector. The CBRC divided the pace of reform 
and innovation into three stages; 1980-1993, 1993-2002 and 2003-2006. In the third 
stage, more of the domestic banking business was opened up to external competition. 
Foreign banks were allowed to expand RMB business from the four major cities of 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian which existed at the time of accession to the
64 CBRC Annual Report 2006 http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/index.jsp
65 According to La Porta, et. al (2002), 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under 
the control of the government in 1995.
66 There is a cap of 25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of 20% for any single 
investor, except in the case of joint-venture banks.
67 Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2007)
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WTO, to the rest of the country. RMB business activity was extended from foreign 
enterprises and individuals to cover domestic firms and residents. Quantitative 
restrictions on foreign banks RMB liabilities were lifted and capital requirements 
were brought into equality with domestic banks. Various restrictions on branch 
development were removed and branches were particularly encouraged in the 
under-banked geographical regions outside the east coast. The upshot of these and a 
number of other reforms is that Chinese banks should exhibit less inefficiency, and 
strong productivity improvements in this period, with marked improvements in the 
latter years as competition with foreign banks intensify.
6.3 Methodology and Literature
Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) can be used to evaluate the efficiency of a firm by 
comparing it with a ‘best practice’ or output efficient firm. An output efficient firm is 
one that cannot increase its output unless it also increases one or more of its input, 
whereas an output inefficient firm is one that can increase its output without 
increasing its inputs. An output efficient firm would have a score of 100% as being 
located on the output efficient frontier whereas an output inefficient firm would be 
inside the frontier and have a score of less than 100%. Similarly an input efficient 
firm is one that cannot reduce its inputs without reducing its output whereas an input 
inefficient firm can.
The major drawback of the DEA approach is that the efficiency scores obtained from 
a particular sample are confined to that particular sample and cannot be compared 
with another sample in a different time period. This limitation does not allow the
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measurement of productivity growth, which allows for improvement in efficiency as 
well as technical progress.
The idea of comparing the input of a decision making unit over two periods of time 
(period 1 and period 2 ) by which the input in period 1 could be decreased holding the 
same level of output in period 2 is the basis of the Malmquist Index68. Fare et al. 
(1994) developed a Malmquist productivity measure using the DEA approach based 
on constant returns to scale. The Malmquist productivity index (M) enables 
productivity growth to be decomposed into changes in efficiency (catch-up) and to 
changes in technology (innovation)69.
Briefly, for a vector of inputs {*} and vector of outputs {y}, for each time period {t} 
the production set {S,} describes all feasible input-output pairs at a given time such 
that;
y t = max{j>, : (xt,yt) e  St} (6.1)
However, observed output at any point of time {>>,} may not correspond to the
maximum potential output for given input {x,} .The appropriate method of accounting
for the discrepancy between actual and potential maximum output (technical 
inefficiency) is the output distance function of Shephard (1970) defined as;
d,i>',.*/) = inf {0 '■ (y, !6’x,) e s,} (6-2)
68 Grosskopf (2003) provides a brief history of the Malmquist productivity index and discusses the 
theoretical and empirical issues related to the index. For the decomposition of Malmquist productivity 
index, see Lovell (2003).
69 A further decomposition can be conducted by separating the change in efficiency into the change in 
pure efficiency x change in scale efficiency. The change in efficiency is constructed under CRS while 
the change in pure efficiency and scale efficiency is constructed under VRS.
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To construct the Malmquist productivity index we need to specify the distance 
function for two adjacent time periods. So for period {t+1} the distance function is 
defined as;
d,+i O',.,, *,+i)= inf {<?: O',., /<?, xM ) e SM } (6.3)
The Malmquist index (.M) of total factor productivity change is the geometric mean of 
the two output distance function ratios based on the technology for period’s t+ 1  and t 
respectively. In other words:
M  = \ d-  £+1L dM{y,,x,) d,(y,,x,)
In their study of productivity growth in industrialised countries, Fare et al (1994) 
decompose (6.4) for changes in efficiency (catch up) and changes in frontier 
technology (innovation). This can be seen by expressing (6.4) as:
dt(yn xt) 
or M  = El+lTl+l
where
M = the Malmquist productivity index
Et+i = a change in relative efficiency over the period t and t+1 (catch-up)
Tt+i = a measure of technical progress measured by shifts in the frontier from period t 
to t+ 1
d,(yM,*M) d,(y„x,) 
d M ( yM>x M ) d , A y n X , ) ,
(6.5)
(6.4)
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When M > 1 it means that there has been a positive total factor productivity change 
between period t and t+1. When M < 1 it means that there has been a negative total 
factor productivity change.
The use of the Malmquist method of evaluating productivity performance of banks 
has been a growth area of academic enquiry. Berg et al (1992) examined Norwegian 
banks over the period 1980-89 and found productivity regress prior to deregulation 
and strong productivity gains due to catch-up after deregulation. The Malmquist 
decomposition was used by Wheelock and Wilson (1999) to examine bank 
productivity in the USA for the period 1984-93. They reported a general drop in 
average productivity caused by failure to catch-up with outward shifts of the 
production frontier. Alam (2001) found that the deregulation period resulted in a 
productivity surge in the first half of the 1980s followed by a productivity regress in 
the second half for large US banks. These results were confirmed by Mukherjee et al 
(2 0 0 1 ) who also used panel estimation to explain productivity growth in terms of 
bank size, product-mix and capitalisation.
Other studies of bank productivity using the Malmquist method have been Drake 
(2001) for the UK, Grifell-Tatjeand Lovell (1997) for Spain, Canhoto and Dermine
(2003) for Portugal, Noulas (1997) for Greece, Fukuyama (1995) for Japan, and Isik 
and Hassan (2003) for Turkey. A pan-European study was conducted by Casu et al
(2004) who compared parametric with the Malmquist method. Their finding is that 
productivity growth in European banking was been largely brought about by 
technological change rather than efficiency improvement. Outside Europe, 
Worthington (1999) found that Australian Credit Unions exhibited strong
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technological progress after deregulation and Neal (2004) found that productivity 
improvements were mostly shifts in the frontier with the majority of banks having 
negative catch-up over 1995-99.
The productivity of Chinese banking has also been the subject of numerous studies by 
Chinese scholars. Chen (2002), Zhang and Wu (2005) and Tang and Wang (2006) use 
the Malmquist method to examine the productivity trend of Chinese banks over the 
1994-1999, 1999-2003 and 1997-2003 periods respectively. Their basic findings were 
that the large state-owned banks exhibited lower average growth compared with the 
joint stock banks. In general average productivity growth was dominated by catch-up 
rather technical innovation but that there had been in a marked improvement in TFP 
in the latter years70. In contrast Ni and Wan (2006) found strong productivity 
improvement led by technical improvement rather than catch-up. Sun and Fang 
(2007) pose the question, whether foreign banks have stimulated an improvement in 
Chinese bank productive efficiency? They find that average TFP growth improved 
during the period 2001-2004 consistent with the hypothesis that the threat of entry has 
had significant efficiency effects on incumbent banks.
However, these studies are limited by two important issues. First, the results are 
conditional on the inputs and outputs employed. There is no consensus as to the 
appropriate measures of inputs and outputs used in the construction of Chinese bank 
productivity. On the input side, operational expenses or labour (where available), 
fixed assets and sometimes deposits in varying combinations are used most
70 See also Hou (2006) which uses a two-stage panel estimation to explain productivity but 
inappropriately uses operating expenses as an explanatory variable when it is also an input in the 
construction of the M index.
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frequently. However, on the output side, the studies can be grouped into three 
variants. Some studies use asset stocks (loans and other earning assets) whereas others 
use income flows (interest earnings, non-interest earnings, net income, profits). A 
third group takes an eclectic approach mixing assets with liabilities (deposits and 
loans) and stocks with flows (loans and profits) and even others mixing (assets, 
liabilities and income flows).
Second, the lack of statistical inferential capability makes it difficult to evaluate the 
sensitivity of the estimates obtained relative to sample variation. In other words, the 
deterministic estimates of the Malmquist index cannot assign confidence levels to the 
measures of growth. The estimates obtained in the above studies represent measures 
of performance relative to an estimate of the true but unobserved frontier. Since these 
estimates are based on finite samples, they will be subject to sampling variation of the 
frontier and subject to finite sample bias. The bootstrap reduces finite sample bias and 
reduces, or even eliminates finite sample errors in the rejection probability of 
statistical tests (see Horowitz, 2001).
Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999, 2000) propose a smooth bootstrapping methodology 
to examine the sensitivity of the DEA scores and Malmquist indices to sampling 
variations with the aim of assigning confidence intervals.
The application of bootstrapping methods to the Malmquist productivity index 
remains an ongoing area of research (Lothgreen and Tambour, 1999). Relatively few 
studies have applied bootstrapping methods to measuring banking productivity. 
Gilbert and Wilson (1998) calculate confidence intervals for estimates of productivity
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in Korean banks in 1980-94 and conclude that the period had experienced significant 
productivity growth against the null hypothesis of no change between periods. 
Tortosa-Ausina et al (2008), apply bootstrapping to Spanish savings banks over
1992-1998 and confirm the common finding that productivity growth is dominated by 
technological progress in the post deregulation period. Murillo-Melchor et al (2005) 
conduct a European wide study of bank productivity over the period 1995-2001 using 
bootstrap techniques. They confirm the basic finding of Casu et al (2004) that 
productivity gains were driven by technological progress but find significant 
differences in inter-country performance71.
6.4 Banking data
This study employs an imbalanced panel of annual data (1997-2007) for the 5 
state-owned or state-controlled commercial banks (SOCB), 9 joint-stock commercial 
banks (JSCB) and 47 city commercial banks (CCB). The total sample consisted of 
314 bank-year observations. The main source of the data was Fitch/Bankscope, and 
individual annual reports of banks.
Two approaches are normally taken in determining what constitutes bank input and 
output. The intermediation approach developed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) 
recognises the main function of the bank is to conduct financial intermediation. Under 
the intermediation approach, bank assets measure outputs and liabilities measure 
inputs. In contrast, the production approach recognises that the bank provides 
intermediation services and payment services to depositors. In the production
71 Alam (2001) also uses bootstrap confidence intervals to provide an inferential capacity to the point 
estimates of productivity of large US banks.
Chapter 6 Productivity in Chinese Banks 151
approach, physical entities such as labour and capital are inputs while deposits are a 
measure of output72. Goldschmidt (1981) argues that deposits are both inputs and 
outputs depending on its use in intermediation services or payments services and 
suggests a weighting mechanism similar to the divisia approach of Barnett et al 
(1984). Such a separation would need information about the term maturity of deposits. 
This information is not easily available for banks in China and in any case up until 
very recently deposit interest rates were regulated and did not reflect market 
fundamentals.
A further issue is the problem of non-performing loans (NPLs) which have been 
treated as an undesirable output in a number of studies. Park and Weber (2006) 
consider loans less NPLs as well as deposits as a valid output of the bank in their 
study of bank productivity in Korea, where NPLs are viewed as an undesirable output. 
Stripping out non-performing loans from the stock of loans for each bank creates a 
new output variable which replaces the stock of total loans and following Scheel 
(2001) I treat the inverse of NPLs as a positive output73.
Another argument for adjusting loans for NPLs is to mitigate the effect of the large 
loan portfolios held by the SOCBs on the efficiency calculation. The unadjusted loan 
portfolio would bias the efficiency score upwards for the SOCBs which have the 
largest share of loans but also the highest proportion of NPLs.
72 Freixas and Rochet (1997) propose a third approach that recognises the specific activities of banks 
such as risk management and information processing.
73 See Thanassoulis (2008) for a discussion.
Chapter 6 Productivity in Chinese Banks 152
Finally, a variant of the production approach is to recognise that the services provided 
to depositors and loan obligors are reflected in the net flows of income to the bank. So 
services to the consumers of banking products whether it is intermediation services or 
other financial services, will be reflected in the net interest earnings to the bank and 
net non-interest earnings.
Following Drake (2001) I adopt a hybrid between the intermediation and production 
approaches. I also recognise that deposits may be viewed as an output or as an input. I 
therefore consider five types of models, which can act as boundaries for the 
intermediation and production approaches including undesirable outputs. Model 1 is 
one where there are three inputs; bank deposits and borrowed funds, fixed assets and 
operational costs, and three outputs; total loans, other earning assets, and non-interest 
income. Although non-interest income remains undeveloped in China, it is selected to 
reflect the growing contribution of this area to banks’ total income. Model 2 separates 
NPLs from Loans and treats NPLs as an undesirable output. Model 3 recognises 
deposits as an output and Model 4 allows deposits as an output and treats NPLs as an 
undesirable output. Model 5 has only fixed assets and overheads as inputs but has net 
interest income and non-interest income as outputs. Model 5 is the closest to the 
concept of the neo-classical production function which uses stocks of capital and 
labour to produce a flow of output. In this study overheads acts as a proxy of labour 
and the outputs are the revenues generated from balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
business, which also subsumes the lower gross interest income generated by NPLs. 
Table 6.2 summarises the input/output structure of each model.
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Table 6.2 Model structure
Model Inputs Outputs
1 Deposits (RDEP), Overheads 
(ROHD), Fixed Assets (RFA)
Loans (RLOAN), Other earning 
assets (ROEA), RFEE (net fee 
income)
2 Deposits (RDEP), Overheads 
(ROHD), Fixed Assets (RFA)
Loans less NPLs (RPLOAN), Other 
earning assets (ROEA), RFEE (net 
fee income), RNPLs as undesirable 
output
3 Overheads (ROHD), Fixed 
Assets (RFA)
Loans (RLOAN), Other earning 
assets (ROEA), RFEE (net fee 
income), Deposits (RDEP)
4 Overheads (ROHD), Fixed 
Assets (RFA)
Loans less RNPLs (RPLOAN), 
Other earning assets (ROEA), RFEE 
(net fee income), RNPLs as 
undesirable output, Deposits 
(RDEP)
5 Overheads (ROHD), Fixed 
Assets (RFA)
Net interest earnings (RNIE), net fee 
income (RFEE)
As an indicator of scale and evolution of the variables over the period, Table 6.3 
presents the summary statistics of the input and output data by bank group for 1999 as 
representative of the first half of the period and for 2007 as representative of the 
second half. Since I am examining the movements in productivity over a period of 
nine years, the nominal values of data were deflated by the consumer price index.
Chapter 6 Productivity in Chinese Banks 154
Table 6.3 Output-Input Variables 1999 and 2007 (million RMB) per bank/year 
deflated by the consumer price index 1997=1   i____
Variable Description Bank Group Mean StandardDeviation Minimum Maximum
RLOAN Real stock of SOCB 142078 783544 29024 2464455
loans 2505421 986477 979895 3464731
JSCB 48577 25186 16643 80603
386374 141514 194756 590849
CCB 11239 9611 4420 33094
18272 28210 553 138379
ROEA Real stock of SOCB 685486 370853 224289 1210672
other earning 2496702 1146125 873945 4025218
assets JSCB 42189 24770 15157 74369
313253 133885 116718 568532
CCB 11875 13207 2024 38144
18179 33965 1254 172276
RFEE Real net fees SOCB 1664 3496 0 7910
and 19834 10308 6403 31032
commissions JSCB 78 67 15 177
1691 1648 407 5811
CCB 11 10 1 28
35 64 0 277
RNPL Real SOCB 642448 411000 50705 1090038
non-performing 203324 300511 20482 738243
loans JSCB 8232 9834 0 31372
8496 3750 4136 16922
CCB 1388 880 370 2792
359 749 4 3947
RDEP Real deposits SOCB 2063133 1097080 31830 3249698
and other 4655574 1956532 1709734 7016662
sources of JSCB 86105 44388 34818 140688
funds 616877 265686 233158 1094492
CCB 23308 23520 5328 69579
32815 56812 2682 281241
RFA Real fixed SOCB 44935 24472 4856 67995
assets 62260 22907 29060 88802
JSCB 2360 951 930 3795
4574 2006 1800 7620
CCB 440 237 122 778
319 470 11 2516
ROHD Real overhead SOCB 25822 12960 6164 38031
and other 63999 27516 19420 84296
non-interest JSCB 1339 677 584 2616
costs 7649 3014 3894 13225
CCB 391 3259 116 1013
338 459 23 2278
RNIE Real net SOCB 40192 21769 844 64969
interest 150729 49225 88490 202585
earnings JSCB 2214 978 957 3913
21112 11803 8669 48866
CCB 859 659 297 1615
1095 1420 47 6724
Sources: Fitch/Bankscope, Almanac o f China's Finance and Banking (various) and author calculations from web sources.
The groups represent collectively the five state-owned or controlled banks (SOCB), 
the joint stock commercial banks (JSCB), and the city commercial banks (CCB). The 
table highlights the rapid growth in the average loan book over this period, 
particularly for the SOCBs and JSCBs. The table also shows the decline in the
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average level of NPLs for the SOCBs in the eight years between 1999 and 2007. In 
part this represents the transfer of tranches of NPLs from the four largest SOCBs to 
the Asset Management Companies in 1999-2000 and in 2003. It also shows that the 
average rate of decline of NPLs by the CCBs were relatively faster. The figures for 
the CCBs are not strictly comparable between the two periods given the unbalanced 
nature of the sample. While the summary statistics for the SOCBs and JSCBs are 
comparable, the number of CCBs in the sample for 1999 was 9 whereas in 2007 it 
was 4174.
6.5 Empirical Results
Positive productivity growth is measured by an estimate greater than unity. 
Productivity regress is indicated by an estimate of less than unity. We conduct two 
exercises in the measurement of bank productivity. First we estimate the standard 
Malmquist measure based on the deterministic Data Envelope Analysis, however this 
will be a biased estimate. Second, a bootstrap estimate of the median of 2000 
bootstrap simulations is examined75.
In both cases a constant returns to scale technology was assumed. If the production 
technology is variable returns to scale (VRS), the Malmquist TFP index can be further 
decomposed into frontier shift, pure efficiency change and scale efficiency . The 
bootstrap algorithm of Simar and Wilson (1999) uses the conical hull of the observed
74 Although the sample is an unbalanced panel for the whole period, the TFP calculation necessarily 
has a balanced panel for each year of calculation. The estimates were weighted by asset share to give 
an aggregated estimate as a means of minimising potential bias.
75 We also conduct a third exercise where the estimate of productivity growth is not significantly 
different from unity as given by the 95% confidence intervals of the bootstrap, the figure is constrained 
to the null of unity. The aggregated results did not look too different from the unconstrained bootstrap 
results and are not reported.
76 See also Ray and Desli (1997)
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data to estimate the production set, which amounts to assuming CRS. However, the 
Malmquist index provides consistent estimates of the true value irrespective of the 
returns to scale assumption but may give inconsistent results regarding the sources of 
productivity in the decomposition77.
Table 6.4 shows the sample mean of the weighted (by group asset share) average of 
TFP and decomposition for each of the five models discussed above using the two 
alternative estimates of the pure DEA estimate and the unconstrained median
Titbootstrap value . The final three rows show the average for the 5 models.
Table 6.4 Weighted annual average of productivity growth 1998 -  2007 (weighted by 
asset share)_______ _________________________ ________________________
Model Group
DEA standard 
linear-programming estimates
Bootstrap Unconstrained 
estimates
TFP Tech Catch-up TFP Tech Catch-up
1 SOCB 1.005 1.035 0.974 0.997 1.046 0.996
JSCB 0.980 0.987 0.961 0.975 0.994 0.970
CCB 1.015 1 .0 1 0 0.994 1.038 1.019 1.018
2 SOCB 0.997 1.085 0.923 0.992 1 .1 0 2 0.946
JSCB L032r 1.048 0.973 1.052 1.085 0.999
CCB 1,027 1.029 1.003 1.294 1.087 1.352
3 SOCB 1.009 1.099 0.948 1.006 1.113 0.949
JSCB 0.967 0.983 0.982 0.952 0.974 1.009
CCB 1 .0 2 1 0.993 1.018 1.008 0.979 1.216
4 SOCB ; lM m 1.213 0.935 0.996 1.133 0.935
JSCB o $ m 1.024 0,957 1.038 1.053 1.008
CCB ' 1.033 1 .0 1 1 1.008 1.340 1.048 1.339
5 SOCB 1.053 1.142 0.941 1.054 1.095 0.936
JSCB 1 .0 2 2 1.029 0.966 1.019 1.015 0.977
CCB 1.109 1.146 0.956 1.085 1.206 0.976
Average 
of all 5 
Models
SOCB 1.014 1.115 0.944 1.009 1.098 0.952
JSCB 1.000 1.014 0.968 1.007 1.024 0.993
CCB 1.041 1.038 0.996 1.153 1.068 1.180
77 In a previous study looking at the productivity growth of the national banks of China for a shorter 
time period Matthews et al (2009) used the third test of Banker (1996) on selected years and found that 
the null of CRS could not be rejected.
78 The multiplicative property does not hold because of die time weighting used in construction of the 
weighted averages.
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The TFP productivity growth is decomposed into technical progress and efficiency 
gains (catch-up) for each of the models. A number of points can be made about the 
results of Table 6.4. First, the results are broadly similar for both sets of estimates. 
However, the bootstrap results are quantitatively different from the DEA estimates, 
indicating significant bias in the raw DEA results and therefore we focus our attention 
on these79. Second, looking at models 1-4, the SOCBs have had significant TFP 
regress over this period and only moderate growth in the case of model 3, where 
deposits are considered as an output. Third, staying with models 1-4, the main driver 
of TFP growth for the national banks has been technical progress defined by the ‘best 
practice’ banks. In most cases the best practice (benchmark) banks have shifted the 
frontier outwards leaving the average banks behind and further to catch up. However, 
the main driver of TFP growth for the CCBs has been catch-up (models 2, 3 and 4). 
Technical progress as the driver of TFP is stronger in the case when NPLs are treated 
as an undesirable output (models 2 and 4). Fourth, the bootstrap estimates show 
strong TFP growth for the CCBs and unlike that of the other two bank groups, also 
strong efficiency gains (catch-up). This means that the CCBs are converging on each 
other (peer group) at a faster rate than the SOCBs and JSCBs within their own groups. 
Fifth, the results show that the TFP growth of the CCBs and JSCBs was higher 
relative to SOCBs in the case of model 2 and 4 where NPLs are treated as undesirable 
outputs but that the technical innovation was stronger in the SOCBs. The reason for 
this is possibly because the distribution of NPLs is concentrated in the state-owned 
banking sector but also that the best practice banks in this group have had strong 
success in reducing their NPL ratios thus reducing their bad output at a faster rate.
79 Out of 1570 bank year estimates of TFP obtained by the DEA method for the 5 models, 36 percent 
were biased at the 95% based on the bootstrap results.
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Finally, model 5 which has a stronger resonance with the neo-classical production 
function shows strong TFP growth in the SOCBs and CCBs with technical progress 
being the main driver.
The striking picture in Table 6.4 is what emerges for the CCBs. Strong TFP growth is 
driven by moderate innovation effects (excepting model 5) and spectacular efficiency 
gains (catch-up), suggesting that simply emulating best-practice without strong 
innovation was sufficient to generate strong productivity gains in the CCBs. The 
average for all 5 models for each bank group is an indication of a robust measure of 
overall TFP growth and its drivers.
Table 6.4 also shows that taking the average of all five models to obtain a robust 
measure, TFP growth by the SOCBs and the JSCBs has on average been zero but 
productivity growth of the CCBs has been 15% a year. However this verdict belies 
sharp differences in the drivers between the bank groups. In the case of the SOCBs, 
technical innovation has been equally offset by regress in efficiency. This means that 
the best practice SOCBs have shifted the frontier and widened the gap between them 
and the remaining SOCBs. A similar but much more moderate picture emerges for the 
JSCBs. With the CCBs both technical innovation and efficiency gains contribute to 
the strong TFP growth. However, efficiency gains dominate suggesting that emulating 
the best practice banks have contributed the most to productivity growth.
The boundary is made up of the benchmark or best practice banks. The banks that 
make up the benchmark and define the extent of technical innovation may change 
from year to year and by model. However, it is instructive to identify the benchmark
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banks within each bank group as the bank that has the most frequent display of 
technical innovation and with highest average growth due to technical innovation. 
Table 6.5 below presents the benchmark banks for each bank group.
Table 6.5 Best Practice Banks
Bank
group
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
SOCB
Bank of China Bank of China Bank of 
China
Bank of 
China
ICBC
Bank of
Communications
Bank of
Communications
JSCB
CMBC CMBC China
Merchant
China
Merchant
China
MerchantChina
Merchant
CCB Xiamen Xiamen Xiamen Xiamen ShanghaiNingbo Ningbo
Increasing deregulation as suggested by the CBRC and the opening up of the Chinese 
banking market post 2006 would suggest that the second half of the sample period 
examined should see a significant improvement in TFP growth. To test for this, the 
sample was split into two periods 1998-2002 and 2003-2007. Table 6 . 6  below shows 
the annual weighted average of TFP growth in both periods for all five models and the 
overall average.
Table 6 . 6  Total Factor Productivity Growth in sub-samples (weig ited averages)
Years BankGroup Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Average
SOCB 1.014 1 .0 0 1 1.027 0.996 1.138 1.035
1998-2002 JSCB 1.005 1.132 1.018 1.176 1.141 1.094
CCB 1.047 1.481 0.954 1.359 1.206 1.209
SOCB 0.979 0.983 0.984 0.996 0.998 0.988
2003-2007 JSCB 0.946 0.973 0 . 8 8 6 0.899 0.938 0.928
CCB 1.030 1.107 1.063 1.321 1.007 1.106
The table shows that the average TFP growth of the SOCBs ranged from 0.1% a year 
to 13.8% a year in the first half of the period but was universally negative in the
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second half. Given that Table 6.4 indicates the main driver for TFP growth was 
technical progress, this suggests that the benchmark banks had raced ahead leaving 
the other banks in the group with more ground to catch-up, leading to an average 
productivity regress. The results for the first half of the period also confirm the 
standard finding that the JSCBs outperformed the SOCBs, particularly when NPLs are 
treated as an undesirable output. But contrary to the findings of some Chinese 
scholars this performance is not sustained in the second half of the period. The final 
column which shows the average TFP for the three bank groups confirm that 
productivity performance was weaker in the second half of the period80. The main 
result is that the TFP growth of the CCBs was stronger than both groups of the 
national banks confirming the findings of Ferri (2009) that city commercial banks 
have increased their performance and are challenging the traditional banks.
Using the distance function method of estimating TFP, Kumbhakar and Wang (2007) 
find that overall TFP growth for the national banks in China over the period
1993-2002 was 4.5% annually with the SOCBs showing an annual growth of 0.7% a 
year and the JSCBs showing an average growth of 6.1%. The inputs in the 
Kumbhakar and Wang (KW) study were labour, fixed assets and deposits and the 
outputs were loans and other earning assets. The inputs and outputs in this chapter do 
not correspond exactly with the KW study; however model 1 is the closest in 
proximity where overheads act a proxy for labour as a factor production. However, if 
the average of all five models is used as a robust measure, the KW estimates fall 
within the neighbourhood.
80 This is also confirmed by a non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney z test) for the differences in the 
measures of TFP growth between the two periods which showed no evidence (at the conventional 5% 
level of significance) that the high productivity growth of the first half of the period was sustained in 
the run-up to the opening up of the banking market to foreign competition.
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I now turn to an examination of the convergence characteristics of TFP growth in 
Chinese banks. The growth convergence literature distinguishes between 
unconditional p-convergence and conditional p-convergence. The former relates to 
convergence to a common point or trajectory and the latter relates to different points 
or steady-states defined by peer group characteristics. These peer group 
characteristics are identified by bank specific components that might explain 
productivity performance.
Recently a number of studies have emerged examining the convergence of bank 
efficiency and productivity. Weill (2009) tests for P-convergence and o-convergence 
of cost efficiency of banks across 10 EU countries and Casu and Girardone (2008) do 
the same for 15 EU countries. Single country studies have been conducted by Fung 
(2006) for bank holding companies in the US and Fung and Leung (2008) for Chinese 
banks. In what follows, I examine conditional p-convergence and o-convergence. I 
conduct panel estimation with all 5 models to estimate a meta- P-convergence 
equation. The purpose of estimating the meta-convergence function is to identify the 
factors common to all the five models. Following Fung (2006) and Weill (2009) I 
specify the following dynamic function.
TFP1,U -  rF P i,u -\ = a  + P rF P ij* -\ + r z ^  +  (6.6)
Where TFP represents total factor productivity, i is the bank, j  is the model and t is 
time. Z represents bank specific variables, e is a stochastic term and a and P are
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parameters to be estimated. A similar function is specified for technical progress 
(frontier shift) and efficiency gain (catch-up).
Following Weill (2009), equation (6 .6 ) is supplemented by a specification for meta- 
a-convergence as shown in equation (6.7).
A(TFPiJJc -TFPj) t = a  + 0(TFPiJJc -  TFP,),_, + (6.7)
Where k is the bank category (SOCB, JSCB, CCB) and a bar over TFP indicates the 
average figure for the specific model and for banks within each category (k) and 
model (/). Sigma (a)-convergence describes the speed at which the dispersion of 
productivity narrows over time. Sala-i-Martin (1996) shows that ^-convergence is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for a-convergence.
The bank specific variables that I experimented with were SIZE measured by the log 
of assets, the cost-income ratio (COST), and a measure of revenue diversification 
given by the proportion of fee income in total revenue (FEE). In addition I also 
explored the performance of banks that have a foreign stake-holding (FOR) and I also 
included a dummy variable to distinguish between the category of bank (JCSB=1 if 
joint stock bank, zero otherwise and CCB=1 if City Commercial Bank, zero 
otherwise) and type of model (Model 1 to Model 5). All bank specific variables were 
lagged one period to account for potential endogeneity.
Table 6.7 summarises the results for TFP, technical innovation and efficiency gain, 
estimated jointly with Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE). The first point to 
note is that the speed of adjustment for all three indicators occurs within the year.
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Such a rapid speed of adjustment has also been confirmed in the findings of Fung and 
Leung (2008). What it means is that mean reversion occurs instantaneously (within 
the year) and the convergence equations can be treated as static representations. The 
results also suggest that lower TFP growth is associated with banks that have a higher 
cost-income ratio and higher TFP growth is associated with banks that have 
diversified their revenue sources by developing non-interest income.
The convergence functions for technical innovation (frontier shifts defined by best 
practice) and efficiency (catch-up) also shows instantaneous adjustment. The 
decomposition of the TFP shows that technical innovation that drives TFP is 
positively associated with banks that have diversified its revenue sources by 
developing non-interest income business. Whereas efficiency gains (catch-up) is 
associated with banks that have reduced their cost-income ratio. This means that the 
benchmark banks are those that have developed a wider spread of non-interest bank 
business and the catch-up has been obtained through stronger cost control. The 
negative coefficient on the lag of log SIZE and the lag of the NPL ratio on the 
efficiency gain equation suggests that smaller banks with lower NPL ratios are 
associated with faster catch-up as is the case for the CCBs.
The results for sigma-convergence (shown below with p  values in parenthesis) 
demonstrate that the dispersion of productivity growth has also narrowed in this 
period.
A(TFP ik -TFPj),  = -  .076 -  1.018 (TFP, ik -TFP , ) MIJ'K (0.000)*" (0.000)*" ,J' 1
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Table 6.7 SURE Regression, 1998-2007, p values in parenthesis
Total Factor 
Productivity 
growth
Technical
Innovation
Efficiency Gain
Intercept 1 1 4 4 *** 
(.0 0 0 )
1 076*** 
(.0 0 0 )
1.570***
(.0 0 0 )
fi -1.031***
(.0 0 0 )
-1.047***
(.0 0 0 )
- 988*** 
(.0 0 0 )
COST_l -.003***
(.0 0 0 )
- -.0 0 2 **
(.028)
FEE_1 1.051***
(.0 0 0 )
1.573***
(.0 0 0 )
-
Ln(SIZE)_l - - _ 027*** 
(.004)
NPL_1 - _ 569*** 
(.0 0 0 )
Model 2 .044**
(.046)
.131***
(.0 0 2 )
.052
(.228)
FOR - . 0 0 2
(.155)
-
JSCB - -.092**
(.046)
-.105**
(.004)
CCB - _ 1 1 1 *** 
(.008)
-
Rz .8986 .5505 .7127
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has used the Malmquist decomposition to quantify the productivity 
growth of Chinese banks in the period 1998-2007. The advantage of using the 
Malmquist method is that it separates the diffusion of technology (efficiency gains) 
from advances in technology (frontier shifts). The paper also applies bootstrapping 
techniques to evaluate significant changes in productivity, efficiency gains and 
innovation. Five models were examined to provide a robust measure of bank 
productivity performance.
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In general, average TFP growth has been neutral over the period for the SOCBs and 
JSCBs but positive for the CCBs. However, the weighted average figures mask wide 
differences in individual performance. The benchmark banks that define the 
production frontier have generated sharp increases in technical innovation, leaving a 
wider gap between them and the other banks in their respective groups. The CCBs 
showed improvements in both technical innovation and efficiency (catch-up) gains.
When NPLs are treated as an undesirable output, the JSCBs show strong TFP growth 
driven by stronger innovation effects. The CCBs show spectacular TFP growth driven 
largely by efficiency gains but also moderate innovation effects. Efficiency gains 
(catch-up) were obtained through cost reduction. Technical innovation is associated 
with greater diversification of revenue away from interest earnings. However, my 
assessment of the performance of CCBs must be interpreted with caution. The number 
of CCBs in the sample count for one-third of the actual number of CCBs in China. It 
is possible that the CCBs that report data publicly are the better ones and there is a 
sample selection bias in favour of the improving segment in the group.
I find no evidence that innovation and reform in the second part of the sample period, 
coinciding with the opening up of the Chinese banking market has resulted in an 
improvement in bank productivity. This may in part be due to the fact that foreign 
banks still only command a small share of the banking market in China. It is also 
possible that domestic competition is particularly strong between local banks with the 
better CCBs challenging the bigger established national banks.
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Convergence of productivity growth to the peer group defined by bank specific 
variables is rapid. Frontier shifts (technical innovation) has been led by banks that 
have innovated their revenue sources. Catch-up has been led by banks that have 
controlled their cost-income ratios.
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Appendix 6-1 Bootstrap Algorithm
The estimates of the distance functions for N banks over 2 periods are obtained 
following the standard method outlined in Fare et al (1994) for dt (yl t, xl t) and
). As in Simar and Wilson (1998) a DGP is assumed whereby the N
banks randomly deviate from the underlying true frontier in a radial input direction. 
Bootstrapping involves replicating the DGP and generating 1000 pseudo samples 
which are used to measure the distance function for either period for each observation 
in the pseudo sample. This section borrows heavily from Jeon and Sickles (2004)
I A A A Id, (yK,, xtl), d, (y2j, x2t )....d, (yNj, xNj )J and
B = I'Ll (.Vi,.!» ) > d,tl (yw , x2jtl )....dM (yNlt,, xw,+l )J. The values in A and B are 
bounded from below at unity.
Step 2: Reflect these values about the boundaries in two-dimensional space to form 
(4N x 2) matrix in partitioned form;
A B
A = 2-^4 B 
2 - A 2 - B  
A 2 - B
The matrix A contains 4N pairs of values corresponding to the two time periods. The
A
estimated covariance matrix of the columns [A B] is E which is the same as that of 
the reflected data [2 -  A, 2 - B ] ,  given by the temporal correlation of the original
data. The covariance matrix of [2 -  A, B] and [A, 2 -  B] is E*, where;
A
z  =
~ A-2 G\
A
<7l2
A
A
and 5^ = <*i2 -< *1 2  A O_S‘\2 2 _ r a n or 2 _
1 z ,Let A . denote the jth row of A. Then g(z) =  V  AT
7 J 4A7*2 ]
z -  A 
h
is a bivariate
kernel density estimator of the 4N reflected data points represented by the rows of A, 
where K{.) is the bivariate kernel function, h is a bandwidth set to (4/5N) 1/6 following
A A
Silverman (1986) and z is (1 x 2) z, =[dt(yitixit),dt+l(yit+],xit+l)] is the ith row of 
the (N x 2) matrix of the original distance function estimates.
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Step 3: Randomly draw with replacement N rows from A to form (N x 2) matrix 
A* = [&ij ], i - l ,2,....N,y-1,2.
Step 4: Compute
SJ=-h'tsiJ,j=\,2
7=1
Step 5: Simulate draws from a bivariate n (o,,£) and #((),£*) by generating iid
pseudo random N{0,1) deviates (zy,z2) s.t. (lxzxJ 2z2 + /3z2) from Af(o,,£) and
(llzl,-l2zl +l3z2)from Ar(o,S^). Here lxJ 2 , / 3 are elements of a lower triangular 
matrix
~lx 0L = obtained from the Cholesky decomposition of the (2 x 2)
A f
matrix 2 . These simulated draws form e which is (N x 2) containing independent 
draws from the kernel function. If A*y. is drawn from [A B] or [2 -  A 2 - B], the ith
row of s* is from Af(o,, £), but if e* is drawn from [2 -  A B] or [A 2 -  B], the ith row
ofe*isfrom #((),£*).
Step 6 : Compute (N x 2) matrix
/
A* +he* - C o'
\
+c >1 o ’
\ 0 d2 _ ) 0 d2 _
where C is (N x 1) of
unit values which gives a (N x 2) of bivariate deviates from the estimated density of A 
and e* is an (N x 2) containing N independent draws from the kernel function Kj(.). 
Step 7: For each element of ytJ of F set; y*tJ = >1 or 2 -  yt j otherwise. The
(N x 2 ) matrix T* = [y*j ] contains simulated distance function values.
Step 8 : Pseudo samples I * are then constructed by setting
x’,j = r',,,xi j /d,(y,nx i,)and y»j = y,,j for '=1 .2 ,  ..N and j = 1,2.
Step 9: Compute the four distance functions;
d' ( y l ,x l ), d'M (y„,x’u),d] (y’ltl, ) , d ’tl ( y ^ , , x ’,tI). Repeat steps 3 to 9 B times to 
get a set of B bootstrap estimates.
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Appendix 6 -II Bootstrapped Estimations of TFP (2,000 bootstrap)
* sig bias at the 5% level
Banks Model 1-2007/2006 Model 1 -2006/2005 Model 1-2005/2004TFP Boot Median L-B U-B TFP Boot Median L-B U-B TFP Boot Median L-B U-B
State-Owned Banks
ICBC 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.96 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.05 0.96 * 0.92 0.88 0.95
CCB 0.81 0.84 0.79 0.91 1.19* 1.23 1.19 1.28 1.01 1.00 0.98 1.03
ABOC 3.91* 2.60 1.75 3.69 0.33* 0.54 0.37 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.04
BOC 0.97 0.95 0.89 1.00 1.12 1.12 1.09 1.15 1.07 1.06 1.03 1.09
BoCom 3.0?* 2.03 1.35 2.80 0.34* 0.55 0.39 0.85 0.99 0.99 0.96 1.02
Joint Stock Comimercial Banks
CMB 0.94 0.94 0.88 1.00 1.07 1.09 1.06 1.14 0.89 * 0.95 0.89 1.03
CMBC 0.90 0.87 0.82 0.92 1.18 1.20 1.15 1.28 0.85 0.87 0.83 0.92
CITIC 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.91 1.05 1.04 0.98 1.07 0.98 0.97 0.93 1.01
SPDB 0.95 0.95 0.89 1.01 1.16 1.15 1.09 1.25 0.90 0.91 0.86 0.95
CIB 0.74* 0.65 0.59 0.72 1.36 1.47 1.34 1.64 0.88 0.89 0.83 0.96
CEB 0.89 0.90 0.84 0.95 1.15 1.19 1.13 1.29 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.95
HUAXIA 0.79 0.74 0.68 0.81 1.14 1.18 1.12 1.26 0.94 0.94 0.89 1.00
GDB 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.92 0.98 0.92 1.04 1.13 1.12 1.07 1.19
SDB 0.97 0.99 0.97 1.02 1.02 1.01 0.96 1.07 0.73 * 0.79 0.74 0.84
City Commercial Banks
BEIJING 0.70* 0.75 0.70 0.79 1.28 1.25 1.22 1.30 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.98
SHANGHAI 0.98 0.93 0.87 1.01 1.14 1.16 1.13 1.19 1.04 1.07 0.98 1.17
Ping An 0.86 0.97 0.85 1.12 1.03 1.00 0.96 1.06 1.00 1.03 0.98 1.10
TIANJIN 0.63 0.61 0.57 0.65 4.68* 2.16 1.68 3.67 0.64 * 2.94 1.67 3.76
NANJING 0.89 0.90 0.85 0.94 1.14 1.13 1.08 1.23 1.10 * 1.02 0.97 1.08
DONGUAN 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.84 1.14 1.12 1.09 1.16 0.96 0.97 0.94 1.04
WUXI 0.86 0.90 0.84 0.98
CHONQING 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.81 1.39 1.45 1.35 1.58 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.04
XIAMEN 0.97 1.06 0.94 1.21 1.11 1.12 1.07 1.19 1.03 1.02 0.89 1.16
NINGBO 0.91 0.94 0.91 0.96 1.15 1.12 1.07 1.16 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.05
XIAN 0.99 0.99 0.91 1.10 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.94
WUHAN 0.90* 0.95 0.92 0.98 3.98* 1.64 1.39 2.50 0.34 * 0.87 0.56 1.02
QINGDAO 0.93* 1.03 0.95 1.11 1.05 1.05 1.01 1.10 0.84 0.86 0.82 0.90
JINAN 0.95* 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.07 1.03 0.97 1.10 0.98 0.99 0.93 1.04
DALIAN 0.98* 1.09 1.00 1.18 1.05 1.07 1.01 1.13 0.86 0.90 0.85 0.93
HANGZHOU 1.01 1.06 0.99 1.14 1.41 1.34 1.28 1.43 0.78 * 0.84 0.78 0.90
CHANGSHA 1.35 1.42 1.33 1.54 1.41 * 1.26 1.22 1.36 0.96 0.98 0.90 1.08
SHIJIAZHUANG 0.96 1.00 0.94 1.05 1.04 1.04 0.98 1.09 1.03 1.01 0.96 1.08
SHAOXING 0.83 0.85 0.81 0.89 1.02 0.98 0.93 1.02 0.87 * 0.92 0.88 0.95
JINZHOU 0.98 0.94 0.88 1.01 1.14 * 1.25 1.16 1.32
LAIWU 0.98 0.94 0.88 0.99 1.02 0.91 0.74 1.19 1.13 * 0.18 0.13 0.34
JIUJIANG 0.82 0.87 0.77 1.00 1.11 1.10 1.08 1.12 1.04 * 1.13 1.05 1.26
PANZHIHUA 0.92* 1.03 0.93 1.10 0.87 0.89 0.83 1.00 0.99 * 0.25 0.19 0.42
DONGYING 0.88 0.80 0.74 0.86 1.15 1.29 1.14 1.43 0.71 0.73 0.63 0.86
ZENGZHOU 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.95 1.03 0.93 1.15
WEIFANG 0.90 0.96 0.87 1.07 0.94 0.97 0.94 1.00
LINYI 1.02* 1.13 1.05 1.20 1.00 0.99 0.89 1.01
XINXIANG 0.89 0.88 0.83 0.91 3.01 * 1.69 1.33 2.74
LIUZHOU 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.88 0.99 0.98 0.92 1.02
HUZHOU 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.89 1.16 1.18 1.15 1.24
KARAMAY 0.85 0.79 0.71 0.89 1.19 1.13 1.01 1.24
HUANGSHI 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.88
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Banks
Model 1—2007/2006 Model 1 -2006/2005 Model 1-2005/2004
TFP BootMedian L -B U -B TFP Boot Median L -B  U -B TFP Boot Median L -B  U -B
XUCHANG 0.96 0.97 0.91 1.02
JINING 1.02 1.07 1.01 1.12
CHENGDE 0.69 0.72 0.65 0.81
HENGYANG 1.02 1.12 1.01 1.23
GANZHOU 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.85
GUILIN 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.83
NIANYANG 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.89
JIAOZUO 3.41 1.58 1.34 1.99
DEYANG 0.77 0.78 0.72 0.86
MINTAI 0.68 0.68 0.62 0.74
CHOUZHOU 0.90 0.93 0.89 0.99
ZHANJIANG 0.81* 0.87 0.81 0.92
JI AXING 0.93 0.97 0.92 1.01
TAILONG 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.91
WEIHI 0.73* 2.00 1.31 2.85
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Banks
Model 1 -2004/2003
TFP * £ Z . L- B U-B
Model 1-2003/2002
B00t L- 
i r r  Median B
U -
B
Model 1-2002/2001
TFP h ~  Median B
U -
B
State-Owned Banl
ICBC 0.93 0.96 0.92 1.00 1.10 1.09 1.06 1.11 1.04 1.01 0.96 1.06
CCB 0.92 0.89 0.87 0.93 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.91 1.14 1.14 1.11 1.18
ABOC 0.95 0.96 0.93 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.99
BOC 1.24 1.16 1.08 1.26 1.06 1.06 1.00 1.11 1.05 1.02 0.99 1.08
BoCom 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.05 0.95 0.93 0.89 0.96 1.46 * 1.23 1.10 1.35
Joint Stock CommercialBanks
CMB 1.16 1.18 1.13 1.23 0.80 0.76 0.73 0.80 0.92 * 0.98 0.93 1.06
CMBC 1.03 ♦ 0.81 0.73 0.92 0.97 0.92 0.88 0.97 0.95 * 1.22 1.08 1.33
CITIC 1.26 1.28 1.21 1.32 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.84 0.94
SPDB 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.07 0.91 0.92 0.87 0.98 0.88 0.88 0.82 0.95
CIB 1.02 1.07 1.00 1.13 0.96 1.00 0.93 1.07 1.01 1.04 0.95 1.15
CEB 1.10 1.10 1.05 1.13 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.88 0.94 0.92 0.87 0.98
HUAXIA 1.02 ♦ 1.06 1.03 1.09 0.95 0.89 0.82 0.96 1.02 1.07 1.01 1.13
GDB 1.27 1.23 1.19 1.28 0.83 * 0.89 0.85 0.93 0.95 * 1.00 0.97 1.05
SDB 1.17 1.16 1.08 1.21 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.88 1.02
City Commercial 1tanks
BEIJING 1.24 1.26 1.15 1.37 0.94 0.86 0.77 0.96 0.79 * 0.87 0.80 0.91
SHANGHAI 1.14 * 1.18 1.15 1.23 1.03 0.97 0.88 1.09 0.88 * 1.01 0.94 1.10
Ping An 1.05 * 1.08 1.06 1.10 0.92 * 0.82 0.75 0.90 0.76 * 0.95 0.80 1.08
TIANJIN 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.10 0.87 0.91 0.81 1.01 0.89 * 0.95 0.90 0.99
NANJING 0.98 * 1.03 1.01 1.04 1.09 * 0.93 0.90 0.99 0.82 * 0.98 0.87 1.08
DONGUAN 1.05 * 1.00 0.96 1.04 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.91 0.88 0.85 0.94
WUXI 1.11 1.05 0.97 1.12 0.97 0.98 0.93 1.03 0.87 0.94 0.85 1.03
CHONQING 1.21 * 1.11 1.05 1.17 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.80 0.87 0.90 0.83 0.96
XIAMEN 1.19 * 1.07 1.01 1.17 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.05 0.87 0.93 0.85 1.03
NINGBO 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.06 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.95 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.92
XIAN 1.03 1.03 0.99 1.07 0.86 * 0.78 0.72 0.84 0.88 0.93 0.84 1.02
WUHAN 1.08 1.11 1.05 1.16 0.94 * 0.90 0.88 0.93 0.77 0.82 0.76 0.88
QINGDAO 1.02 ♦ 0.90 0.81 1.00 0.99 * 0.75 0.63 0.87 0.87 * 1.28 1.06 1.44
JINAN 0.89 * 0.93 0.89 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.98 1.00 0.96 1.05
DALIAN 0.99 1.00 0.96 1.03 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.85 1.12 1.12 1.06 1.19
HANGZHOU 1.51 ♦ 1.00 0.87 1.21 1.97 1.88 1.41 2.58
CHANGSHA 1.13 * 1.00 0.91 1.12 0.84 * 0.93 0.88 0.99
SHIJIAZHUANG 1.00 0.98 0.90 1.05
SHAOXING 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.90
JINZHOU 0.63 0.60 0.54 0.67
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Banks
Model 1-2001/2000
' i|»|i|y ... ' . BOOt * . 1/ —
■ 1 • Median B
U-
B
Model 1-2000/1999
imp Boot L- 
■ Median B
U-
B
Model 1-1999/1998
TFp Boot L- 
■ Median B
U-
B
State-Owned Banks
ICBC 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.93 1.02 1.00 0.99 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.00 1.06
CCB 0.97 0.98 0.94 1.03 0.95 0.89 0.81 0.96 1.11 * 1.23 1.12 1.36
ABOC 1.09 1.11 1.09 1.13 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.04
BOC 1.05 1.10 1.02 1.14 1.18 1.11 1.08 1.19 0.84 0.89 0.75 1.06
BoCom 1.00 093 0.88 1.01 1.00 0.97 0.87 1.11 0.81 0.73 0.67 0.85
Joint Stock Csmmercial Banks
CMB 1.01 * 0.93 0.84 1.00 1.17 1.16 1.10 1.25 1.09 1.09 1.06 1.16
CMBC 0.86 0.86 0.77 0.96 0.95 0.90 0.77 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.00 1.11
CITIC 0.96 * 0.92 0.88 0.95 1.10 0.99 0.87 1.13 1.22 * 1.04 0.95 1.20
SPDB 0.91 0.87 0.86 0.92 1.10 1.06 0.98 1.15 1.24 1.20 0.95 1.44
CIB 0.79 0.79 0.72 0.86 0.94 0.82 0.72 0.96 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.02
CEB 1.03 0.95 0.85 1.05 1.29 1.25 1.11 1.38 1.03 1.01 0.97 1.06
HUAXIA 1.03 1.11 1.03 1.27 1.04 0.97 0.88 1.08 1.21 1.15 1.06 1.24
GDB 0.75 0.74 0.69 0.79 1.04 1.05 0.98 1.12 1.15 * 1.02 0.92 1.13
SDB 0.91 0.86 0.82 °-93 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.88 1.28 1.28 1.05 1.45
City Commercial Banks
BEIJING 0.73 0.65 0.61 0.76 1.10 1.16 1.03 1.37 0.92 1.00 0.91 1.07
SHANGHAI 0.31 * 0.57 0.37 0.79 1.07 0.95 0.93 1.07 1.03 * 0.96 0.95 1.03
Ping An 0.79 * 0.73 0.68 0.78 1.04 1.02 1.00 1.10 0.98 0.98 0.94 1.01
TIANJIN 0.97 1.00 0.96 1.06 1.20 1.17 1.12 1.26 1.13 1.14 1.00 1.19
NANJING 0.99 * 1.04 1.00 1.12 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.12
DONGUAN 1.06 1.14 1.04 1.18 1.00 0.89 0.82 1.01
WUXI 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.94 1.03 * 0.88 0.74 1.01
CHONQING 1.38 1.19 0.97 1.43 0.83 0.92 0.78 1.14
XIAMEN 0.88 0.91 0.86 0.96 1.07 1.04 0.98 1.11
NINGBO 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.96
XIAN 0.90 * 0.85 0.80 0.89
Model 1-1998/1997
Banks TFP BootMedian L-B U-B
State-Owned Banks
ICBC 0.98 0.99 0.94 1.08
CCB 1.07 * 0.97 0.84 1.04
ABOC 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.97
BOC 1.03 1.04 0.98 1.11
BoCom 1.07 * 0.96 0.93 1.04
Joint Stock Commercial Banks
CMB 1.08 1.13 0.96 1.18
CMBC 1.37 1.29 1.12 1.41
CITIC 0.96 1.08 0.89 1.19
SPDB 1.16 * 0.92 0.86 1.08
CIB 2.15 * 1.55 1.10 2.06
CEB 1.11 1.20 1.10 1.29
HUAXIA 1.04 1.03 1.00 1.06
GDB 0.94 * 1.00 0.96 1.05
SDB 1.02 1.13 1.00 1.38
City Commercial Banks
BEIJING 1.18 1.22 1.17 1.30
SHANGHAI 1.05 * 1.35 1.19 1.47
Chapter 6 Productivity in Chinese Banks 173
Banks
Model 2 -2007/2006 
TFP Boot L -B U -B
Model 2 
TFP
-2006/2005 
Boot L-B U -B
Model 2 
TFP
-2005/2004 
Boot L-B U-B
Model 2 
TFP
-2004/2003 
Boot L-B U-B
State-Owned Ban <s ' -
CBC 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.95 1.03 1.05 1.01 1.10 0.88* 0.84 0.81 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.97
: c b 0.79 0.84 0.78 0.91 1.22 1.23 1.19 1.27 1.05 1.05 1.03 1.07 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.92
VBOC 4.38* 2.85 2.04 4.00 0.33 * 0.55 0.37 0.85 1.05 1.06 1.02 1.13 0.92 0.95 0.90 1.00
50C 0.98 0.97 0.91 1.02 1.14 1.16 1.12 1.19 1.11 1.10 1.08 1.13 1.23* 1.15 1.07 1.23
3oCom 3.28* 2.12 1.47 2.95 0.35 * 0.59 0.40 0.89 1.03 1.03 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.04
taint Stock Comnlerciai Banks
: m b 0.89 0.87 0.82 0.92 1.17 1.21 1.16 1.29 0.96* 1.03 0.97 1.11 1.17 1.19 1.13 1.24
: m b c 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.80 1.19 1.13 1.03 1.23 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.98 1.07 * 0.91 0.81 1.01
: it ic 0.70 0.70 0.67 0.74 1.25 1.22 1.20 1.28 1.00 1.01 0.96 1.06 1.28 1.26 1.19 1.32
SPDB 0.79 0.78 0.73 0.83 1.32 1.27 1.19 1.38 0.98 0.98 0.92 1.04 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.10
T
T 5 0.73* 0.65 0.60 0.72 1.38 1.43 1.32 1.57 0.94 0.94 0.87 1.02 1.07 1.13 1.05 1.22
: e b 2.97* 1.72 1.17 2.46 0.35* 0.61 0.41 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.94 1.02 1.15 1.12 1.06 1.17
tU A X IA 0.75 0.74 0.69 0.78 1.11 1.11 1.02 1.19 1.02 1.03 0.97 1.09 1.05 1.09 1.04 1.13
3DB 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.91 0.99 1.07 1.06 1.01 1.13 1.32 1.28 1.24 1.32
SDB 0.83 * 0.88 0.84 0.89 1.21 1.20 1.14 1.27 0.81 * 0.90 0.84 0.95 0.77* 0.69 0.62 0.76
ITIty Commercial Banks
3EIJING 0.68 0.72 0.66 0.75 1.33 1.33 1.30 1.37 1.02 1.03 1.00 1.05 1.26 1.29 1.17 1.39
SHANGHAI 1.01 0.96 0.90 1.04 1.07 1.04 1.01 1.09 1.10 1.18 1.08 1.30 1.16* 1.21 1.16 1.26
*ing An 0.80* 0.96 0.87 1.05 1.02 1.00 0.93 1.06 1.15 1.21 1.15 1.29 1.08 1.10 1.05 1.12
TIANJIN 0.63 0.61 0.56 0.64 4.69* 2.26 1.74 3.78 0.65* 2.59 1.41 3.51 1.07* 1.08 1.07 1.13
NANJING 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.90 1.16 1.18 1.11 1.29 1.13 * 0.97 0.60 1.08 0.99 0.85 0.79 1.04
DONGUAN 0.77 0.77 0.73 0.83 1.18 1.20 1.16 1.29 0.99 1.01 0.88 1.09 1.06* 0.98 0.83 1.05
VUXI 0.92 0.80 0.41 1.03 1.11 1.14 0.95 1.22
: h o n q i n g 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.79 1.57* 2.19 1.64 3.59 1.02 1.04 1.00 1.23 1.23 1.13 1.02 1.31
CIAMEN 1.06 1.12 0.97 1.29 1.14* 1.66 1.19 2.36 1.06* 0.62 0.40 1.05 1.19* 1.82 1.21 2.10
vIINGBO 0.90* 0.95 0.90 1.00 1.18 1.20 1.12 1.41 1.07* 0.35 0.22 0.90 1.01 * 1.86 1.30 1.97
<IAN 1.05 1.00 0.91 1.11 1.00 0.93 0.66 1.02 1.06 1.00 0.90 1.10
VUHAN 0.90* 0.98 0.92 1.04 4.26* 2.07 1.62 3.82 0.34* 0.83 0.57 0.98 1.14 1.16 0.96 1.25
QINGDAO 0.75 0.78 0.65 0.86 1.19* 1.51 1.19 2.17 0.86 0.66 0.39 0.89 1.05 1.05 0.84 1.28
IN AN 0.90 0.95 0.89 1.00 1.17 1.37 1.08 2.17 1.09 0.85 0.44 1.12 0.92* 0.60 0.58 0.90
)A LIA N 0.88* 0.99 0.90 1.08 0.97 0.93 0.84 1.00 0.94 0.85 0.49 0.99 0.90* 1.26 0.93 1.84
iA N G ZH O U 0.96 1.02 0.94 1.12 1.42 1.37 1.24 1.70 0.83* 0.36 0.14 0.81 1.51 * 0.81 0.79 1.23
: h a n g s h a 1.36 1.44 1.34 1.58 1.47 1.37 1.32 1.60 0.96 0.71 0.31 0.99 1.14* 0.62 0.55 0.90
SHIJIAZHUANG 0.95 0.99 0.91 1.07 1.13 * 1.25 1.15 1.65 1.06 1.03 0.94 1.11 1.00 0.94 0.68 1.06
SHAOXING 0.88 0.76 0.68 0.92 1.11 1.15 1.08 1.30 0.92* 0.40 0.35 0.52 0.89* 1.50 1.38 1.89
INZHOU 0.91 0.89 0.82 0.94 1.82* 0.96 0.39 1.81 0.66* 0.31 0.23 0.47
.A IW U 0.70* 0.52 0.42 0.56 1.15 * 1.39 1.17 2.11 1.23* 0.53 0.39 0.55
IUJIANG 0.85 1.07 0.80 1.22 1.15 * 1.66 1.56 1.70 1.24* 0.38 0.32 0.49
’ANZHIHUA 0.94* 1.52 1.31 1.55 0.93 * 1.31 1.07 1.57 1.12* 0.42 0.33 0.53
DONGYING 0.90* 0.59 0.59 0.70 1.26* 2.00 1.75 2.02 0.80* 0.27 0.22 0.30
^ENGZHOU 0.71 0.70 0.60 0.73 1.12* 1.58 1.20 1.90
VEIFANG 0.95 0.98 0.80 1.15 1.02* 0.21 0.20 0.36
.IN Y I 0.89 0.97 0.87 1.06 1.44* 2.63 1.66 3.14
“CINXIANG 0.86* 0.64 0.56 0.77 3.71 * 16.82 5.25 28.59
.IU ZHO U 0.79* 0.64 0.61 0.70 1.12* 2.81 2.31 3.09
iU Z H O U 0.86* 0.98 0.90 1.00 1.21 * 2.31 2.02 2.45
CARAMAY 0.55* 0.72 0.70 0.88 1.08 1.02 0.99 1.24
1UANGSHI 0.75* 0.61 0.58 0.65
<UCHANG 0.95 0.98 0.79 1.06
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tanks
Model 2 -2007/2006 
TFP Boot L -B  U -B
Model 2 -  2006/2005 
TFP Boot L -B  U -B
Model 2 -  2005/2004 
TFP Boot L -B  U-B
Model 2 -  2004/2003 
TFP Boot L-B  U-B
[NING 0.80* 0.57 0.48 0.60
HENGDE 0.75* 0.11 0.09 0.13
[ENGYANG 1.04 1.08 0.87 1.19
iANZHOU 0.83* 0.60 0.59 0.64
iUILIN 0.75* 0.64 0.62 0.66
HANYANG 0.85* 0.65 0.63 0.69
IAOZUO 4.29 6.45 3.05 12.94
>EYANG 0.66* 0.42 0.36 0.53
1INTA1 0.65* 0J8 0.35 0.41
HOUZHOU 0.79* 0.55 0.54 0.56
IIANJ1ANG 1.15* 0.44 0.40 0.53
[AXING 0.88* 0.69 0.57 0.82
AILONG 0.79* 0.49 0.47 0.53
VEIHI 0.61 * 2.13 1.28 3.22
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Banks
Model 2 
TFP
—2003/2002 
Boot ii-B U-B
Model! 
TFP' ^
-2002/2001 
Boot L-B U-B
Model 2 
TFP
-2001/2000 
Boot L-B U-B
State-Owned Bai iks
ICBC i l l 1.10 1.05 1.13 1.02 0.98 0.92 1.04 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.86
c c b 0.85 0.87 0.83 0.90 1.14 1.15 1.12 1.20 0.99 1.00 0.95 1.06
\B O C 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.97 1.06 1.08 1.05 1.14
BOC 1.05 1.05 0.99 1.09 1.05 1.03 0.99 1.08 1.05 1.09 1.01 1.13
BoCom 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.96 1.49 • 1.27 1.14 1.41 1.02 0.95 0.90 1.04
Joint Stock Commerdal Banks V •’
CMB 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.88 0.93 0.98 0.92 1.06 1.01 0.96 0.88 1.03
CMBC 0.98 0.96 0.92 1.01 0.% 1.00 0.68 1.21 0.96 * 0.35 0.26 0.71
CITIC 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.86 0.96 0.98 * 0.93 0.91 0.96
SPDB 0.94 0.98 0.92 1.05 0.89 0.96 0.89 1.06 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.95
CIB 0.96 1.02 0.95 1.08 1.05 0.98 0.88 1.12 0.81 0.84 0.72 0.91
CEB 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.88 1.01 1.02 0.93 0.82 1.03
HUAXIA 0.95 0.93 0.86 1.01 1.02 1.07 1.01 1.13 1.12 1.01 0.76 1.20
3D B 0.79 • 0.84 0.80 0.89 1.04 1.05 0.99 1.12 0.72 0.73 0.68 0.79
SDB 1.71 1.85 1.67 2.05 1.00 1.05 0.98 1.16 0.87 0.83 0.74 0.91
City Commercia Banks •i.-
BEIJING 0.95 0.89 0.79 0.99 0.78 0.85 0.77 0.89 0.79 0.70 0.60 0.81
SHANGHAI 1.04 0.99 0.89 1.11 0.84 * 0.98 0.89 1.16 0.33 0.48 0.25 0.76
Ping An 0.94 0.88 0.80 1.00 0.72 0.60 0.47 0.83 0.79 * 0.70 0.62 0.78
TIANJIN 0.85 0.90 0.80 1.04 0.89 0.84 0.75 0.95 1.05 * 0.53 0.52 0.78
NANJING 1.09 121 0.96 1.29 0.81 • 0.79 0.63 0.81 0.99 1.03 0.96 1.13
DONGUAN 0.97 0.83 0.69 0.98 0.91 0.88 0.78 1.03 0.97 * 1.31 1.19 1.59
WUXI 0.98 1.07 0.95 1.18 0.81 0.88 0.71 1.03 0.95 0.99 0.93 1.05
CHONQING 0.79 • 0.33 0.26 0.76 1.01 * 0.60 0.58 0.69 1.76 * 1.08 0.78 1.54
XIAMEN 1.03 * 0.85 0.79 1.01 0.94 • 0.83 0.71 0.92 0.86 * 0.98 0.94 1.01
NINGBO 0.92 1.03 0.79 1.14 0.88 • 0.75 0.66 0.86 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.80
XIAN 0.88 0.81 0.72 0.93 0.88 * 0.75 0.62 0.85 1.04 • 0.70 0.68 0.79
WUHAN 0.97 0.97 0.93 1.07 0.71 0 0.46 0.44 0.55
QINGDAO 1.00 0.67 0.51 1.07 0.78 0 0.68 0.61 0.69
IINAN 0.94 0.98 0.90 1.04 1.05 0 0.89 0.76 1.00
DALIAN 0.86 0.75 0.57 0.88 1.01 0.95 0.83 1.09
HANGZHOU 1.91 • 6.23 3.22 6.48
CHANGSHA 0.84 • 1.95 1.21 2.07
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Banks
Model 2 
TFP
-2000/1999 
Boot L-B U-B
Model 2 
TFP
-1999/1998 
Boot L-B U-B
Model 2-1998/1997 
TFP Boot L-B U-B
State-Owned Banks
ICBC 1.07 1.07 1.05 1.12 1.01 0.99 0.95 1.02 0.98 1.02 0.95 1.13
CCB 1.02 1.00 0.91 1.10 1.08 1.21 1.08 1.36 1.06 0.96 0.81 1.09
ABOC 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.91 0.83 0.80 0.71 0.90 1.06 1.02 0.99 1.08
BOC 1.18 • 1.10 1.08 1.16 0.84 0.88 0.75 1.05 1.02 1.02 0.97 1.08
BoCom 1.10 1.12 1.03 1.20 0.88 0.83 0.73 0.99 1.04 * 0.94 0.87 1.04
Joint Stock Conimercial Banks
CMB 1.23 1.26 1.22 1.35 1.15 1.16 1.06 1.28 1.11 1.14 0.98 1.52
CMBC 0.89 0 1.14 0.92 1.53 1.29 * 0.83 0.74 1.00 1.35 1.23 0.96 1.49
CITIC 1.30 1.25 1.19 1.30 1.35 1.28 1.13 1.53 0.95 1.07 0.87 1.38
SPDB 1.20 1.18 1.09 1.23 1.40 1.43 0.98 2.46 1.14 1.42 1.04 2.59
CIB 0.96 0.89 0.64 1.08 1.02 • 1.44 1.20 1.49 2.16 5.27 1.79 11.33
CEB 1.39 1.38 1.26 1.53 1.20 1.08 0.71 1.28 1.12 1.29 1.04 2.34
HUAXIA 1.04 0 0.65 0.52 0.94 1.15 • 1.65 1.38 2.06 1.02 * 1.82 1.24 1.93
GDB 1.19 1.17 1.12 124 1.20 1.15 1.04 1.45 0.91 0.94 0.87 1.21
SDB 1.02 0.97 0.73 1.05 1.69 2.53 1.65 3.81 1.02 * 2.15 1.17 4.62
City Commerce
BEIJING
tl Banks
1.22 1.31 1.13 1.57 0.91 * 1.83 1.36 1.93 1.18 * 3.20 1.33 5.62
SHANGHAI 1.14 1.11 1.07 1.18 1.09 • 1.42 1.19 1.50 1.02 * 3.00 1.55 3.59
Ping An 1.38 0 0.84 0.76 1.11 0.99 * 1.41 1.40 1.65
TIANJIN 1.27 0 1.14 1.11 124 1.10 • 1.58 1.19 1.95
NANJING 1.08 0 1.34 121 1.36
DONGUAN 1.17 0 0.83 0.65 0.99
WUXI 1.08 0.91 0.66 1.15
CHONQING 0.87 1.06 0.73 1.28
XIAMEN 1.09 0 121 1.15 1.55
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Banks TFP
Model 3 -  2007/2006 
Boot L-B U-B TFP
Model 3 -  2006/2005 
Boot L-B U-B TFP
Model 3 -  2005/2004 
Boot L -B U-B
State-Owned Banks
ICBC 0.99 0.98 0.94 1.00 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.90 1.12 1.13 1.11 1.18
CCB 0.82 0.84 0.74 0.95 1.09 1.13 1.06 1.21 0.93 0.90 0.84 0.94
ABOC 1.15 1.16 1.09 1.28 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.98 1.01 1.03 0.99 1.09
BOC 1.06 1.03 0.95 1.12 1.10 1.11 1.07 1.16 1.04 1.05 1.03 1.09
BoCom 0.79 0.80 0.76 0.84 1.15 1.21 1.15 1.30 0.82 0.80 0.75 0.83
Joint Stock Commercial Banks
CMB 0.90 • 0.84 0.78 0.89 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.95 0.79 0.81 0.76 0.89
CMBC 0.99 0.93 0.87 1.00 1.03 1.01 0.95 1.12 0.83 0.82 0.78 0.88
CITIC 0.73 * 0.67 0.63 0.71 1.04 1.06 1.01 1.11 0.99 0.96 0.91 1.01
SPDB 0.89 0.83 0.74 0.91 1.05 1.10 1.03 1.22 0.93 0.92 0.87 0.96
CIB 0.86 * 0.70 0.64 0.81 1.00 0.99 0.92 1.07 0.90 0.94 0.88 1.02
CEB 0.76 * 0.66 0.59 0.73 1.11 1.21 1.09 1.33 0.80 0.80 0.77 0.84
HUAXIA 0.85 * 0.73 0.67 0.83 0.92 0.86 0.81 0.94 0.88 0.85 0.78 0.90
GDB 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.85 1.08 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.88
SDB 0.98 * 1.05 0.98 1.10 1.09 * 1.22 1.12 1.39 0.70 0.69 0.64 0.74
City Commercial Banks
BEIJING 0.63 0.59 0.53 0.63 1.23 1.21 1.15 1.27 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.97
SHANGHAI 1.08 1.08 0.99 1.13 1.03 1.01 0.97 1.05 1.07 1.13 1.03 1.24
Ping An 0.75 0.77 0.68 0.88 0.93 0.88 0.83 0.96 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.96
TIANJIN 1.24 * 0.84 0.70 1.06 2.23 * 1.36 1.04 2.06 0.58 * 2.40 1.47 3.09
NANJING 0.95 0.94 0.86 1.01 0.93 0.91 0.87 0.97 1.10 1.08 1.01 1.16
DONGUAN 0.75 0.73 0.66 0.82 1.03 1.00 0.95 1.05 0.88 * 0.94 0.89 1.01
WUXI 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.67
CHONQING 0.76 * 0.70 0.68 0.76 1.31 1.40 1.26 1.54 0.90 * 0.86 0.83 0.89
XIAMEN 1.13 • 1.38 1.15 1.67 0.89 0.84 0.80 0.90 0.75 * 0.64 0.55 0.72
NINGBO 1.01 1.04 0.98 1.13 1.04 1.03 0.99 1.09 1.02 1.02 0.98 1.06
XIAN 0.74 0.70 0.64 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.80
WUHAN 0.99 1.04 0.96 1.11 5.93 * 2.98 2.67 4.79 0.19 * 0.36 0.22 0.40
QINGDAO 0.91 • 1.05 0.94 1.10 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.06 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.79
JINAN 0.99 * 1.08 0.99 1.09 0.97 0.98 0.95 1.01 1.14 1.13 1.11 1.15
DALIAN 0.93 1.05 0.90 1.11 0.84 * 0.78 0.74 0.83 0.77 * 0.72 0.67 0.77
HANGZHOU 0.86 0.92 0.85 0.98 1.13 1.07 0.89 1.19 0.61 0.59 0.53 0.62
CHANGSHA 0.96 1.07 0.91 1.20 1.64 1.65 1.57 1.81 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.82
SHIJIAZHUANG 0.94 0.85 0.74 0.98 1.73 * 2.10 1.76 2.75 0.87 0.82 0.74 0.91
SHAOXING 0.74 0.74 0.69 0.75 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.87
JINZHOU 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.85 0.93 0.97 0.91 1.03
LAIWU 0.98 0.88 0.80 0.99 0.38 0.35 0.28 0.41 2.13 * 0.41 0.33 0.64
JIUJIANG 0.88 * 1.06 0.91 1.23 1.09 1.08 1.04 1.12 0.81 0.76 0.69 0.84
PANZHIHUA 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.78 0.81 * 0.86 0.81 0.97 0.95 * 0.26 0.21 0.41
DONGYING 1.02 1.01 0.93 1.09 1.09 * 1.23 1.10 1.29 0.62 0.61 0.55 0.69
ZENGZHOU 0.90 0.87 0.82 0.94 0.80 0.87 0.79 0.90
WEI FANG 0.71 0.67 0.59 0.73 0.94 0.97 0.91 1.01
LINYI 1.28 * 1.56 1.34 1.59 1.10 1.27 1.10 1.38
XINXIANG 0.92 0.91 0.84 0.97 3.27 2.18 1.67 3.30
LIUZHOU 0.88 0.90 0.85 0.94 0.91 0.90 0.84 0.94
HUZHOU 0.96 1.01 0.94 1.05 0.98 0.97 0.88 1.02
KARAMAY 0.78 * 0.68 0.61 0.78 1.07 * 0.92 0.81 1.06
HUANGSHI 0.80 0.82 0.77 0.85
XUCHANG 1.09 1.08 0.99 1.15
JINING 0.89 • 0.80 0.71 0.89
CHENGDE 0.52 * 0.45 0.40 0.52
HENGYANG 1.24 1.46 1.21 1.64
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Banks Model 3 -  2007/2006 TFP Boot L-B U-B
Model 3 -  2006/2005 
TFP Boot L-B U-B
Model 3 -  2005/2004 
TFP Boot L-B U-B
GANZHOU 0.80 0.84 0.77 0.87
GUILIN 0.84 0.78 0.74 0.84
NLANYANG 0.87 0.86 0.82 0.92
JIAOZUO 5.08 3.14 2.39 4.03
DEYANG 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.70
MINTAI 0.63 0.56 0.50 0.65
CHOUZHOU 0.85 0.78 0.76 0.87
ZHANJIANG 0.53 0.51 0.43 0.57
JIAXING 0.91 0.93 0.82 1.01
TA1LONG 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.90
WEIHI 0.52 1.34 0.92 1.85
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Banks
Model 3 -  
TFP Boot
2004/2003 
L-B U-B
Model 3 -  
TFP Boot
2003/2002 
L-B U-B
Model 3 -  
TFP Boot
2002/2001
L-B U-B
State-Owned Banks *
ICBC 0.88 0.89 0.85 0.92 1.03 1.03 0.98 1.07 1.07 1.03 0.99 1.09
CCB 0.99 1.01 0.98 1.05 0.83* 0.76 0.71 0.82 1.05 1.07 0.99 1.15
ABOC 0.90 0.89 0.82 0.95 0.81* 0.77 0.75 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.82
BOC 1.33* 1.23 1.15 1.32 1.07 1.07 1.01 1.11 1.05 1.03 0.99 1.08
BoCom 1.14 1.15 1.13 1.16 0.80* 0.72 0.67 0.78 1.80 1.63 1.44 1.90
Joint Stock Commercial Banks
CMB 1.18 1.18 1.13 1.22 0.66* 0.55 0.52 0.61 0.90* 0.98 0.90 1.07
CMBC 1.10* 0.86 0.77 1.00 0.95* 0.88 0.85 0.93 0.85* 1.03 0.95 1.11
CITIC 1.39* 1.54 1.41 1.61 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.84 0.94* 0.88 0.83 0.94
SPDB 1.11* 1.13 1.11 1.14 0.79 0.75 0.68 0.79 0.62* 0.54 0.50 0.60
CIB 1.04* 1.13 1.05 1.21 0.80* 0.72 0.69 0.77 1.07 1.19 1.06 1.33
CEB 1.28* 1.42 1.33 1.48 0.73* 0.67 0.63 0.71 0.84* 0.76 0.72 0.84
HUAXIA 1.00* 1.05 1.01 1.07 0.84* 0.71 0.65 0.80 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.91
GDB 1.27 1.25 1.20 1.31 0.71 0.75 0.70 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.78 0.91
SDB 1.28 1.24 1.13 1.34 0.84* 0.80 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.73 0.65 0.82
City Commercial Banks
BEIJING 1.25 1.26 1.16 1.39 0.95 0.87 0.79 0.97 0.74 0.78 0.72 0.81
SHANGHAI 1.21* 1.32 1.28 1.38 1.21 1.29 1.13 1.49 0.83 0.91 0.83 0.99
Ping An 1.11* 1.19 1.14 1.21 0.83* 0.64 0.58 0.74 0.67* 0.90 0.72 1.04
TIANJIN 1.11* 1.16 1.15 1.19 0.67* 0.64 0.61 0.66 0.80 0.83 0.78 0.84
NANJING 0.97* 1.02 0.99 1.03 1.17* 1.07 1.04 1.15 0.63 0.67 0.63 0.67
DONGUAN 1.01 0.96 0.92 1.03 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.76 0.78 0.74 0.81
WUXI 1.27 1.33 1.21 1.45 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.91 0.60* 0.56 0.53 0.59
CHONQING 0.90* 0.73 0.65 0.82 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.78 0.85* 1.02 0.89 1.11
XIAMEN 1.08 1.04 1.00 1.10 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.88 1.00
NINGBO 1.04 1.06 1.02 1.08 0.80 0.76 0.71 0.81 0.73* 0.70 0.68 0.72
XIAN 1.13 1.09 1.02 1.15 0.85* 0.72 0.64 0.83 0.77* 0.99 0.82 1.08
WUHAN 1.32* 1.72 1.48 1.83 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.95 0.78 0.83 0.73 0.94
QINGDAO 1.14* 0.93 0.85 1.06 1.06* 0.84 0.71 0.98 0.87* 1.31 1.09 1.47
JINAN 0.83 0.84 0.80 0.86 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.85
DALIAN 1.08* 1.19 1.10 1.25 0.78* 0.68 0.64 0.74 0.82 0.86 0.80 0.89
HANGZHOU 1.99* 1.46 1.36 1.65 1.97 1.89 1.41 2.65
CHANGSHA 1.06* 0.78 0.73 0.91 0.70 0.70 0.67 0.71
SHIJIAZHUANG 1.00 1.03 0.90 1.17
SHAOXING 0.54 0.53 0.48 0.57
JINZHOU 4.85* 2.41 2.17 2.92
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Banks
Model3 — 
TFP Boot
2001/2000 
L -B  U-B
Model 3 -  
TFP Boot
2000/1999 
L-B  U-B
Model 3 -  
TFP Boot
1999/1998 
L-B  U-B
Model 3 -  
TFP Boot
1998/1997 
L-B U-B
State-Owned Banks
ICBC 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.90 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.01 1.08 0.93 0.93 0.86 0.99
CCB 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.96 0.86 0.80 0.68 0.89 1.23* 1.41 1.25 1.70 1.46 1.45 1.41 1.54
ABOC 1.14 1.13 1.12 1.16 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.01 0.89 0.88 0.80 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.89 1.01
BOC 1.10 1.18 1.06 1.21 1.24 1.22 1.19 1.27 0.84 0.88 0.75 1.05 1.03 1.03 0.98 1.10
BoCom 1.00 0.92 0.89 1.02 0.92 0.86 0.79 0.98 0.89 0.82 0.77 0.90 1.14 1.07 1.05 1.14
Joint Stock Commercial Banks
CMB 0.95 0.88 0.78 0.96 0.94 0.90 0.80 1.000.96 0.96 0.92 1.01 1.31 1.50 1.21 1.67
CMBC 0.86 0.82 0.75 0.92 0.66 0.59 0.49 0.71 0.97 0.91 0.81 1.05 1.60 1.52 1.37 1.64
CITIC 0.95 0.93 0.89 0.96 1.12 1.03 0.90 1.18 1.33 1.21 1.12 1.37 0.93 1.05 0.88 1.13
SPDB 0.83 0.81 0.78 0.85 0.94* 0.84 0.74 0.94 2.21 2.26 1.89 2.91 1.20* 0.96 0.91 1.12
CIB 0.73 0.71 0.64 0.77 0.64 0.60 0.52 0.69 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.04 2.19 2.95 2.13 3.69
CEB 1.01* 0.83 0.79 0.89 1.24 1.21 1.07 1.34 1.08 1.10 1.05 1.12 1.11 1.19 1.09 1.28
HUAXIA 1.08* 1.22 1.11 1.39 0.90* 0.78 0.67 0.89 1.19 1.11 0.99 1.33 1.04 1.06 1.01 1.09
GDB 0.69 0.65 0.61 0.71 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.83 1.31 1.20 1.04 1.34 0.99 1.08 0.99 1.20
SDB 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.65 0.78 2.38 2.46 2.30 2.73 0.47 0.46 0.40 0.50
City Commercial Banks
BEIJING 0.80 0.74 0.69 0.81 0.92 0.90 0.79 1.06 0.86* 0.92 0.87 0.94 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.11
SHANGHAI 0.33* 0.58 0.35 0.80 0.98 0.84 0.78 0.98 1.03* 0.97 0.95 1.02 1.06* 1.37 1.17 1.46
Ping An 0.76* 0.68 0.65 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.69 0.83 0.80 0.78 0.74 0.81
TIANJIN 0.99 1.04 0.98 1.12 1.06 1.01 0.91 1.14 1.42 1.47 1.22 1.76
NANJING 0.93 0.96 0.90 1.02 0.98 0.96 0.94 1.00
DONGUAN 1.26 1.26 1.21 1.35 0.76 0.73 0.64 0.83
WUXI 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.94 1.16* 0.84 0.74 1.02
CHONQING 2.07 1.78 1.45 2.17 0.64 0.74 0.63 0.82
XIAMEN 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.82 0.74 0.71 0.59 0.78
NINGBO 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.94
XIAN 0.79* 0.71 0.68 0.76
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Banks
Model 4-2007/2006 
TFP Boot L -B  U-B
Model 4 -  2006/2005 
TFP Boot L-B  U-B
Model 4 -  2005/2004 
TFP Boot L-B  U-B
State-Owned Banlu
ICBC 0.99 0.98 0.94 1.00 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.89 1.06 1.05 1.02 1.11
CCB 0.82 0.85 0.75 0.96 1.09 1.10 1.03 1.17 1.01 1.01 0.96 1.05
ABOC 1.12 1.11 1.03 1.22 1.11* 1.20 1.12 1.28 1.02 1.06 1.01 1.13
BOC 1.06 1.04 0.96 1.13 1.10 1.11 1.07 1.15 1.04 1.04 1.02 1.08
BoCom 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.85 1 19 1.20 1.15 1.26 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.94
Joint Stock Commerdal Banks
CMB 0.89 0.83 0.78 0.88 0.96* 0.90 0.86 0.96 0.87 0.92 0.86 1.00
CMBC 0.94 0.88 0.79 0.97 0.95 0.88 0.77 0.99 0.92 0.93 0.87 1.00
CITIC 0.68 0.63 0.57 0.68 1.12 1.09 1.01 1.19 1.02 1.00 0.96 1.05
SPDB 0.81 0.74 0.65 0.85 1.13 1.18 1.06 1.37 1.04 1.04 0.98 1.10
CIB 0.86 0.71 0.64 0.81 1.01 0.98 0.92 1.07 0.98 1.04 0.97 1.13
CEB 2.36 1.05 0.71 1.60 0.28* 0.45 0.30 0.68 0.86 0.88 0.84 0.93
HUAXIA 0.8S 0.78 0.69 0.87 0.90 0.85 0.76 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.91 1.04
GDB 0.97 0.97 0.90 1.06 0.94 0.90 0.81 0.95 0.81 0.80 0.76 0.83
SDB 0.89 0.99 0.88 1.07 1.23* 1.37 1.26 1.56 0.79 0.79 0.73 0.86
City Commercial Banla
BEIJING 0.62 0.58 0.53 0.63 1.23 120 1.15 1.27 1.01 1.02 0.99 1.03
SHANGHAI 1.08 1.07 0.99 1.14 1.03 1.00 0.96 1.06 1.07 1.12 1.03 1.21
Ping An 0.74 0.81 0.73 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.84 0.99 1.03 1.05 1.00 1.12
TIANJIN 1.23 • 0.83 0.70 1.04 2.23* 1.35 1.04 2.05 0.58* 2.21 1.39 2.88
NANJING 0.94 0.93 0.85 1.01 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.98 1.10* 0.92 0.53 1.09
DONGUAN 1.03 1.02 0.97 1.12 0.88 0.88 0.67 0.96
WUXI 0.75 0.72 0.66 0.82 0.70* 0.47 0.24 0.64
CHONQING 0.76 0.72 0.64 0.79 1.31* 1.75 1.32 2.49 0.89 0.88 0.82 1.00
XIAMEN 1.16 1.30 1.13 1.59 0.89 1.22 0.87 1.51 0.78* 0.37 0.24 0.64
NINGBO 1.04 1.10 1.01 1.18 1.03* 0.29 0.21 0.67
XIAN 1.00 1.08 1.00 1.21 0.69 0.63 0.56 0.69 0.86 0.79 0.51 0.89
WUHAN 0.98 1.02 0.94 1.14 5.93 3.71 2.80 7.11 0.19* 0.34 0.22 0.38
QINGDAO 0.80 0.85 0.71 0.96 1.13* 1.55 1.20 2.11 0.78* 0.52 0.32 0.74
JINAN 0.98 * 1.12 1.01 1.21 1.08* 1.50 1.12 2.37 1.25* 0.88 0.46 1.20
DALIAN 0.92* 1.10 0.95 1.19 0.85 0.80 0.73 0.86 0.87* 0.66 0.36 0.81
HANGZHOU 0.85* 0.97 0.86 1.05 120 1.21 0.99 1.63 0.67* 0.21 0.08 0.50
CHANGSHA 0.96 1.05 0.90 1.17 1.64 1.72 1.59 2.24 0.76* 0.45 0.20 0.72
SHIJIAZHUANG 0.93 0.82 0.71 0.96 1.73* 2.34 1.85 3.93 0.88* 0.79 0.67 0.88
SHAOXING 1.05* 1.23 1.17 1.24 0.97* 0.39 0.39 0.47
JINZHOU 0.83 0.72 0.67 0.88 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.80 1.14* 0.52 0.21 1.06
LAIWU 0.80* 0.66 0.52 0.68 0.39 0.50 0.31 0.62 2.36* 1.32 1.14 1.36
JIUJIANG 0.88* 1.17 0.90 1.31 1.09 * 1.48 1.39 1.51 1.24* 0.39 0.32 0.50
PANZHIHUA 0.73 • 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.85* 1.19 1.05 1.29 1.07* 0.42 0.32 0.49
DONGYING 1.04 * 0.78 0.78 0.89 1.10* 1.55 1.44 1.55 0.74* 0.23 0.23 0.25
ZENGZHOU 0.85 0.80 0.74 0.89 0.84* 1.01 0.87 1.08
WEIFANG 0.76 0.68 0.53 0.83 0.95* 0.19 0.17 0.28
LINY1 1.24 • 1.51 1.33 1.65 1.82* 4.86 3.04 5.73
XINXIANG 0.92* 0.71 0.64 0.84 3.70* 21.57 7.24 33.86
LIUZHOU 0.87* 0.80 0.73 0.86 1.10* 3.18 2.45 3.21
HUZHOU 0.96* 1.18 1.13 1.24 1.40* 3.31 2.81 3.58
KARAMAY 0.53* 0.66 0.64 0.83 1.07 0.99 0.97 1.30
HUANGSHI 0.78* 0.72 0.64 0.74
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Banks Model 4 -  2007/2006 TFP Boot L -B  U-B
Model 4 -  2006/2005 
TFP Boot L-B  U-B
Model 4 -  2005/2004 
TFP Boot L-B U-B
XUCHANG 1.09 1.18 0.96 1.21
JINING 0.80* 0.52 0.46 0.61
CHENGDE 0.67* 0.10 0.08 0.11
HENGYANG 1.24 1.50 1.18 1.64
GANZHOU 0.88* 0.77 0.69 0.77
GUILIN 0.84* 0.81 0.77 0.82
NIANYANG 0.87* 0.69 0.67 0.70
JIAOZUO 5.47 11.40 5.05 22.69
DEYANG 0.65* 0.47 0.42 0.52
MINTAI 0.64* 0.40 0.40 0.40
CHOUZHOU 0.92* 0.72 0.72 0.74
ZHANJIANG 0.90* 0.35 0.25 0.43
JIAXING 0.91 * 0.70 0.58 0.86
TAILONG 0.83* 0.58 0.52 0.61
WEIHI 0.49* 1.65 1.07 2.37
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Banks TFP
Model 4 -  2004/2003 
Boot L-B U-B TFP
Model 4-2003/2002 
Boot L-B U-B
Model 4 -  2002/2001 
TFP Boot L -B U-B
State-Owned Banks
ICBC 0.90 0.92 0.88 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.90 0.99 1.04 0.99 0.94 1.05
CCB 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.03 0.85 0.84 0.79 0.90 1.01 0.96 0.89 1.04
ABOC 0.83 0.80 0.73 0.87 0.83 * 0.78 0.76 0.83 0.76 * 0.72 0.66 0.76
BOC 1.33 * 1.23 1.15 1.33 1.12 1.16 1.11 1.21 1.06 1.03 1.00 1.08
BoCom 1.13 1.14 1.12 1.17 0.81 • 0.74 0.70 0.80 1.83 1.67 1.48 1.90
Joint Stock Commercial Banks
CMB 1.21 1.22 1.17 1.27 0.66 * 0.59 0.55 0.64 0.90 0.97 0.90 1.08
CMBC 1.14 • 0.98 0.85 1.11 0.94 • 0.88 0.84 0.93 0.89 0.92 0.59 1.10
CITIC 1.43 1.57 1.42 1.69 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.84 0.95 0.92 0.87 0.96
SPDB 1.16 1.18 1.16 1.20 0.81 0.80 0.75 0.83 0.61 0.57 0.52 0.62
CIB 1.09 • 1.20 1.10 1.29 0.83 « 0.78 0.75 0.81 1.09 1.07 0.95 1.25
CEB 137 * 1.53 1.42 1.63 0.72 * 0.68 0.63 0.71 0.83 * 0.74 0.69 0.82
HUAXIA 1.04 • 1.11 1.05 1.15 0.83 0.73 0.66 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.90
GDB 137 1.23 1.19 1.31 0.68 0.73 0.68 0.79 0.87 0.85 0.76 0.93
SDB 1.15 1.13 1.02 135 1.01 • 0.90 0.81 1.00 0.81 0.78 0.69 0.86
| City Coaunerdal Banks
BEIJING 136 1.27 1.17 1.40 0.96 0.89 0.81 0.99 0.74 0.77 0.71 0.80
SHANGHAI 132 • 134 1.29 1.40 1.21 1.31 1.14 1.51 0.83 * 0.95 0.85 1.13
Ping An 1.13 • 1.20 1.14 1.24 0.86 * 0.71 0.64 0.84 0.63 0.47 0.46 0.66
TIANJIN 1.11 • 1.17 1.15 1.23 0.67 0.66 0.62 0.72 0.81 0.71 0.67 0.82
NANJING 0.97 0.81 0.76 0.99 1.18 1.41 1.11 1.48 0.67 * 0.55 0.54 0.55
DONGUAN 1.07 1.00 0.85 1.08 0.91 * 0.75 0.64 0.90 0.76 * 0.69 0.60 0.70
WUXI 138 1.51 1.25 1.61 0.91 0.93 0.86 1.02 0.62 * 0.56 0.52 0.61
CHONQING 0.95 * 0.80 0.61 0.91 0.75 * 0.29 0.24 0.66 1.24 * 0.99 0.94 1.05
XIAMEN 1.08 • 1.72 1.17 2.00 0.92 * 0.74 0.70 0.86 1.01 * 0.81 0.81 1.00
NINGBO 1.05 • 1.96 1.43 2.11 0.80 0.81 0.57 0.87 0.88 * 0.84 0.82 0.87
XIAN 1.18 1.13 1.08 1.18 0.90 0.84 0.75 0.97 0.75 * 0.60 0.59 0.63
WUHAN 1.32 • 1.62 1.35 1.78 0.93 0.93 0.89 1.00 0.79 * 0.60 0.60 0.66
QINGDAO 1.23 1.38 1.07 1.42 1.11 0.81 0.63 1.32 0.75 * 0.63 0.63 0.64
JINAN 0.87 • 0.55 0.53 0.78 0.99 1.05 0.94 1.05 0.99 0.85 0.85 0.99
DALIAN 1.05 • 1.68 1.19 2.54 0.83 * 0.69 0.55 0.79 0.76 * 0.63 0.59 0.65
HANGZHOU 1.99 • 1.38 1.38 1.59 1.91 * 6.26 3.22 6.48
CHANGSHA 1.09 * 0.53 0.50 0.72 0.69 * 1.41 0.90 1.42
SHIJIAZHUANG 1.00 0.93 0.66 1.11
SHAOXING 0.55 * 0.85 0.56 0.95
JINZHOU 5.33 10.19 3.99 14.63
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Banks
Model 4-2001/2000 
TFP Boot L-B U-B
Model 4-20000999 
TFP Boot L-B U-B
Model 4-1999/1998 
TFP Boot L-B U-B TFP
Model 4-1998/1997 
Boot L-B U-B
State-Ownct I Banks
ICBC 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.93 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.02 1.09 0.89 0.86 0.79 0.9:
CCB 0.90 0.88 0.84 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.74 0.96 1.10 1.15 0.99 1.37 1.37 1.32 1.26 1.4
ABOC 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.06 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.05 0.95 0.96 0.89 1.03 1.01 1.02 0.98 1.0
HOC 1.10 1.17 1.06 1.21 1.24 1.23 1.20 1.27 0.84 0.86 0.75 1.00 1.03 1.02 0.97 1.0
BoCom 1.02 0.95 0.90 1.05 1.02 1.00 0.95 1.05 0.93 0.86 0.80 0.98 1.15 1.13 1.06 1.2
Joint Stock Commercial Banks'
CMB 0.98 0.94 0.85 1.02 1.00 0.96 0.88 1.06 1.11 1.16 1.05 1.30 1.40 • 1.75 1.45 2.4:
CMBC 0.94 • 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.58 0.92 1.34 * 0.94 0.79 1.12 1.54 1.46 1.20 1.6>
CITIC 0.96 • 0.91 0.89 0.94 1.24 • 1.16 1.11 1.22 1.41 1.36 1.25 1.61 0.93 1.04 0.88 1.2
SPDB 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.86 1.08 * 0.97 0.86 1.06 2.04 2.22 1.60 3.94 1.19 1.46 1.05 2.6*
CIB 0.74 0.70 0.60 0.77 0.67 • 0.51 0.43 0.63 0.99 * 1.36 1.19 1.46 2.02 • 9.65 3.29 20.1
CEB 1.06 • 0.91 0.87 0.99 1.31 1.33 1.20 1.46 1.22 1.12 0.74 1.31 1.12 1.25 1.04 2.2.
IIUAXIA 1.16 1.07 0.80 1.30 0.96 • 0.56 0.45 0.82 1.08 * 1.46 1.23 1.89 0.95 * 1.64 1.11 1.61
GDB 0.70 0.70 0.64 0.78 0.89 0.90 0.84 0.96 1.33 1.22 1.07 1.59 0.98 1.09 0.97 1.4
SDB 0.69 0.66 0.58 0.70 0.90 • 0.77 0.60 0.85 2.54 * 4.10 2.79 5.44 0.46 • 0.77 0.47 1.3'
City Comm nrdal Banks
BEIJING 0.82 0.74 0.65 0.82 0.97 0.88 0.74 1.07 0.83 * 1.57 1.16 1.62 1.03 * 2.54 1.11 4.4
SHANGHAI 033 0.48 0.25 0.72 1.00 * 0.86 0.82 0.95 1.09 * 1.41 1.19 1.47 1.03 * 3.00 1.58 3.7'
I ’ing An 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.85 0.86 * 0.40 0.36 0.49 0.63 * 0.70 0.66 0.73
TIANJIN 1.04 • 0.53 0.51 0.73 1.13 * 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.11 * 1.46 1.14 1.89
NANJING 0.99 1.03 0.95 1.12 0.97 • 1.10 1.10 1.11
DONGUAN 1.19 • 1.83 1.75 2.06 0.83 • 0.50 0.41 0.52
WUXI 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.96 1.15 0.93 0.75 1.35
CHONQING 1.96 • 1.11 0.88 1.57 0.81 1.05 0.76 1.10
XIAMEN 0.80 • 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.82 0.81 0.61 1.01
NINGBO 0.85 • 0.98 0.98 0.98
XIAN 0.94 • 0.64 0.62 0.65
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Banks TFP
Model 5 -  2007/2006 
Boot L -B U-B TFP
Model 5-2006/2005 
Boot L-B U-B
Model 5 -  2005/2004 
TFP Boot L-B U-B
State-Owned Banks
ICBC 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.93 1.03 1.03 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01
CCB 1.01 1.05 0.96 1.15 0.95 0.94 0.90 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.05
ABOC 1.12 * 1.08 1.10 1.11 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.10 1.28 * 1.46 1.31 1.73
BOC 1.02 1.03 0.98 1.09 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.92 0.91 0.87 0.93
BoCom 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.79 1.11 1.13 1.09 1.17 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.92
Joint Stock Commercial Banks
CMB 0.97 0.99 0.95 1.03 1.03 * 1.04 1.03 1.05 0.92 0.94 0.87 1.06
CMBC 0.95 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.96 1.16 1.14 1.07 1.21
CITIC 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.70 1.13 * 1.13 1.12 1.16 1.13 1.14 1.11 1.20
SPDB 0.91 0.87 0.80 0.94 1.11 * 1.13 1.10 1.21 0.97 0.94 0.89 0.99
CIB 0.88 • 0.84 0.82 0.87 1.06 * 1.06 1.05 1.06 0.90 0.91 0.86 0.96
CEB 0.83 0.79 0.72 0.86 1.14 1.17 1.11 1.26 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.97
HUAXIA 0.92 • 0.92 0.91 0.91 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.10 1.00 0.99 0.94 1.06
GDB 0.79 0.78 0.73 0.83 1.10 * 1.03 0.93 1.10 0.61 0.58 0.47 0.62
SDB 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.95 1.03 * 1.07 1.03 1.19 0.93 0.92 0.86 0.99
City Commercial Banks
BEIJING 0.70 0.72 0.67 0.75 1.19 * 1.17 1.16 1.20 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.09
SHANGHAI 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.94 1.14 * 1.14 1.12 1.15 0.97 0.98 0.93 1.05
Ping An 0.81 * 0.91 0.85 0.93 1.23 * 1.25 1.22 1.32 0.80 0.82 0.79 0.87
TIANJIN 0.67 0.69 0.64 0.70 4.84 * 2.57 1.71 4.06 0.60 * 1.98 0.95 3.47
NANJING 0.94 0.96 0.90 1.00 1.01 * 1.00 0.99 1.01 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.85
DONGUAN 0.92 0.89 0.83 0.97 0.88 ♦ 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.98 1.00 0.97 1.05
WUXI 0.77 0.79 0.75 0.84
CHONQING 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.81 1.13 * 1.14 1.11 1.16 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.98
XIAMEN 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.12 0.96 * 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.81 0.78 0.66 0.87
NINGBO 0.98 1.00 0.96 1.05 1.11 * 1.11 1.10 1.13 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.03
XIAN 0.94 * 0.93 0.87 0.96 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.94
WUHAN 0.83 * 0.90 0.84 0.91 4.86 * 2.84 2.61 4.13 0.11 * 0.19 0.14 0.21
QINGDAO 0.76 0.80 0.75 0.84 1.02 * 1.02 1.01 1.03 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.63
JINAN 0.76 0.81 0.76 0.81 1.37 * 1.37 1.36 1.38 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.05
DALIAN 0.51 0.57 0.50 0.63 1.30 * 1.28 1.21 1.35 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.71
HANGZHOU 0.87 0.88 0.83 0.92 1.00 * 0.94 0.81 1.01 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.85
CHANGSHA 0.93 0.98 0.86 1.05 1.04 * 1.07 1.00 1.17 1.08 1.03 0.91 1.12
SHIJIAZHUANG 1.53 * 1.73 1.50 2.20 0.65 0.65 0.58 0.72
SHAOXING 0.75 0.76 0.72 0.76 1.10 * 1.10 1.10 1.11 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.90
JINZHOU 1.05 ♦ 1.06 1.05 1.06 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.73
LAIWU 0.73 * 0.70 0.65 0.73 0.68 * 0.65 0.55 0.70 1.43 * 0.41 0.23 0.84
JIUJIANG 0.40 * 0.47 0.41 0.52 1.70 * 1.69 1.65 1.71 0.76 0.75 0.70 0.80
PANZHIHUA 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.97 1.00 0.96 1.11 0.99 * 0.40 0.23 0.74
DONGYING 0.92 * 0.82 0.82 0.87 0.95 * 0.99 0.95 1.02 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.68
ZENGZHOU 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.03 0.82 * 0.82 0.81 0.83
WEIFANG 0.93 * 0.93 0.89 0.94
LINYI 1.18 1.20 1.17 1.22 0.91 * 0.90 0.86 0.92
XINXIANG 0.86 0.84 0.79 0.88 1.95 * 1.41 0.95 1.98
LIUZHOU 0.79 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.97 0.96 0.92 0.98
HUZHOU 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.88 1.05 * 1.04 0.97 1.07
KARAMAY 3.44 • 2.66 2.29 3.28 1.33 1.16 1.02 1.32
HUANGSHI 0.76 0.77 0.73 0.78
Chapter 6 Productivity in Chinese Banks 186
Banks TFP
Model 5-2007/2006 
Boot L-B U-B
Model 5 -  2006/2005 
TFP Boot L-B  U-B
Model 5 -  2005/2004 
TFP Boot L-B U-B
XUCHANG 0.97 0.98 0.91 1.01
JINING 0.78 0.73 0.67 0.80
CHENGDE 0.61 0.60 0.55 0.64
HENGYANG 1.40 1.47 1.25 1.67
GANZHOU 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.70
GUILIN 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63
NIANYANG 0.78 * 0.80 0.78 0.80
JIAOZUO 2.78 * 1.72 1.20 2.54
DEYANG 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.87
MINTAI 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98
CHOUZHOU 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.03
ZHANJIANG 0.56 0.56 0.49 0.62
JIAXING 0.93 0.91 0.83 0.98
TAILONG 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.82
WEIHI 0.41 * 0.93 0.70 1.12
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Banks
Model 5-2004/2003 
TFP Boot L -B U-B TFP
Mode! 5 -  2003/2002 
Boot L-B U-B TFP
Model 5 -  2002/2001 
Boot L-B U-B
State-Owned Banks
ICBC 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.92 1.06 1.04 0.97 1.12
CCB 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.98 1.01 * 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.94
ABOC 0.84 0.87 0.80 0.95 0.95 * 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.84 0.76 0.89
BOC 1.33 * 1.21 1.13 1.31 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.09 1.09 1.07 1.04 1.12
BoCom 1.06 1.06 1.02 1.09 0.99 * 0.94 0.97 0.95 1.57 1.37 1.20 1.59
Joint Stock Commercial Banks
CMB 1.04 1.05 0.99 1.12 0.82 * 0.77 0.81 0.78 1.04 1.06 0.98 1.19
CMBC 1.01 0.98 0.92 1.06 1.05 * 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.51 1.58 1.45 1.70
CITIC 1.14 1.22 1.10 1.36 0.98 * 0.97 1.02 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.98
SPDB 0.99 * 1.03 1.00 1.04 0.98 * 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.80
CIB 0.95 0.98 0.91 1.06 0.97 * 0.94 0.94 0.94 1.11 1.17 1.10 1.31
CEB 0.96 1.07 0.96 1.17 0.87 * 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.96 0.97 0.93 1.00
HUAXIA 0.93 0.98 0.93 1.02 1.04 * 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.06
GDB 1.28 * 1.21 1.18 1.27 0.86 * 0.99 1.06 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.82 1.03
SDB 0.84 0.85 0.78 0.91 1.08 * 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.95 1.09
City Commercial Banks
BEIJING 1.03 1.03 0.93 1.13 1.10 * 1.03 0.97 0.97 0.93 1.00 0.92 1.02
SHANGHAI 1.04 1.08 1.02 1.13 1.20 * 1.27 1.33 1.34 1.02 1.06 0.98 1.17
Ping An 0.96 1.03 0.94 1.12 0.83 * 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.57 0.59 0.55 0.62
TIANJIN 0.53 * 0.59 0.53 0.65 0.89 * 0.84 0.84 0.84 1.26 1.28 1.25 1.32
NANJING 0.90 * 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.37 * 0.37 0.33 0.37 1.41 1.50 1.34 1.69
DONGUAN 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.88 1.17 * 1.17 1.17 1.17 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.69
WUXI 1.07 1.16 1.05 1.29 1.03 * 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.73 0.71 0.66 0.74
CHONQING 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.32 1.29 1.22 1.33
XIAMEN 1.10 1.06 1.01 1.15 1.07 * 1.18 1.22 1.12 0.96 0.95 0.87 1.04
NINGBO 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.88 0.86 * 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.80 0.86
XIAN 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.99 1.15 * 1.19 1.16 1.17 0.75 * 0.72 0.70 0.74
WUHAN 2.16 1.94 1.67 2.22 0.82 * 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.63 0.75 0.61 0.96
QINGDAO 0.81 0.72 0.63 0.82 1.20 * 1.23 1.40 1.22 1.38 1.38 1.25 1.55
JINAN 0.62 * 0.67 0.63 0.69 1.12 * 1.09 1.08 1.08 0.87 0.88 0.85 0.90
DALIAN 1.03 1.02 0.92 1.13 1.05 * 1.02 0.98 1.04 1.14 1.09 1.09 1.16
HANGZHOU 1.28 1.30 1.17 1.42 2.33 * 1.58 1.34 1.96
CHANGSHA 0.64 0.65 0.56 0.76 0.80 ♦ 0.83 0.83 0.83
SHIJIAZHUANG 1.39 1.36 1.20 1.54
SHAOXING 0.41 0.40 0.36 0.41
JINZHOU 1.03 * 1.15 1.06 1.19
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Model 5 -2001/200Q Model 5 -  2000/1999
Banks TFP Boot L-B U-B TFP Boot L-B U-B
State-Owned Banks
ICBC 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.92 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.14
CCB 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.94 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.17
ABOC 1.02 * 0.99 0.98 1.02 1.07 1.05 1.01 1.07
BOC 1.09 1.17 1.06 1.18 1.08 1.02 0.92 1.12
BoCom 1.01 0.96 0.87 1.07 0.80 0.84 0.80 0.86
Joint Stock Commercial Banks
CMB 0.95 0.94 0.87 0.99 1.10 1.13 1.07 1.23
CMBC 0.73 0.68 0.60 0.76 0.86 * 1.01 0.87 1.21
CITIC 1.10 1.10 1.08 1.13 1.08 1.07 1.04 1.08
SPDB 0.95 * 0.92 0.87 0.95 1.04 1.07 1.02 1.16
CIB 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.92 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.86
CEB 1.21 1.12 1.06 1.22 1.07 1.14 1.05 1.28
HUAXIA 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.04 0.97 0.98 0.96 1.02
GDB 0.62 0.63 0.57 0.70 1.35 1.39 1.32 1.49
SDB 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.11 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.96
City Commercial Ba nks
BEUING 1.02 0.88 0.83 1.03 0.82 0.92 0.82 0.93
SHANGHAI 0.80 * 0.63 0.51 0.79 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.94
Ping An 0.86 0.89 0.86 0.91 1.45 1.56 1.43 1.75
TIANJIN 0.99 0.98 0.95 1.05 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.87
NANJING 0.87 0.90 0.85 0.95 0.86 0.84 0.74 0.93
DONGUAN 1.49 1.50 1.48 1.58 0.75 0.74 0.69 0.77
WUXI 0.96 0.98 0.96 1.01 0.86 * 0.64 0.52 0.81
CHONQING 1.90 1.54 1.27 1.92 0.39 0.46 0.38 0.49
XIAMEN 0.84 0.82 0.74 0.90 0.79 0.82 0.71 0.94
NINGBO 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.04
XIAN 0.89 * 0.87 0.85 0.89
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Banks TFP
Model 5 -1999/1998 
Boot L-B U -B TFP
Model 5 -1998/1997 
Boot L-B U-B
State-Owned Banks
ICBC 1.39 1.35 1.30 1.39 0.75 0.74 0.67 0.82
CCB 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.57 2.82 2.90 2.63 3.22
ABOC 0.43 0.42 0.38 0.46 2.44 2.55 2.44 2.75
BOC 0.82 0.87 0.72 1.05 1.11 1.15 1.05 1.25
BoCom 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.46 2.23 2.15 2.14 2.28
Joint Stock Commercial Banks
CMB 0.60 0.60 0.51 0.68 2.38 2.40 2.13 2.67
CMBC 0.54 0.56 0.51 0.65 2.24 2.12 1.83 2.45
CITIC 0.97 0.85 0.64 1.04 1.10 1.15 0.93 1.41
SPDB 1.30 1.31 1.06 1.65 1.77 1.70 1.44 1.99
CIB 0.58 0.59 0.52 0.63 3.19 3.15 2.33 4.28
CEB 0.98 0.99 0.86 1.11 1.95 1.79 1.45 2.24
HUAXIA 0.57 0.59 0.53 0.69 1.97 1.93 1.78 2.20
GDB 0.77 0.77 0.60 0.93 1.14 1.16 0.96 1.41
SDB 1.50 1.49 1.29 1.74 0.99 0.95 0.82 1.09
City Commercial Banks
BEUING 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.55 1.28 1.30 1.23 1.35
SHANGHAI 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.67 3.44 3.28 2.84 3.56
Ping An 0.53 0.54 0.47 0.60
TIANJIN 0.84 0.82 0.70 0.94
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Chapter 7
Chinese Banking: A Network Data Envelopment Analysis
Framework
“An approximate answer to the right problem is worth a good deal more than an exact 
answer to an approximate problem” John Tukey
7.1. Introduction
The past twenty years have seen a multitude of studies employing conventional DEA 
analysis in evaluating bank efficiency. These studies have provided some information 
about the relative position of certain banks against local ‘best practice’. In the case of 
significant inefficiency, the management of the inefficient bank is alerted that there is 
a production problem, but is none the wiser as to where the focus of change needs to 
concentrate. In principle, the methodology of network data envelopment analysis 
provides management with information about the areas of operational inefficiency.
As Avkiran (2009) notes, “An organization that is not constantly acquiring 
knowledge, sourced internally from various divisions, or externally, is condemned to 
lose its competitive advantage”. It is argued that management focus has been shifting 
from strategic planning to organizational learning (Bartlet and Ghosal, 1985) whereby 
management develops a capacity to respond flexibly and rapidly to change. As 
Avkiran (2009) argues, responding to change is more effective if operational 
inefficiencies are readily identifiable and so efficiency analysis of organisational 
divisions within the production unit is an integral part of organisational learning. The 
banking industry is a rapidly evolving global institution. As Matthews and Thompson
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(2008) describe it, the modem bank is a multifaceted financial institution, staffed by 
multi-skilled personnel, conducting multi-task operations. The modem bank is 
evolving from a vertically integrated structure towards a more complex network of 
specialist functions in what Llewellyn (1996) calls contract banking -  a contract to 
deliver financial services organised on multiple sources. In this aspect, Chinese banks 
are no different from its Western economy counterparts. While it can be argued that 
Chinese bank management lags behind Western banks, its rapid evolution and 
continuing pace of reform has narrowed the managerial gap. Understanding the source 
of operational inefficiencies is as important to Chinese bank mangers as to their 
Western counterparts.
This chapter applies the concept of network DEA introduced in Chapter 3 to evaluate 
the internal efficiency of the 14 national banks that dominate the Chinese banking 
market. The chapter is organised on the following lines. The next section describes 
the motivation and conceptual framework. Section 3 reviews the theoretical model 
and the optimisation exercise. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 shows the results. 
Section 6 discusses the value-added from the exercise and concludes.
7.2 Conceptual Framework
The standard application of DEA to banking follows either the intermediation or 
production methods. These methods were reviewed in earlier chapters and will not be 
elaborated here. In this chapter inputs are captured by operational costs (non-interest 
expenses) and interest expenses. Output is measured by net interest income and net 
non-interest income. This method effectively measures the bank’s profit efficiency 
because the variables are directly from the profit and loss account of the bank’s
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income statement81. If there is k= \,2,...K DMUs, q= 1,2,...Q outputs (yq), and 
n= 1,2,...A inputs (x„) and the price of inputs for each k DMU is given by {w„ k} and
the price of outputs for each k DMU is given by {pq k}, the profit efficiency model 
within the DEA framework as described by Zhou (2003) is;
Q N
Ma*Lp<i.*y<,* -  H wn.kxn.k (7.i)
<7-1 n -1
£ * „ ;»  =  1,2,...AT
K
Subject to ^ y qv} = \,2,-Q  (7.2)
k-\
k = 1 , 2 , >  0
Equations (7.1) and (7.2) describe the optimisation for the constant returns to scale 
model (CRS). In the case of the variable returns to scale model the additional
K
constraint of add = 1 is made.
* - i
The internal functional structure of Chinese banks have evolved progressively from 
the simple task of taking deposits from households and making loans to state owned 
enterprises. The modem Chinese bank has a functional structure dominated by the 
retail bank activity. Wholesale, Investment and Private banking is in its infancy and 
even today Consumer banking remains undeveloped. However, the sector churning 
from the surplus household sector to the deficit corporate sector has moved over to a 
more balanced internal structure which can be characterised by three profit centres,
“  Examples of other studies that have used these input and output variables include Miller and Noulas 
(1996), Avkiran (1999), and Sturm and Williams (2004).
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namely, corporate banking, consumer banking and treasury banking. Table 7.1 shows 
the typical divisional functionalities of the modem Chinese bank.
The traditional business of banking in China was taking deposits from households and 
lending to SOEs. During the 1990s and following the first stage of banking reform, 
the banks gradually extended loans to the non-SOE sector.
Table 7.1 The divisional functionalities of commercial bank
Corporate Banking Consumer Banking Treasury
Providing services to Providing services to retail •  foreign exchange
corporate customers, customers transactions
government authorities •  current accounts •  customer-based
and financial institutions •  demand deposits interest rate and
•  current accounts •  time deposits foreign exchange
•  deposits •  investment savings derivative
•  overdrafts products transactions
•  lending •  credit and debit •  money market
•  custody cards transactions
•  trade related products •  consumer loans and •  bill market
•  other credit facilities mortgages. transactions
•  foreign currency •  proprietary trading
•  derivative products and asset and
liability management
Corporate banking remains the dominant area of bank lending in China however in 
recent years consumer loans, largely mortgages, have emerged as a fast growing area 
of business. Lending to households began in earnest with reform of house ownership. 
Under the planning regime, houses were allocated to workers according to rank by the 
SOEs. In the mid 1990s, the central government allowed workers of SOEs to purchase 
properties from the enterprises they worked for. Lending to households began to grow 
from small ticket loans for auto purchase and home improvements to full mortgages.
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Consumer banking in recent years is dominated by mortgage lending. Auto-financing 
was popular in the late 1990s and early 2000s but has shrunk because of high default 
rates, while mortgages are viewed as relatively safe because of its collateralised 
nature. In 2007, mortgages accounted for more than 70 percent of consumer loans82. 
Other areas of consumer banking such as credit cards remain undeveloped. Chinese 
households use credit cards in the same way Western consumers use debit cards, and 
pay off all their borrowing within the stipulated credit period. Consequently the credit 
card sector remains a loss-making business in China.
The growth of high income earners has prompted banks to develop a hitherto 
unknown area of consumer banking in China, namely private banking. Private 
banking provides tailor made products to VIP customers. For example ICBC reports 3 
million ‘Elite Club’ customers out of a total of 170 million consumer customers, in 
2007.
Treasury operations have developed as the residual function of the banks, sandwiched 
between corporate and consumer banking. The current commercial banking law 
stipulates that the bank’s loan-to-deposit ratio should not exceed 75%. Treasury 
management has evolved as a result of managing the funding surplus to meet liquidity 
requirements and maximise profit. Treasury operations have evolved from interbank 
and money-market activity which has traditionally been a passive exercise to active 
bond and bill transactions in the government and commercial bill market.
Sector churning continues to be present in Chinese banks. Typically, the consumer
S2 CBRC Annual Report 2007
Chapter 7 Chinese Banking: A Network Data Envelopment Analysis Framework 195
banking division continues to internally finance the Corporate and Treasury divisions 
of the bank, although the picture has become more complex in recent years. In the 
next section, I develop a framework to examine the internal flow of financing and 
revenue generation within the three profit centres as a network DEA (NDEA) 
framework.
73  Methodology
The general NDEA model was introduced in chapter 3 and will not be elaborated 
further. However, what was described in Chapter 3 was a system that could be 
described as a serial network that sees the organisational structure as a vertical 
integration of production in stages or divisions. In this chapter I introduce an adapted 
version that satisfies the particular framework of Chinese banks discussed in the 
previous section. Basically the version described in this chapter can be thought of as a 
parallel structure which separates production into consecutive units that interact with 
each other.
Basically, there are k = 1,2,... 14 banks (DMUs) in the analysis. There are five SOCBs 
and 9 JSCBs in total. There are two primary inputs, interest expense and non-interest 
expense, denoted as {xb x„} respectively. Interest expense is the total interest cost of 
borrowed funds (customer’s deposits and interbank borrowing). Non-interest 
expenses include, personnel expenses and rental, building maintenance, information 
technology etc. Final outputs are net interest income and net non-interest income
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denoted as {yb y„}. The intermediate input {xm} and output {ym} relates to interest 
income only83.
The inputs and outputs corresponding to the k =1,2,... 14 banks in the analysis must 
satisfy the following properties:
yq.k  ^o 
q = i,n 
it = 1,2,...14
There are three profit centres. These are corporate (centre 1), consumer (centre 2) and 
Treasury (centre 3). For the bank the allocation of the primary input and final 
output is described by;
+*».* ZXnJ*
y!jt +yfj, +yh y^,* 
ylj, + ylj, +  y l s  ^y»j,
(7.3)
Non-negative intensity factors are used to capture the extent of the participation of a 
given profit centre in the production process. So for final outputs {a,, Ppj= 1,2,3} is 
the profit centre contribution of net interest and net non-interest income respectively. 
For primary inputs {yjt Sj, j - 1,2,3} is the profit centre utilisation of interest and 
non-interest expense respectively. For intermediate input and output only interest
13 In reality the non-interest expense of each profit centre will be included in the internal price charged 
to other profit centres.
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expense and interest income is used for the reasons discussed above. The intermediate 
output {ay, j= 1 ,2 ,3} is the profit centre internal production of interest income and the 
intermediate input {bj, j= 1,2,3} is the profit centre utilisation of interest expense. 
The parallel structure of the internal flow of funds between the three profit centres is 
described in Figure 1 below.
Figure 7.1 Divisional flow of funds
Centre 1
m,i (?C m,i)
Primary
Input
(xb x»)
Final
Output
(yi>yn)Centre 2
m,i ( x  m,i)
Centre 3
Figure 7.1 shows the internal flow of funds among three divisions. As aforesaid, 
Centre 2 (Consumer banking) is the funding provider. Therefore the surplus from 
Centre 2 is channelled to either Centre 1 (Corporate banking) or Centre 3 (Treasury 
banking). Here I assume the surplus funding will go to Centre 1 first than flow to 
Centre 3. The implicit assumption is that corporate banking is the key business and 
the return is strong and stable. The surplus from Centre 1 goes to Centre 3. The figure 
shows that the intermediate output from centre 1 and 2  act as intermediate inputs to 
Centre 3 but there is no intermediate output from Centre 3. Similarly, the intermediate 
output of Centre 2 feeds into Centre 3 as intermediate inputs.
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The structure of each profit centre is described by the following sets of equations;
Profit centre 1 (Corporate banking^
Final output
3
(7)y',.t ^a, E-Va
y-i
Primary input
7-1
7=1
7=1
Intermediate output
3
Intermediate input
3
Profit centre 2 (Consumer banking)
FiVwj/ output
yfj, ^ Z - ^ a
7=1
* a Z
7=1
Primary input
(7.4)
(7.5)
^ , z ^  <7-6)
y-i
(?'7>
j-i
(7.8)
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j -1 
3
>1
Intermediate output
3
Intermediate input
Profit centre 3 (Treasury banking) 
F/mi/ output
3
> 1
H
Primary input
*1 *
y-i
Intermediate output
(7.9)
(7-io)
>-1
(7.10
j-i
(7.12)
(7.13)
a 3 = °  (7-14)
/ - I
Intermediate input
< , , * b £ x^ k (7.15)
y-i
With conditions
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3 3
The solution of the NDEA problem uses the DEA-Solver Pro Version 6  software84. 
The software employs a weighted network slacks based model (NSBM) assuming 
variable-retums to scale and non-orientation. The objective function for the DMU and 
constraints for divisional (profit centre) weights taken from Tone and Tsutsui (2007) 
are shown below.
p  -  mm
1 + ^
i - ±
3
3
(7.16)
Subject to
3
J > 0) =1 ,a>U) SO;(V/) (7.17)
(7.19)
M www.saitech-inc.com
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Where k = {1,2,.. 14} DMUs (banks), j  = {1,2,3} divisions (profit centres), m 
represent intermediate output or input, q — {1 ,2 } outputs (and inputs), co is the 
divisional weight, s(~* is the input slack and s(+) is the output slack.
Constraint (7.17) says that the divisional weights are all non-negative and sum to 
unity, which means that each division is separately accounted for. Constraint (7.18) 
indicates non-negative divisional intensities that sum to unity (variable returns to 
scale). Constraint (7.19) says that the sum of intermediate inputs from the respective 
divisions is the sum of intermediate outputs from the respective divisions.
The objective function for divisional efficiency is shown in equation (7.20) below. 
The solution of (7.20) for the optimal input and output slacks are substituted in (7.14) 
to yield the overall efficiency score which is a weighted sum of the divisional scores.
=
,0 ->
O) _L vO)
<! J
,u+) 'N
1 + i E , vw/ + vv"^ ?■* s  qO) . „0 >
(7.20)
Following Avikran (2009) we employ the non-orientated case because it can 
accommodate the simultaneous contracting of inputs and expansion of outputs. The 
use of the slacks based model instead of the conventional CCR or BCC models allow 
the analysis to capture the non-radial reduction in inputs and non-radial increase in 
outputs. The CCR and BCC models assume proportional expansion or contraction 
which may be unnecessarily restrictive in a banking setting where banks offer bundled 
services. For example interest charges may be low with the prospect or intention to 
charge higher service charges etc.
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7.4 Data
The 14 national banks used in the previous chapters were chosen for this exercise, the 
principal reason being the ease at which the data can be collected from their 
respective annual statements. Data from 2007 to 2009 were collected for this study. 
The 2007-09 data on the internal flows of funds were obtained from individual bank 
annual statements, with observations updated in the following year statements. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the primary input data consists of interest expenses 
and non-interest expenses. Primary output is net non-interest income and net interest 
income. Inter-divisional flows of funds were published by nine banks in 2009 in the 
sample. Table 2 indicates which banks provided detailed data.
Table 7.2 Data Avai ability
Bank Mnemonic Bank Name Data Available?
CCB China Construction Bank Y (2007-09)
ICBC Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Y (2007-09)
ABOC Agricultural Bank of China Y (2007-09)
BOC Bank of China Y (2007-09)
CMB China Merchant Bank Y (2007-09)
CMBC China Minsheng Bank Limited Y (2008-09)
GDB Guangdong Development Bank N
BoCom Bank of Communications N
CEB China Everbright Bank Y (2007-09)
Citic Citic Bank Y (2007-09)
Huaxia Huaxia Bank N
SDB Shengzhen Development Bank Y (2008-09)
SPDB Shanghai Pudong Development Bank N
IBC Industrial Bank of China N
The internal flow of funds data for the banks that do not provide a complete matrix of 
flows is estimated. Table 7.3 shows the primary input and output data for each bank in 
2009 in the sample. The full data set is shown in Appendix 7-1.
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Table 7.3 Primary inputs and outputs in 2009
Banks
Corporate Consumer Treasury
Primary Input Primary Output Primary Input Primary Output Primary Input PrimaryOutput
Interest
Expenses
Ope ratio 
nal 
Expenses
Net
Interest
income
Net Fee 
Income
Interest
Expenses
Opera tio 
nal 
Expenses
Net
Interest
income
Net Fee 
Income
Interest
Expenses
Opera tio 
nal 
Expenses
Net
Interest
income
CCB 50651 34538 124389 19884 60325 49854 62817 17882 13161 3420 22199
ICBC 59584 46233 132807 32486 85662 41551 70598 22499 13021 12123 42416
ABOC 34176 33119 102659 19983 71062 54447 57057 15657 9270 8257 21915
BOC 36731 34830 97918 25185 48227 35016 48672 13108 11170 7270 11196
CMB 11870 10982 21562 2831 7744 13835 6971 4780 3928 1098 11801
CMBC 13024 17374 19012 3037 3036 3617 4307 1291 3826 5449 8921
GDB 6339 4103 7414 978 1478 2418 2334 768 1950 440 21773
BoCom 21431 10678 49457 6041 12576 12761 11985 5,358 13994 2083 6430
CEB 10529 6306 15819 1671 2706 3162 3611 1444 3589 65 171
Citic 14522 8962 27686 2137 3245 5327 5347 1359 1532 574 1919
Huaxia 6886 2099 20% 1 573 1386 1237 1228 451 7378 225 -5350
SDB 5724 3898 8568 893 1257 2574 2838 368 1500 231 934
SPDB 16043 2668 22744 1236 3327 1572 5332 971 6374 286 6369
IBC 10614 6425 20041 1745 1806 3786 3948 1,371 7752 688 5879
For corporate banking business, the banks need to pay interest to the external 
corporate depositors. These depositors may or may not be the bank’s credit customers. 
For example, in 2007 ICBC had 2.72 million corporate customers, of which only 59 
thousand were credit customers. Banks provide services to non-credit customers 
(depositors) while charging fees for the services provided, such as remittance, foreign 
exchanges etc. Same as Corporate banking, Consumer banking needs to pay interest 
to individual depositors. As for Treasury banking, the primary interest input is the 
expenses to other depositors, like inter-bank borrowing.
As for data collection, all banks published the total interest expenses and interest 
expenses on (corporate/consumer) customer deposits. The residual amount is treated 
as the primary input for Treasury Banking. Considering banks have different 
definition for corporate deposits but almost identical understanding regarding what
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constitutes consumer deposits, to make the data more comparable, here I subtract 
interest expenses to consumer deposits from the total interest expenses to customer 
deposits as the primary input for Corporate banking. Some banks did not directly 
disclose the interest paid to corporate and consumer depositors. However, the daily or 
monthly average corporate/consumer deposits and respective average interest rate 
were given in the management discussion. I use these information to calculate the 
actual interest paid to depositors.
Apart from interest expenses, the other primary input is operating expense. All banks 
disclosed the total operating expenses but not all banks have divisional data. To 
construct the full data set for each division, the banks are firstly divided into two 
groups: SOCBs and JSCBs. From the available divisional data from the banks in 
Table 7.2 the average percentage of each group for three divisions is calculated. Table
7.4 shows an example for year 2009. The other two years data are shown in Appendix 
7-II.
Table 7.4 Average percentage of operating expenses for three divisions 2009
Available Banks Corporate Consumer Treasury Total
CCB 39% 57% 4% 100%
ICBC 45% 41% 12% 98%
SOCBs ABOC 35% 57% 9% 100%
BOC 43% 43% 9% 95%
Average ' • ' : y  m ,. 49% 8% 98%
CMB 41% 51% 4% 96%
CMBC 64% 13% 20% 97%
CEB 66% 33% 1% 100%JSCBs Citic 55% 33% 4% 91%
SDB 53% 35% 3% 91%
: - '.it *4." "•;':, V .*
Average " ...... 33% 6% 95%
The average percentage shares of operating expenses for three divisions are applied to 
all remaining SOCBs and JSCBs. The final divisional operating expense for each
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bank is calculated as the product of the total operational expenses and the percentage 
of each division.
The same method is used to simulate the data set for net fee income. For most of the 
banks, only corporate banking and consumer banking charge fees from clients. Some 
banks reported a small amount of fee income from Treasury banking. As the 
percentage is normally less than 8 % of total fee income from known data, I assume 
that only corporate and consumer divisions contribute fee income to simplify the 
process of data construction. Similarly, the average percentage of total net fee income 
for corporate banking for SOCBs and JSCBs groups is calculated, and an example is 
shown in Table 7.5. The calculated average % is applied to all other SOCBs and 
JSCBs to construct the net fee income for the corporate banking division. The fee 
income of Consumer division is the residual amount after subtracting the corporate 
net fee income from the total net fee income. Appendix 7-III shows all three years 
calculation.
Table 7.5 Average percentage of net fee income for three divisions 2009
Available Banks Corporate Consumer Total
CCB 41% 59% 100%
ICBC 59% 41% 100%
SOCBs ABOC 56% 44% 100%
BOC 55% 45% 100%
Awa&fcft * 53% 47% 100%
CMB 35% 65% 100%
CMBC 65% 35% 100%
CEB 53% 47% 100%JSCBs Citic 51% 49% 100%
SDB 76% 24% 100%
Average 56% 44% 100%
The greatest difficulty in data construction is to build inter-divisional flows of funds. 
As shown in Figure 7.1 of the previous section, inter-divisional interest expenses and
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interest incomes are chosen as the intermediate input and output. From the sample 
data, total six directions of divisional flow of funds are found over 2007 to 2009. 
Table 7.6 illustrates the divisional flow of funds and the flow direction of surplus 
funding.
Table 7.6 Divisional flow of funds
Scenario
Corporate: 
Funding 
Surplus (+) 
/ Deficit (-)
Consumer: 
Funding 
Surplus (+) 
/ Deficit (-)
Treasury: 
Funding 
Surplus 
(+)/ 
Deficit (-)
The direction of flow of surplus funding
Corporate
to
Consumer
Corporate
to
Treasury
Consumer
to
Corporate
Consumer
to
Treasury
Treasury
to
Corprate
Treasury
to
Consumer
1 - + - No No Yes Yes No No
2 + + - No Yes No Yes No No
3 - - + No No No No Yes Yes
4 + - - Yes Yes No No No No
5 + - + Yes No No No No Yes
6 - + + No No Yes No Yes No
The scenario 1 and 2 are the most common directions of surplus funds. In 2009, there 
are 4 banks under scenario 1 and 5 banks under scenario 2, represent 64% of the 
sampled banks. The other three scenarios are rare situations. Therefore this study 
focuses more on the scenario 1 and 2. The 5 large SOCBs benefit from a wider 
national branch network and therefore their individual consumer deposits are much 
larger than consumer lending giving rise to ‘sector churning*. The surplus funds act as 
a funding source for Corporate banking and/or Treasury banking. In the case of the 
JSCBs, due to limited network, the situation is reversed. For some banks, both 
Corporate and Consumer banking can be self-funded. In this scenario, Treasury 
banking will be the only user of the funding surplus.
Table 7.7 shows the self-fund status of Corporate, Consumer and Treasury divisions 
in 2009. It can clearly be seen that all SOCBs have surplus funding from Consumer 
Banking divisions. In the JSCBs group, the majority of banks are able to be
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self-funded for their consumer banking business. The only exceptions are the two 
banks SDB and IBC. The funding users in JSCB groups are mixed. In most of the 
cases, Treasury banking is the user for surplus funds. However it is very interesting to 
see that Treasury became the funding providers in three banks: CMBC, GDB and 
IBC.
Table 7.7 Divisional flow of funds 2009
Banks Scenario
Corporate: 
Funding Surplus 
(+ )/Deficit (-)
Consumer: 
Funding 
Surplus (+) / 
Deficit (-)
Treasury: 
Funding 
Surplus (+) 
/ Deficit (-)
CCB 1 - + -
ICBC 1 - + -
SOCBs ABOC 1 - + -
BOC 2 + + -
BoCom 2 + + -
CMB 1 - + -
CMBC 6 - + +
GDB 6 - + +
CEB 2 + + -
JSCBs Citic 2 + + -
Huaxia 2 + + -
SDB 4 + - -
SPDB 2 + + -
IBC 5 + - +
The inter-divisional interest incomes (from the perspective of the lending divisions) or 
interest expenses (from the borrowing division’s perspective) are calculated as the 
arithmetic product of the funding gap multiplied by inter-divisional funding rate. As 
the inter-divisional pricing rate is not available, I construct a simple inter-divisional 
pricing reference rate, taken into consideration the published PBOC base rate and the 
actual rate disclosed in the annual accounts of some of the banks. Table 7.8 shows the 
reference rate used for data simulation for 2007.
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Table 7.8 Reference rate 2007
Reference Rate
SOCBs
CCB
SOCBs
ICBC
JSCBs
CMBC
JSCBs
CITIC
JSCBs
SDB
JSCBs
Average
Overall
Average
Corporate loan interest 6.59% 6.78% 6.36% 6.57% 6.58%
Corporate Bill discounting 3.66% 3.97% 3.97% 3.82%
Consumer loan interest 6.05% 6.09% 6.09% 6.07%
Corporate deposit interest -  
Overall weighted rate 1.41% 1.48% 1.45%
- time deposit rate 2.42% 2.60% 3.20% 2.83% 2.99% 3.01% 2.81%
- Demand deposit rate 1% 0.99% 1% 1.02% 0.96% 0.99% 0.99%
Consumer deposit interest -  
Overall weighted rate 1.71% 1.96% 2.17% 1.98% 2.08% 1.96%
- time deposit rate 2.33% 2.58% 2.29% 2.79% 2.30% 2.46% 2.46%
- Demand deposit rate 0.79% 0.80% 0.80% 0.77% 0.78% 0.78% 0.79%
Deposit rate with PBOC 1.79%
Inter-bank placement rate 1.73%
The 1.79% deposit rate with the central bank PBOC is adopted as the inter-divisional 
benchmark rate for the corporate banking division for 2007.1 take into consideration 
the following factors: first, the surplus funding can only be placed either to inter-bank 
market or deposit with PBOC by Corporate banking. Second, the inter-divisional rate 
should cover the overall funding cost. As shown in Table 7.8, the average rate paid to 
corporate deposits is 1.45%. Therefore the slightly higher rate of 1.79% is used to 
consider the incentive for Corporate banking to lend to internal divisions.
The rate of 2.5% is used as the inter-divisional pricing for consumer banking. This is 
to cover the average consumer deposit rate of 1.96%. The higher funding cost in the 
consumer sector is caused by the Chinese consumer customer behaviour. Starved of 
the usual channels for saving available to the western consumer, the Chinese 
individual saver prefers time deposit to sight deposits to gain higher interest income. 
This is in turn is caused by the current underdeveloped investment market for 
individual investors in China. The current popular and available investment products
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and markets for individual investors are bank deposit, the stock market, and 
residential and commercial properties. The latter markets require larger amount of 
funds and educated market knowledge, which may not fit every individual’s needs. 
Furthermore, historically China is a country with a high deposit-income ratio (as 
mentioned in Chapter 4). Bank deposit is still the first choice of savings instrument 
for many Chinese families.
Although the funding cost in consumer banking is higher than in corporate banking, 
the inter-divisional pricing charged by consumer banking cannot be much higher than 
the inter-bank market rate. Otherwise it will drive off the internal funding users, either 
corporate Bank or Treasury, to seek external sources of cheaper funding. By setting 
2.5% as the internal pricing, Consumer banking still has about 55 base points as the 
internal gain, which can be viewed as an acceptable rate considering the risk free 
nature of internal lending.
As explained in the previous discussions, in most cases Treasury banking is a purely 
internal funding user, other than a funding provider. Therefore, the inter-divisional 
interest expenses paid by Treasury banking are the sum of inter-divisional incomes of 
Corporate and Consumer divisions.
The inter-divisional pricing rates for 2009 are 2.1% for Corporate and 2.31% for 
Consumer, while for 2008, the pricing rates are 2.84% and 2.79% for Corporate and 
Consumer divisions respectively. The detailed reference rate for 2008 and 2009 are 
shown in Appendix 7-IV.
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Table 7.9 shows the intermediate input and output including both actual and simulated 
data for 2009. The data for 2007 and 2008 are in Appendix 7-V.
Table 7.9 Intermediate input and output (actual and simulated data) 2009
Banks
Intermediate input / output 
Net Interest Expense (-) / Income (+) from/to Internal Divisions
Corporate Consumer Treasury
CCB -18525 84613 -65434
ICBC -35965 108571 -72606
ABOC -27152 96417 -69273
BOC 6742 52808 -59332
CMB -121 5224 -5141
CMBC -3038 490 2548
GDB -820 266 554
BoCom 1003 11419 -12422
CEB 4419 516 -4934
Citic 1337 3229 -3679
Huaxia 1456 611 -2067
SDB 1736 -664 -383
SPDB 168 583 -751
IBC 539 -1218 679
One thing to mention is that the amount of funding surplus and deficit of some banks 
is spot data in some years, not averaged period data covering full financial years. 
Therefore, the calculated interest income or expense may be not very accurate if the 
year-end figures were significantly different from the average amount. Ideally one 
should use the daily averaged funding surplus or deficit amount for data construction. 
Some banks did published daily average data but not all. Further study may continue 
to improve the data quality by using quarterly average data as the listed banks 
published financial reports on quarterly basis. Quarterly data would level out the 
fluctuation in 1 year period.
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Through simulation for intermediate input and output data, the primary output of net 
interest income for the three divisions can be constructed. The method for the 
calculation for primary net interest income is given as;
Net interest income = external interest income -  external interest expense (i.e. primary 
input interest expenses) +/- inter-divisional interest income/ expense (i.e. intermediate 
input/output)
Here the external interest income is the interest income earned from corporate loans 
including commercial bill discounting for Corporate banking, while the interest 
income from consumer loans, which are largely from mortgage business, for 
Consumer banking. As for Treasury banking, the external interest income is the 
difference between gross interest income and interest income from corporate and 
consumer loans.
7.5 Results
This section presents the results of the network DEA (NDEA). One finding is that the 
mean of network DEA result is lower than the black box DEA results. The full results 
are shown in Appendix 7-VI. Table 7.10 shows the results in 2009 as an illustration. 
For purposes of comparison, the results from a standard black box DEA is included in 
column 3. The black box DEA is the BCC model, VRS with input orientation85. The 
black box DEA indicates 7 efficient banks out of the sample of 14, of which 6  remain 
on the efficient frontier in the NDEA exercise. Seven banks are measured as efficient 
in the NDEA exercise. China Everbright Bank (CEB) has moved into the efficient set,
15 There were only marginal differences in the output orientation case.
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while Huaxia Bank has moved into the inefficient set. However, in the main the 
NDEA exercise has not largely altered the dichotomous set of efficient and inefficient 
banks. What the exercise has revealed is the principal source of inefficiency for the 
inefficient banks.
Table 7.10 Profit Efficiency of Chinese Banks 2009: Network DEA
B
i1
W1NDEA Division 1 Division 2 Division 3
Bank Rank Score \ . Rank Score* Corporate Consumer Treasury
CCB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ICBC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ABOC 9 0.942554 8(T) 0.8585 1 0.7348 0.8408
BOC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CMB 8 0.999683 9(1) 0.7344 0.8423 1 0.361
CMBC 13 0.794665 14(1) 0.5079 0.5749 0.8192 0.1297
GDB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BoCom 11 0.879032 11 0.7135 1 1 0.1405
CEB 10 0.924757 l(T) 1 1 1 1
Citic 14 0.719277 10 (t) 0.7294 0.6086 0.8126 0.767
Huaxia 1 1 12(1) 0.6677 1 1 0.0032
SDB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SPDB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IBC 12 0.7964 13(1) 0.6603 0.8527 1 0.1282
Mean 0.932598 0.847979 0.919893 0.954757 0.669314
Std Dev 0.097038 0.173273 0.14952 0.09177 0.412014
•Weighted arithmetic mean of Divisional Scores. Equal weight (33.33%) is given to three divisions in 
this study.
The exercise has revealed that the ranking of the banks performance from the standard 
DEA against the NDEA has changed markedly. The Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient is 0.6992 (p > .0054). This means that by and large the benchmark banks 
in the DEA exercise retain their position on the frontier under the NDEA but the 
position of the inefficient banks has changed.
In the case of Huaxia Bank, the relative score has moved its position from 1st in the 
DEA exercise to 12th in the NDEA exercise. The root course of the inefficiency for 
Huaxia is the Treasury banking centre indicating the weakest link of the profit 
generation process. A possible reason for this can be found in the raw data presented
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in table 7.3. Huaxia bank is the only one among the sampled banks making loss in 
their treasury business. Compared with the reference bank CEB, the interest expense 
relating to earnings in the Treasury division is doubled than that of CEB. The 
inefficiency in China Minsheng Bank (CMBC) can be traced to all three profit centres 
in roughly equal parts. From Table 7.3 it can be seen that this bank makes a profit in 
all three divisions but underperforms relative its peers in each division.
From Table 7.10 it can be seen that Treasury operation is less performed than other 
two divisions. The manager can focus on the Treasury operation to isolate the extent 
of the inefficiency by examining the projections (or slack analysis) and the 
benchmarks afforded by the peer group. The projections show how much the inputs 
need to contract or outputs need to improve to reach efficiency. The benchmark peer 
group alerts the manager as to which banks she can emulate to improve efficiency. 
Table 7.11 shows the results for Treasury operations in 2009.
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Table 7.11 Projections for Treasury banking profit centre 2009
BaniH
■ *.......-
Divisional
^•Score*
(Input) Interest expenses (Input) Operational Expenses (Output) Net Interest Income Peer group 
(weight)Data Projection Change(%) Data Projection Change(%) Data Projection Change(%)
CCB 1 13161 13161 0 3420 3420 0 22199 22199 0 CCB(l)
ICBC 1 13021 13021 0 12123 12123 0 42416 42416 0 ICBC(l)
ABOC 0.8408 9270 9270 0 8257 7940.7162 -3.83 21915 25565.754 16.66
ICBC(0.272)
ABOC(0.536)
CMB(0.191)
BOC 1 11170 11170 0 7270 7270 0 11196 11196 0 BOC(l)
CMB 0.361 3928 2830.7081 -27.94 1098 673.6959 -38.64 11801 21806.859 84.79 CCB(0.079)
CMBC 0.1297 3826 2056.4423 -46.25 5449 551.8906 -89.87 8921 21971.896 146.29 ICBC(O.Ol)
GDB 1 1950 1950 0 439.56 439.56 0 21773.427 21773.427 0 GDB(l)
BoCom 0.1405 13994 3920.5159 -71.98 2083.44 1323.5727 -36.47 6430.185 20949.563 225.8 CCB(0.108)
CEB 1 3589 3589 0 65 65 0 171 171 0 CEB(l)
Citic 0.767 1532 1532 0 574 416.1727 -27.5 1919 2157.9827 12.45
GDB(0.034)
Citic(0.519)
SDB(0.447)
Huaxia 0.0032 7378 6631.719 -10.11 224.94 222.7881 -0.96 0.42416* 126.3997 29700
CCB(0.001)
CEB(0.038)
Huaxia(0.858)
SDB 1 1500 1500 0 231 231 0 934 934 0 SDB(l)
SPDB 1 6374 6374 0 285.9 285.9 0 6369.334 6369.334 0 SPDB(l)
IBC 0.1282 7752 2066.2032 -73.35 688.44 470.4526 -31.66 5878.9489 21777.838 270.44 CCB(0.01)GDB(0.99)
Average 0.7499 7031.7857 5648.042 3014.9486 2530.9821 11566.023 15672.504
St Dev 0.3201 4502.5824 4337.8866 3811.5226 3804.6147 11892.796 12476.977
* Negative numbers in DEA are converted into small positive numbers.
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It can be seen that Huaxia bank is the worst performer in Treasury operations. An 
examination of the projections results shows that the problem is not one of inputs but 
one of outputs. Once again, the managers of Huaxia bank need to make great effort to 
achieve at least RMB126 million of net interest income in their Treasury business. 
One possible reason for Huaxia to make loss in the Treasury business might be the 
large amount of interest payment (the initial input). Compare with its peer CEB, 
Huaxia bank reported RMB7,378 million interest payment (vs. RMB3,589 million of 
CEB) in 2009. To further investigate this issue, I examined the financial reports and 
found out that Huaxia bank booked RMB5,721 million interest expenses on REPO 
operations. As a reference, the total interest expenses paid to customer deposits were 
only RMB8,282 million. Similar to Huaxia bank, the peer CEB spent RMB 10,528 
million on customer deposit interests, but only paid RMB 136 million payment on 
REPO operations. The managers of Huaxia may re-consider the scope of their REPO 
business in the future to improve Treasury efficiency.
A test for the veracity of the NDEA results can be obtained by separating the efficient 
from the inefficient banks as indicated by the standard DEA and network DEA to 
evaluate which separating indicator is superior in terms of identifying the set of 
inefficient banks. The network DEA exercise was conducted across the 14 for all 
three years of available data 2007-2009. This produces a meta-frontier of efficiency 
scores using the network framework. Similar exercise was conducted using the 
standard DEA. The results of both are presented in Table 7.12 below. The column 
labelled NDEA is the overall score of the network DEA calculated as a harmonic 
mean of the three divisions whereas WNDEA is the score calculated as the weighted 
arithmetic mean. For purposes of comparison with the black box DEA (DEA) the
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weighted arithmetic mean is reported in Table 7.10 and in the Appendix 7-VI. The 
overall score (NDEA) is reported here in Table 7.12.
The results confirm the findings of the individual year exercises. The summary 
statistics show that the measure of average efficiency in the network DEA is lower 
than in black box DEA and the dispersion are higher. As with the individual years, the 
main area of inefficiency is concentrated in Treasury operations.
The question that is investigated is, which of the two efficiency scores are better at 
identifying the set of efficient banks? One way of testing for this is to conduct a 
profiling of the inefficient and efficient banks according to the efficiency score from 
the network DEA results compared with the black box DEA results and test for some 
correspondence with accounting measures of financial performance such as ROA or 
cost-income ratio (Cl).
Table 7.13 shows the sample means and standard deviations of the return on assets 
(ROA) and cost-income ratio (Cl) for the efficient and inefficient banks for the full 
sample period 2007-2009. The null hypothesis is that those banks identified in the 
efficient set will not have a higher ROA and a lower Cl than those identified in the 
inefficient set. 1 conduct a conventional difference in means, ‘t’ test and since 
normality cannot be guaranteed, also a non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney). While 
the results are not unambiguous it can be seen from the results of Table 7.13 that the 
null can be rejected at conventional levels of significance in the case of the NDEA 
being used as a filter to profile the banks at least three out of four cases, but in the 
case of the DEA results the null is rejected only one out of four cases.
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Table 7.12 Meta-Frontier DEA and network DEA 2007-2009
No. Bank-year DEA NDEA WNDEA Corporate Consumer Treasury
DMU Score Score Score Score Score Score
1 CCB 07 1.000 0.846 0.864 1.000 1.000 0.590
2 ICBC 07 0.985 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
3 ABOC 07 0.989 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
4 BOC 07 0.963 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
5 CMB 07 1.000 0.459 0.596 0.532 1.000 0.255
6 CMBC 07 0.675 0.215 0.423 0.480 0.681 0.109
7 GDB 07 0.834 0.010 0.667 1.000 0.997 0.003
8 BoCom 07 0.823 0.340 0.575 0.966 0.662 0.098
9 CEB 07 0.726 0.614 0.690 0.436 0.632 1.000
10 Citic 07 0.743 0.206 0.438 0.518 0.698 0.098
11 Huaxia 07 0.787 0.007 0.309 0.421 0.504 0.003
12 SDB 07 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
13 SPDB 07 0.687 0.263 0.328 0.214 0.518 0.252
14 IBC 07 0.602 0.183 0.565 0.637 1.000 0.059
15 CCB 08 1.000 0.887 0.900 1.000 0.701 1.000
16 ICBC 08 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
17 ABOC 08 0.825 0.877 0.886 1.000 0.658 1.000
18 BOC 08 0.921 0.730 0.727 0.973 0.728 0.482
19 CMB 08 0.900 0.525 0.529 0.584 0.610 0.394
20 CMBC 08 0.541 0.284 0.382 0.377 0.665 0.104
21 GDB 08 1.000 0.710 0.740 0.629 0.591 1.000
22 BoCom 08 0.779 0.356 0.540 0.886 0.650 0.084
23 CEB 08 0.679 0.498 0.502 0.542 0.554 0.411
24 Citic 08 0.653 0.165 0.413 0.561 0.602 0.075
25 Huaxia 08 0.766 0.008 0.667 1.000 1.000 0.002
26 SDB 08 0.665 0.153 0.428 0.691 0.525 0.067
27 SPDB 08 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
28 IBC 08 0.669 0.348 0.567 0.581 1.000 0.119
29 CCB 09 0.969 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
30 ICBC 09 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
31 ABOC 09 0.875 0.689 0.714 1.000 0.660 0.483
32 BOC 09 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
33 CMB 09 0.885 0.461 0.504 0.636 0.560 0.314
34 CMBC 09 0.704 0.340 0.430 0.472 0.674 0.144
35 GDB 09 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
36 BoCom 09 0.869 0.393 0.698 1.000 1.000 0.093
37 CEB 09 0.835 0.126 0.499 0.689 0.757 0.052
38 Citic 09 0.699 0.591 0.605 0.523 0.606 0.687
39 Huaxia 09 0.835 0.009 0.667 1.000 1.000 0.002
40 SDB 09 1.000 0.982 0.982 0.947 1.000 1.000
41 SPDB 09 1.000 0.856 0.877 1.000 1.000 0.629
42 IBC 09 0.745 0.336 0.516 0.638 0.773 0.138
mean 0.848 0.559 0.696 0.784 0.810 0.494
st. dev 0.139 0.354 0.230 0.243 0.191 0.417
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Table 7.13 Financial Ratio profiling Chinese Banks 2007-2009
Statistic Return on Assets (ROA) % Cost-income ratio (Cl) 
%
Full sample Mean 0.934 38.53
Standard Deviation 0.279 4.79
NDEA Efficient set Mean 1.016 36.33
Standard Deviation 0 . 2 2 2 5.13
NDEA Inefficient set 
Mean
0.908 39.21
Standard Deviation 0.292 4.54
Difference in means ‘t* 1.90(p> t =.064)* -2.98 (p> t =.005)**
Wilcoxon rank sum ‘z’ -1.24 (p> | z | = .214) 1.95 (p> z =.051)*
DEA Efficient set Mean 1.015 37.47
Standard Deviation 0.271 5.14
DEA Inefficient set Mean 0.898 38.90
Standard Deviation 0.283 4.66
Difference in means‘t’ 1.88 (p> t =.067)* 1.43 (p> t =.591)
Wilcoxon rank sum ‘z’ -1.31 (p> | z | = .193) 0.72 (p> z =.469)
significant at the 5% level o f significance; * significant at the 10%
A further exercise looks at the ranking obtained from the network DEA and the black 
box DEA against the accounting measures and the simple correlation. The null 
hypothesis is that the ranking produced by the network DEA will have no 
correspondence to the ranking of the banks in terms of ROA or Cl and similarly for 
the ranking produced by the DEA exercise. Similarly the null is that there is no 
relationship between the scores produced by either of the benchmarking exercises and 
accounting measures of performance. Table 7.14 shows the results.
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Table 7.14 Rank correlation tests
ROA Cost-income ratio
NDEA (correlation) 0.3682** 
p>  11 1 = .0164
-.3240** 
p > 11 1 = .0364
NDEA (Spearman’s rank) 0.3608** 
p > 11 1 = .0189
-.3695** 
p>  11 1 = .0194
DEA (correlation) 0.2670* 
p > 11 1 = .0874
-.1328
p > 11 1 =.4017
DEA (Spearman’s rank) 0.2516 
P > 1 1 1 = .1080
-.1054
p > 11 1 = .5067
** significant at the 5% level of significance; * significant at the 10%
Clearly the NDEA efficiency score outperforms the conventional DEA, although a 
larger sample of results may provide a more precise differentiation. The results of this 
exercise suggests that not only is the network framework valuable in terms of 
identifying the areas of inefficiency within the internal structure of the bank but also 
the resulting efficiency score is a better indicator of efficiency in terms of having a 
stronger correspondence with accounting measures of efficiency.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has applied a novel method of benchmarking to banking data. While 
network DEA is gaining credence and has seen a number of applications86, its use in
ftnbanking let alone Chinese banking has hitherto been scarce . The purpose of the 
chapter has been threefold. First, it aims to illustrate an interesting application of the 
network DEA framework to the internal profit centres of Chinese banking. Second, in 
applying the method to the data it aims to provide an insight into the internal 
efficiency of Chinese banks and provide information for the manager to allocate 
resources so as to reap the maximum benefits in terms of relative performance both
“  Recent applications include Hsieh and Lin (2010) to Hotels, Tsutsi and Tone (2009) to Electric 
utilities, Liu and Lu (2010) to R&D, Cook, Zhu, Bu and Yang (2010) to supply chain management.
*7 A recent e xception is Avkiran (2009) and Matthews (2010).
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internally and externally. Third, it has shown that the results from the network DEA 
exercise have a closer correspondence to accounting measures of performance, which 
adds to it validity.
The chapter reports success in all three of these three objectives. The illustration of 
network DEA to banking is a natural extension of the study of Chinese banks 
contained in Chapters 5 and 6 . Its application has revealed aspects of the internal 
workings of the system that lie hidden in the convention DEA method. From a 
managerial perspective, the method not only identifies the performance of the internal 
divisions relative to each other but also relative to its peer groups and benchmark 
units.
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Appendix 7-1 Network DEA: Primary inputs and outputs
Primary inputs and outputs in 2007
Banks
Corporate Consumer Treasury
Primary Input Primary Output Primary Input Primary Output Primary Input PrimaryOutput
Interest 
Expenses to 
External 
Depositors
Operational
Expenses
Net
Interest
income
Net Fee 
Income
Interest 
Expenses to 
External 
Depositors
Operational
Expenses
Net
Interest
income
Net Fee 
Income
Interest 
Expenses to 
External 
Depositors
Operational
Expenses
Net Interest 
income
CCB 39853 37787 109412 7471 39164 44799 52958 20344 13031 5015 29577
ICBC 52294 38431 115352 10778 64042 35479 62774 23400 16486 10670 46339
ABOC 28195 22685 84076 10788 49369 31803 47190 12207 8288 5418 26261
BOC 52324 31504 65617 15844 43869 29408 43330 8995 19956 10502 45059
CMB 8825 7727 18347 1621 4430 8193 8345 4666 4433 818 7210
CMBC 11327 6528 17271 855 1854 4815 3502 1,536 4308 447 1808
GDB 4053 3163 10387 410 1880 2333 4881 736 5175 216 -3946
BoCom 16563 8619 41324 2906 9628 9468 8614 4,189 9524 2127 4465
CEB 8471 4070 13797 509 1837 2276 2912 676 3025 30 1064
Citic 10739 5273 20882 826 1934 3558 3429 1258 2651 565 2322
Huaxia 6078 3415 14387 161 794 2576 1487 290 4758 227 -4038
SDB 4468 1026 7092 106 580 757 2122 190 3390 70 392
SPDB 9489 5407 20728 404 1977 3988 3044 726 2797 370 179
IBC 7366 4481 18328 543 624 3305 2923 975 12856 307 -2169
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Primary inputs and outputs in 2008
Banks
Corporate Consumer Treasury
Primary Input Primary Output Primary Input Primary Output Primary Input Primary < Output
Interest 
Expenses to 
External 
Depositors
Operational
Expenses
Net
Interest
income
Net Fee 
Income
Interest 
Expenses to 
External 
Depositors
Operational
Expenses
Net
Interest
income
Net Fee 
Income
Interest 
Expenses to 
External 
Depositors
Operational
Expenses
Net Interest 
income
CCB 55494 31180 126010 15350 61666 45984 58417 15286 11994 2429 40628
ICBC 70350 41650 125747 24907 89903 33043 87334 18953 16043 11462 49956
ABOC 37063 32798 106407 8667 74752 50644 51375 15131 9986 10820 36105
BOC 40991.38 31402 86750 22110 50719.07 29417 44681 10948 15102 8340 31194
CMB 13107 10300 24249 2747 6817 12080 6528 4,761 4825 1140 16104
CMBC 15951 15996 17581 2925 2477 3239 4661 975 6093 5373 8138
GDB 7286.545 3592 11955 880 1734.455 2286 2638 692 3335 457 22215
BoCom 24059 9611.2 48636.18 4153.39 13479 11293.16 9859.343 4683.61 11797 2402.8 7339.4739
CEB 11165 5108 17376 1251 2571 3138 3606 906 6401 55 1354
Citic 18003 6981 28931 1719 2509 5168 5302 1,289 3581 700 2274
Huaxia 9442.609 1885 22190 461 1314.391 1199 1937 362 8926 240 -6440
SDB 7162.315 3758 9686 653 1394.685 2331 2467 300 4985 205 901
SPDB 16214 2190 20389 1005 2821 1394 5188 790 4111 279 6999
IBC 11115 5691.95 16712.83 1469.44 1274 3622.15 6226.692 1154.56 11417 724.43 5779.4742
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Primary inputs and outputs in 2009
Banks
Corporate Consumer Treasury
Primary Input Primary Output Primary Input Primary Output Primary Input PrimaryOutput
Interest 
Expenses to 
External 
Depositors
Operational
Expenses
Net
Interest
income
Net Fee 
Income
Interest 
Expenses to 
External 
Depositors
Operational
Expenses
Net
Interest
income
Net Fee 
Income
Interest 
Expenses to 
External 
Depositors
Operational
Expenses
Net Interest 
income
CCB 50651 34538 124389 19884 60325 49854 62817 17882 13161 3420 22199
ICBC 59584 46233 132807 32486 85662 41551 70598 22499 13021 12123 42416
ABOC 34176 33119 102659 19983 71062 54447 57057 15657 9270 8257 21915
BOC 36731.13 34830 97918 25185 48227.26 35016 48672 13108 11170 7270 11196
CMB 11870 10982 21562 2831 7744 13835 6971 4,780 3928 1098 11801
CMBC 13024 17374 19012 3037 3036 3617 4307 1,291 3826 5449 8921
GDB 6339.102 4103 7414 978 1477.898 2418 2334 768 1950 440 21773
BoCom 21431 10677.63 49456.79 6041.47 12576 12761.07 11985.02 5357.53 13994 2083.44 6430.185
CEB 10529 6306 15819 1671 2706 3162 3611 1444 3589 65 171
Citic 14522 8962 27686 2137 3245 5327 5347 1,359 1532 574 1919
Huaxia 6885.722 2099 20961 573 1385.657 1237 1228 451 7378 225 -5350
SDB 5723.958 3898 8568 893 1257.042 2574 2838 368 1500 231 934
SPDB 16043.03 2668 22744 1236 3326.974 1572 5332 971 6374 286 6369
IBC 10614 6425.44 20040.86 1744.96 1806 3786.42 3948.191 1371.04 7752 688.44 5878.9489
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Appendix 7-II Average percentage of operating expenses for three divisions
Year 2007:
Availa ble Banks Corporate Consumer Treasury Total
SOCBs
CCB
ICBC
ABOC
BOC.......^
41% 49% 5% 95% 
44% 40% 12% 97% 
38% 53% 9% 100% 
37% 35% 12% 85%
m
JSCBs
CMB
CEB
Citic
46% 49% 5% 100% 
64% 36% 0% 100% 
54% 36% 6% 96%
' - 99%
Year 2008:
Availa ble Banks Corporate Consumer Treasury Total
CCB 38% 56% 3% 97%
ICBC 46% 36% 13% 94%
SOCBs ABOC 35% 54% 11%. 100%
BOC 44%
m a m
41% 12% 96%
97%
CMB 43% 51% 5% 99%
CMBC 63% 13% 21% 97%
JSCBs CEB 62% 38% 1%. 100%Citic 48% 36% 5% 88%
SDB 59% 37% 3% 88%
96%
Year 2009:
Available Banks Corporate Consumer Treasury Total
CCB 39%. 57% 4% 100%
ICBC 45%. 41%. 12%. 98%
SOCBs ABOC 35%. 57% 9% 100%
BOC 43%. 43% 9%. 95%
341% * 49% 00 98%
CMB 41% 51% 4% 96%
CMBC 64%. 13% 20% 97%
CEB 66%. 33% 1%. 100%JSCBs Citic 55% 33% 4% 91%
SDB 53%. 35% 3% 91%
iiS.6% ***. 95%
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Appendix 7-III Average percentage of net fee income for three divisions 
Year 2007:
Availa ble Banks Corporate Consumer Total
SOCBs
CCB
ICBC
ABOC
BOC
•VV s >  i ! „*Average*
24% 76% 100% 
31% 69% 100% 
47% 53% 100% 
58% 42% 100% 
40% 60% 1
JSCBs
CMB
CEB
Citic
25.17% 75% 100% 
42.79% 57% 100% 
39.71% 69% 96%
‘ * - 6 $ % ^ *  ido$fc
Year 2008:
Available Banks Corporate Consumer Total
SOCBs
ICBC
ABOC
0  ♦'S
40% 60% 100%
57% 43% 100%
36% 64% 100%
55% 45% 100%
ISS3F-: &%■; mm
JSCBs
CMB 35% 65% 100%
CMBC 66% 34% 100%
CEB 58% 42% 100%
Citic 46% 54% 100%
SDB 77% 23% 100%
Avmm, 56% 44% 100%
Year 2009:
Available Banks Corporate Consumer Total
SOCBs
CCB
ICBC
ABOC
BOC
41% 59% 100%
59% 41% 100%
56% 44% 100%
55% 45% 100%
53% 47%* 100%
35% 65% 100%
65% 35% 100%
53% 47% 100%
51% 49% 100%
76% 24% 100%
56% 44% 100%
JSCBs
CMB
CMBC
CEB
Citic
SDB
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Appendix 7-IV Reference rate and inter-divisional pricing rate
2008 SPDB IBC GDB Huaxia BoCom
Average
reference
rate
Inter-divisional 
pricing rate
Corporate 
deposit rate -  
weighted 
average
2.06% 2.37% 2.32% 2.51% 2.20% 2.29% 2.84%
Consumer 
deposit rate -  
weighted 
average
2.30% 1.95% 2.32% 2.18% 2.46% 2.24% 2.79%
2009 SPDB IBC GDB Huaxia BoCom
Average
reference
rate
Inter-divisional 
pricing rate
Corporate 
deposit rate -  
weighted 
average
1.56% 1.57% 1.62% 1.53% 1.49% 1.55% 2.10%
Consumer 
deposit rate — 
weighted 
average
1.82% 1.56% 1.78% 1.89% 1.74% 1.76% 2.31%
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Appendix 7-V Intermediate input and output
Year 2007:
Banks
Intermediate input / output 
Net Interest Expense (-) / Income (+) from/to Internal Divisions
Corporate Consumer Treasury
CCB -11096 57129 -45018
ICBC -28160 84742 -56582
ABOC -50697 63631 -12872
BOC -8084 51595 -42155
CMB -390 4294 -3904
CMBC 1604 280 -1884
GDB -1361 4509 -3148
BoCom 1966 9030 -10995
CEB 2785 1082 -3867
Citic 2078 1514 -3177
Huaxia 681 111 -792
SDB 1332 -365 -967
SPDB -20 122 -102
IBC 903 -1305 401
Year 2008:
Banks
Intermediate input / output 
Net Interest Expense (-) / Income (+) from/to Internal Divisions
Corporate Consumer Treasury
CCB -22347 76493 -52023
ICBC -56035 123456 -67421
ABOC -46332 81462 -35088
BOC -3394 53831 -49750
CMB 752 5862 -6616
CMBC -1162 -200 1362
GDB 1957 671 -2628
BoCom 2994 10255 -13250
CEB 5971 109 -6079
Citic 3942 1913 -5576
Huaxia 1534 599 -2133
SDB 2389 -1189 -83
SPDB -283 407 -124
IBC 591 -1782 1191
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Appendix 7-VI Profit Efficiency of Chinese Banks 
Black Box DEA vs. Network DEA
Year 2007
Black Box NDEA 1 Division 1 1 Division 2 1 Division 3 1
Bank Rank Score Rank Score* Corporate Consumer Treasury
CCB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ICBC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ABOC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BOC I 1 1 1 1 1 1
CMB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CMBC 13 0.81706 14 0.577 0.4013 0.8117 0.5178
GDB 12 0.872095 1 1 1 1 1
BoCom 1 1 10 0.8231 1 1 0.4694
CEB 11 0.880839 1 1 1 1 1
Citic 1 1 11 0.8068 0.6923 0.7282 1
Huaxia 10 0.906387 12 0.6678 1 0.0033
SDB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SPDB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IBC 14 0.751137 13 0.5913 0.5464 1 0.2275
Mean 0.944823 0.890429 0.902857 0.967136 0.801286
Std Dev 0.08417 0.165682 0.201296 0.085129 0.345454
•Weighted arithmetic mean of Divisional Scores. Equal weight (33.33%) is given to three divisions in 
this study.
Year 2008
Black Box NDEA 1 Division 1 | Division 2 1 Division 3
Bank Rank Score Rank Score* Corporate | Consumer | Treasury
CCB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ICBC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ABOC 9 0.901599 1 1 1 1 1
BOC 1 1 9 0.8063 1 1 0.4188
CMB 1 1 8 0.9068 1 1 0.7204
CMBC 14 0.702102 14 0.4173 0.4448 0.6895 0.1176
GDB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BoCom 10 0.824466 11 0.6157 0.9381 0.8039 0.1051
CEB 11 0.820177 1 1 1 1 1
Citic 13 0.707431 13 0.4587 0.6712 0.6212 0.0838
Huaxia 1 1 10 0.6678 1 1 0.0033
SDB 8 0.962282 1 1 1 1 1
SPDB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IBC 12 0.763563 12 0.5948 0.6608 1 0.1236
Mean 0.90583 0.8191 0.908207 0.936757 0.612329
Std Dev 0.117782 0.222371 0.179161 0.130785 0.437854
•Weighted arithmetic mean of Divisional Scores. Equal weight (33.33%) is given to three divisions in 
this study.
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Year 2009
Black Box NDEA Division 1 Division 2 Division 3
Bank Rank Score Rank Score* Corporate Consumer Treasury
CCB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ICBC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ABOC 9 0.942554 8(T) 0.8585 1 0.7348 0.8408
BOC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CMB 8 0.999683 9(1) 0.7344 0.8423 1 0.361
CMBC 13 0.794665 14(1) 0.5079 0.5749 0.8192 0.1297
GDB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BoCom 11 0.879032 11 0.7135 1 1 0.1405
CEB 10 0.924757 Kt) 1 1 1 1
Citic 14 0.719277 10 (t) 0.7294 0.6086 0.8126 0.767
Huaxia 1 1 12 0 ) 0.6677 1 1 0.0032
SDB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SPDB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
IBC 12 0.7964 13(1) 0.6603 0.8527 1 0.1282
Mean 0.932598 0.847979 0.919893 0.954757 0.669314
Std Dev 0.097038 0.173273 0.14952 0.09177 0.412014
•Weighted arithmetic mean of Divisional Scores. Equal weight (33.33%) is given to three divisions in 
this study.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
“The archer who misses the target turns to himself and not to another for the cause of 
his failure.” Confucius
“Eighty percent of results come from twenty percent of efforts” The Pareto Principle
This study began with the modest aim of extending my study of the efficiency of 
ICBC bank branches in China to that of banks in China as a whole. It soon became 
clear that there were two problems with this objective. First, a non-parametric based 
study of bank efficiency of any economy or banking system would be insufficient 
material for a PhD. Second, there was nothing that could be said in a fresh study of 
Chinese banking using Data Envelopment Analysis that has not already been said in 
almost 180 publications in Chinese economic journals on bank efficiency . The 
consensus of findings in the Chinese scholarly literature is that the SOCBs are less 
efficient than the JSCBs and the JSCBs are getting more efficient over time and 
increasing their market share at the expense of the state-owned sector.
Studies of Chinese bank productivity using the Malmquist method tend to support the 
findings of standard DEA. Mostly, average productivity growth by the JSCBs has 
been higher than average productivity growth in the SOCBs but technical innovation 
has been defined by the best of the big-4 with the smaller JSCBs catching-up through 
efficiency gains.
** Not to mention the armies of Chinese MSc dissertation students in the UK, USA, Australia and 
mainland Europe that repeat Chinese banking efficiency studies.
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This study confirms some of these findings but its main contribution is in three areas. 
First, it uses a bootstrap technology due to Simar and Wilson (2000a, 2000b) that 
provides bias-corrected estimates of efficiency and TFP productivity growth that has 
inferential capability. Previous studies are necessarily biased according to Simar and 
Wilson and they fail to provide standard error bands to the estimates, therefore there is 
no way that an estimate of inefficiency or productivity growth could be said to be 
statistically significant.
The second contribution is in the interpretation of the results. Second stage 
regressions are used to explain the bootstrap estimates of inefficiency and TFP growth 
in chapters 5 and 6. Furthermore the standard DEA method is supplanted with a 
network framework that opens out the working of the internal flow of funds of the 
bank to provide the manager a measure of internal efficiency.
Chapter 5 decomposed cost inefficiency into technical and allocative inefficiency. The 
interpretation given to these estimates is that technical inefficiency is Leibenstein’s 
X-inefficiency and allocative inefficiency is symptomatic of rent-seeking behaviour. 
This chapter is an extension of a paper published with my supervisor in the China 
Finance Review (2007) for a smaller sample of banks and smaller time frame that 
examined unconditional beta-convergence. In this study, I find that the average level 
of X-inefficiency is larger than rent-seeking inefficiency and there is no difference 
between the Big-4 and JSCBs in the levels of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking 
inefficiency. However, once NPLs are removed from the loan portfolio, it turns out 
that X-inefficiency is higher in the JSCBs and rent-seeking inefficiency is higher in
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the Big-4. This completely plausible as historically, the state-owned banks have the 
constraint of social and political obligation to maintain a higher level of staffing and 
branch network than the JSCBs.
The second stage modelling of both types of inefficiency revealed differences in the 
speed of decline of both types of inefficiency between the Big-4 and the JSCBs when 
loans were unadjusted. However, once NPLs were taken out of the scene, there was 
no difference between the two types of banks. The results suggest that over the period 
1997-2006 also showed that the speed of decline of X-inefficiency was twice that of 
rent-seeking inefficiency indicating the social problems and costs of shedding labour. 
The dynamic second-stage equations can also be interpreted as conditional 
beta-convergence which further separates this chapter from the published paper. The 
results also suggest that there may be a trade-off between X-inefficiency and 
rent-seeking inefficiency in the reduction of X-inefficiency as suggested by Crain and 
Zardkoohi (1980).
Chapter 6 applies the bootstrap technology to measuring TFP growth of the banks and 
its components, growth in technical efficiency and growth due to catch up. The 
sample covers the SOCBs, JSCBs and CCBs, which separates this chapter in terms of 
coverage and time period from a published paper with my supervisor in The Chinese 
Economy (2009). The contribution of this chapter is show that the CCBs are growing 
faster than the SOCBs and JSCBs by emulating best-practice and also to suggest that 
contrary to expectations there was no significant improvement in TFP growth of the 
banks in the run up to WTO. Second stage modelling of the bootstrap values revealed 
that efficiency gains were obtained through cost reduction and NPL divestment. These
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new results are used in a paper with my supervisor forthcoming in China Economic 
Review (in press).
Chapter 7 applies a novel technology that to my knowledge has yet to be used in 
Chinese banking. My interest in the application of the method of network-DEA was 
stimulated by a workshop attended during the 2008 Asia-Productivity Conference in 
Taipei, Taiwan. While Matthews (2010) examines the role of the risk management 
practice and organisational process as intermediate outputs and inputs in a serial 
network framework for Chinese banks, in chapter 7 I examine the efficiency of the 
income generating process in a parallel network process. The contribution of this 
chapter is to reveal the internal efficiency in the profit generating process between 
three cost centres, namely consumer, corporate and Treasury banking. Not only does 
the technology indicate to the manager the location of the relative inefficiency but by 
benchmarking against the best practice banks, she can learn how much inputs should 
be reduced to achieve full efficiency. This chapter also suggests that the efficiency 
scores obtained from the network DEA have a better association with accounting 
measures of performance such as return on assets and cost-income ratio.
Chinese banking is evolving at such a rapid pace that any study conducted using past 
data will be out of date before it is published. The studies conducted in this thesis are 
no exception. The global financial crisis, continuing reform of the regulatory process, 
competition from within and pressure from foreign banks provide a tension in the 
Chinese banking system that govern its dynamic path. The speed of reduction of 
inefficiency indicated in Chapter 5 suggests that allocative inefficiency 
(rent-seeking?) may have all but eradicated in Chinese banking. Technical
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(X-inefficiency) may also have diminished to manageable proportions. The process of 
catch-up between the inefficient banks and efficient banks will continue to narrow the 
gap between them and contribute to overall productivity growth. Chinese banks will 
learn from its foreign counterparts and in time possibly improve on it. The researcher 
will have a tough time in using her research to predict the path of Chinese banking.
The technology of investigation will also develop and new methods will come to the 
PhD student in the future which will reveal new insights into the past behaviour of 
Chinese banks and their managers. However, it is difficult to say these methods will 
be any better in foreseeing the future of Chinese banking than informed guesses by 
industry practitioners. As a practitioner of 14 years experience in frontline business 
generation and risk management I have been able to bring my experience to this study 
to ask the pertinent questions. As a PhD student, I return to the practice of banking 
armed with techniques and insights that not only give me a macro appreciation of the 
banking market in China but also the means to improve operational efficiency in my 
area of work.
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